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ABSTRACT
This dissertation contains an examination and test
of the conditions under which aggregates of individuals
sharing class and racial characteristics are found to ex
hibit distinctive patterns of political participation.
The argument is made that these objective

characteristics

lead to distinctive political activity chiefly through
the presence of an intervening variable, namely, an organi
zational factor.

In short, it is argued that the hierarchy

of organizations found in a community represent a prime
agent of that community's salient features of social dif
ferentiation, especially those of class and race.
An ecological perspective is employed in develop
ing the operationalization of these basic concepts.

Eleven

selected elections from the 1972, 1973, and 1974 Democratic
primaries in New Orleans are analyzed.

Measures of the

class, race, and political participation variables are de
rived from census materials and precinct data.

The class

and racial characteristics of areal units are refined into
a combined race/class index consisting of black, lower
white, and upper white dimensions.

Election data examined

here include voter registration, voter turn out, and votes
cast for various candidates.

There is no corresponding

data repository for the organizational variable.

Thus, a

large part of the dissertation is devoted to establishing
xiii

ABSTRACT, Continued
the hierarchy of political organizations in New Orleans.
Interview data is presented for nineteen political organi
zations found to be active in the recent New Orleans
elections.

Organizational leaders and candidates for office

were asked to rate these political organizations in terms
of their effectiveness in the elections.

Composite ratings

derived from this procedure are used to apply the reputed
effectiveness labels of the organizations themselves to
their corresponding areas of operation, thus converting
organizational effectiveness into an ecological variable as
well.
Descriptive summaries of the structural and com
positional characteristics of the nineteen political organi
zations are presented.

Contrary to expectations, there is

much more formal political organizational activity and a
higher reputation for organizational effectiveness among
black than white areas and among lower white than upper
white neighborhoods.

Cast within a typology of political

organizations, upper white organizations were said to ex
hibit normative compliance structures, while black and lower
white organizations were characterized as utilitarian com
pliance organizations.

Examination of registration levels

by the race/class designation and organizational effective
ness ratings of areal units generally indicates a positive
relationship between race/class and registration levels and
xiv

ABSTRACT, Continued
the absence of any relationship between organizational
effectiveness and registration levels.

Likewise, voter

turn out is highest in upper white areas in two of the years
considered and shows no significant difference by organiza
tional effectiveness levels.

However, in 1973, turn out in

black and lower white areas matches that found in the upper
white neighborhoods.

Analysis of votes cast in the elections

offers some strong support for the organizational thesis.
Voting cohesiveness

(the tendency to "bloc vote")

is found

to be greatest in black neighborhoods and to be fairly pro
nounced in upper white areas as well.

Such cohesiveness is

much more negligible in lower white areas.

Voting cohesive

ness is greater in higher rated organizational effectiveness
areas than in lower rated neighborhoods only occasionally—
mainly, it seems, when the candidates involved are politi
cally identifiable in either class or racial terminology.
A factor analysis of the basic variables confirms
these contentions.

Voter registration, voter turn out, and

candidate choice are shown to be independent indicators of
political participation.

Black and upper white organizations

emerge as distinct factors comprising both their respective
ecological characteristics and candidate choices.
pendent factor is shown for the lower white areas.

xv
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CHAPTER I
A SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH TO THE ANALYSIS
OF POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS
Introduction
In the minds of many professionals and laymen
alike, the study of political organizations and voting
behavior belongs in the realm of political science.
back in the contemporary era to Rice's

Dating

(1928) Quantitative

Methods in Politics, the investigation of electoral dynam
ics and trends has, in fact, been a mainstay of political
science research.
Gaudet's

However, since Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and

(1944) classic study of the impact of a presiden

tial campaign upon candidate choice in Erie County, a
goodly number of sociological works have dealt with the
social aspects of the electoral process.

It is now common

ly acknowledged that sociologists have made a contribution
to the understanding of electoral behavior, although the
extent of that contribution is often a matter of lively
debate.^
Nevertheless,

as if subliminally aware of to whom

the study of elections "really belongs," sociologists have
shied away in their analyses from factors too obviously po
litical in content.

While some of this bias may be

defensible on theoretical grounds, this informal division
of labor clouds the fact that many overtly political factors
have dimensions of legitimate theoretical interest to soci
ologists as well as political scientists.

To illustrate,

the composition, structure, and operation of political or
ganizations, an undeniable factor of some sort in most
elections, has often fallen into the "obviously political"
category.

However, analyses of such organizations would

seem to include questions of the following variety:

under

what domain and specific conditions do different types of
organizations emerge?

How are they formally organized?

What informal variations arise in day-to-day operations?
How do they attract and retain membership?
ces, intended or otherwise, do they entail?

What consequen
These are the

sorts of questions a sociologist would ask instinctively
about any group.

It is suggested that answers to these

and similar questions about the nature of political organ
izations merit extended sociological investigation.
The Sociological Context of Political Organizations
Sociological studies abound in the analysis of
various social characteristics of the voter in relation to
his party identification and candidate choice.

It has been

well established that party and candidate preferences tend
to vary in a number of settings by social class, race, re
ligious affiliation, ethnicity, and other distinguishable
social characteristics.

For example, in summarizing re

current themes reported in voting studies, Lipset

(1963:

234)

3
offers the following generalization:
. . . the most impressive single fact about political
party support is that in virtually every economically
developed country the lower-income groups vote mainly
for parties of the left, while higher-income groups
vote mainly for parties of the right.
Studies of socially mobile individuals further confirm
this contention.

The remarks of Parkin (1971: 49-51) are

representative:
As a rough general estimate, between about a quarter
and a third of those born into the manual working
class in modern Western countries will move to the
ranks of the middle class. . . . There is little
doubt that the overall tendency is for the upwardly
mobile to shift their political allegiances from
parties of the Left to parties of the Right.
Likewise,

in an assessment of the persistence of racial,

ethnic, and religious bloc voting,

Wolfinger (1965: 897)

concludes:
Ethnic politics constitute one of those features of
American life that are always said to be on the point
of disappearing, but that somehow endure. . . . From
the stump. . . politicians righteously deplore any
suggestion that their red-blooded American constituents
might be influenced by bloc-voting patterns; off the
stump they find it hard to discuss strategy in any
other terms.
These findings reiterate the basic premise of a
sociological approach to the study of electoral behavior,
namely, that the electorate may be correctly viewed as a
collection of social categories, groups, and organizations,
rather than simply a composite of individuals.

Carried a

step further, an entire corpus of sociological literature
has developed over the years concerning the role of "groups"
in disseminating,

legitimating, and interpreting information
2
for its members and sympathizers.
Many a politician has

learned from campaign experience that, while it is impossi
ble to approach and persuade each voter individually, a
personal touch can be indirectly effected through the medi
ating capacity of groups.

Therein lies the practical and

sociological wisdom of the candidate seen eating gumbo,
blintzes, kielbasa, pizza, and the like.
Given this bit of insight, one may be moved to pon
der the question of how such collectives of individuals
come to act in varying degrees of unison.

If, for a moment

a social category may be defined as an aggregate of persons
sharing some characteristics, and groups and organizations
are thought of as social categories in which recurrent in
teraction is increasingly structured, it can be easily
shown that concerted, unified action is by no means auto
matic.

Dealing first with social categories, it is quite

evident that not all characteristics shared with a number
of other persons result in joint behavioral effort.

The

lack of a "left-handed bloc vote" is a trivial yet true
example.

It is also true that, of characteristics which

are somehow deemed important, not all lead to identical
action.

The Italian, working class vote in the eastern

seaboard cities,

is solidly Democratic— except in New Haven

where it is staunchly Republican.
found among organizations as well.

Such variation may be
Since 1952, Democratic

presidential candidates have rarely won a plurality in
Deep South states

3

despite Democratic party registration

levels there exceeding ninety percent of the electorate.

5
These examples are by no means uncommon, and the
fact that one can conjure some explanation for these varia
tions does not negate the basic point.

Thus, the central

concern of this dissertation is to investigate the electoral
role of political organizations in a metropolitan setting
and, in doing so, to advance and test some explanation of
collective political action.

Without being very systematic

about it at this point, it is speculated that political
organizations play a key role in effecting:

(1) the spec

ification of which social characteristics come to be
considered a matter of political importance, and (2) the
conversion of otherwise dormant categories of individuals
sharing these characteristics into persons acting to a
significant degree in unison.
This dissertation, therefore, purports to test pro
positions regarding the organizational factor in defining
salient cleavages, especially along class and racial lines,
and in mobilizing these portions of the electorate into
political action.

The activity of political organizations

during recent local elections in the city of New Orleans
will be used as a relevant case in point.

With some mod

ifications to be specified as the argument unfolds, the
investigation essentially entails:

(1) elaborating the

distribution of salient features of social differentiation
in New Orleans, namely, those of class and race,

(2)

specifying the political organizational framework of the
city vis-a-vis these features of differentiation, and (3)

ascertaining the role of this political organizational
structure in inducing collective action along these lines
of differentiation in the electoral process.
The Electoral Context of Political Organizations
Rationales for the treatment of political organi
zations within an electoral context are both theoretical
and practical.

A prominent characteristic

of democratic

and quasi-democratic systems is that a large number of key
governmental and judicial figures are selected by popular
ballot.

Since such selection is subject to periodic re

newel, again by ballot, elections may be viewed as controll
ed, legitimized struggles for access to the apparatus of
government (Lipset, 1963: 230-233).

The formation and

persistence of political organizations has typically been
an integral part of this process.

The question of types

of political organizations aside, it has been generally
observed that no candidate or ideology has ever made much
headway in this system without some organizational base
(Barnes, 1966: 522).

The diminished chances of success

commonly ascribed to those candidates and platforms buck
ing established political organization are further evidence
of this theme.
Therefore, success in the electoral sphere is a
commonplace if not primary goal of political organizations.
The potential theoretical importance of this item lies in
the fact that many social scientists have followed the
lead of Weber and Michels in analyzing organizational

functions in terms of organizational goals.

This trend

has received further impetus and sanction in the Parsonian
scheme in which "goal orientation" is a central defining
characteristic of organizations

(Parsons, 1956: 64-67).

As shall be shown in the next chapter, there are some
problems with equating functions with goals.

Nonetheless,

at least one good reason for studying political organiza
tions within an electoral context is that these organizations
generally consider electoral activity and success to be their
raison d'etre.
The electoral context of organizations is important
in other respects as well.

Discussion of the role of po

litical organizations in a metropolitan setting is predicated
initially upon an assessment of the nature of political par
ties in the American political system.

In this regard,

American political parties are seldom "organized" in the
European political sense of the word.

To begin with, being

a Democrat or a Republican in the United States is largely
a matter of self-definition, party membership requiring
only a minimum of active support and participation.

The

structure of both parties, therefore, consists of full
time politicians, professional staff, a small number of
party activists, and an immense pool of formally inert
party identifiers

(Dye and Zeigler, 1972: 199-200).

This

description is likewise appropriate in the one-party South
where factional politics prevails.

Here, the party struc

ture tends to consist of emergent factions, usually

temporary coalitions of professionals, activists, and
formally inactive identifiers hinging upon the personality
and force of individual political leaders

(Key, 1949:

302-305) .
This situation implies that the influence and
sphere of operation of political organizations extend far
beyond their formal and immediate membership.

The best

test of the operating domains of such organizations would,
therefore, be found in an actual election, or preferably,
a series of elections.

Consequently, eleven recent elec

tions in New Orleans have been selected to provide a test
of the relationship between political organizations and
patterns of political action.
Footnotes
■*Tor an illustration of the debate, see Key and
Munger (1959) and Sartori (1969).
Key and Munger argue
that most sociological studies of the vote exhibit a form
of "social determinism" which essentially takes the
politics out of the study of political behavior.
Sartori
is in agreement with this point and, of particular rele
vance here, suggests party organization as an intervening
variable in the relationship between social class and
political as a theoretical remedy.
2

Pertinent examples include Festinger (1959), Homans
(1951, 1961), Sherif and Sherif (1953), Katz and Lazarsfeld
(1955), Blau (1964), and Laumann (1973).
3
Deep South states are here defined as Alabama,
Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and North and
South Carolina.

CHAPTER II
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to elaborate some
of the thoughts and efforts of others who have considered
issues related to the context and operation of political
organizations.
reasons.

This is considered essential for the usual

First, a goodly number of capable scholars have

previously tackled the basic or similar problems and have
advanced a wide range of theoretical observations and em
pirical findings.

Their insights can be of assistance in

choosing those approaches and perspectives with greater
potential utility, weeding out by experience those most
likely to prove untenable or irrelevant.

Secondly, such

review aids in delimiting the focus of the study by iden
tifying a coherent series of propositions to be investi
gated.
In this spirit, there are several topic areas which
receive close inspection in this chapter.

These topics

suggest a central theme of the dissertation, namely, that
the organizational structure of a community may be thought
of as a prime agent of the community's salient lines of
social differentiation, especially those of class and race.
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Social Differentiation, Political Action,
and the Organizational Factor
Social Class

and Political Action. If any

one

independent variable

has become associated with the socio

logical perspective,

it is probably,that of social

class.

One can scarcely find any research done recently within the
discipline, or indeed within the social sciences or the
polling industry, which does not routinely include social
class in an associative, predictive, or explanatory role.
Apparently, many social scientists and laymen .alike think
that some relevant class-type phenomenon does in fact exist.
The historical and intellectual impetus for this
interest may be traced to the works of Karl Marx, whose
efforts roughly a century ago mark sociology's first com
prehensive treatment of class.

It is not totally an

exaggeration to assert, as does Zeitlin

(196 8), that the

principal lines of investigation in the general area of
social stratification since that time constitute an "on
going debate with Marx's ghost."

Nevertheless, Marx would

explicitly reject as relevant to class analysis much of
what modern sociologists do in the name of social strati
fication.

For Marx, class constitutes a dynamic concept

rooted in a dialectical materialistic theory of social
change.

In this scheme, classes are depicted as the po

tential vehicles of conflict capable of inducing real
change.

Marx did not assume that a group identity was re

quired for the existence of classes

(Klasse an sich) .
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However, a class was not conscious of itself (Klasse fiir
sich)

until there was organization for the purpose of

political, that is, class, action.
It is apparent from this that few American socio
logists are truly Marxists in their approach to social
class.

Class is now most often treated as a static con

cept in a theory of social stratification.

The referents

in this scheme are categories of individuals differentiated
by varying income, educational, or occupational levels and
their corresponding life-styles.

Consider as a plausible

illustration the tone of the following comments by Berger
(1963: 80-81) :
A sociologist worth his salt, if given two basic
indices of class such as income and occupation, can
make a long list of predictions about an individual
. . . [the sociologist] will be able to make in
telligent guesses about the part of town in which
the individual lives. . . give a general descrip
tion of the interior decorating. . . predict the
voluntary associations [he] has joined, guess [his]
political affiliation. . . predict the number of
children sired and also [predict] whether the indi
vidual has sexual relations with the lights turned
on or off.l
The sheer bulk of empirical data linking social
class with behavioral correlates seems to have lulled many
sociologists and social scientists into accepting the po
sition that class characteristics sui generis lead to class
action.

In the absence of a further rationale, the position

is untenable for two simple reasons.

One, not all class

conditions lead to political action.

Secondly, identical

class conditions do not necessarily lead to identical po
litical actions.

These two factors strongly suggest that
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objective class conditions, by themselves, lack the
mechanisms conducive to political action.

In short, class

conditions do not constitute a sufficient condition for the
emergence of class action.
The focal point of this section then is this:

in

the absence of dialectical materialistic themes, how may
one account for the class consciousness component of social
class and, by extension, class action.

The suggestion is

not that Marx holds the only answer to this question.
Rather, it is being argued that if the class terminology
is to be theoretically useful, Marx's explanatory mechanisms must be replaced when his basic tenets are set aside.

2

Of course, class consciousness and political organ
ization, essential properties of Marx's concept of class,
have received attention from contemporary sociologists.
For instance, the interest of political sociologists in po
litical action corresponds quite closely to that of Marx.
However, the manner in which class has typically been used
as an independent variable in this regard is more congruent
with the stratification than with the change approach of
class.

Likewise, the extensive attention devoted to the

study of the organizational factor has taken place mainly
I

under the guise of organizational analysis rather than with
in the rubric of class analysis.
Some sociologists have preferred to rephrase the
issue of social class and class consciousness in terms of
the

concepts of social status and status self-perception.

3
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Though some have used the terms of social class and social
4

status synonymously,
tical.

the connotations are clearly not iden

By way of definition, social status indicates the

acknowledgement of a stratification hierarchy comprising a
gradient of prestige ranks.

Status self-perception

(or

status awareness), then, refers to the capacity or inclina
tion of the individual to locate himself within that hier
archy.

This is quite a different matter than that of social

class and class consciousness.

As has been shown, social

class connotes the existence or imminent emergence of a
conscious class ideology.

Through class consciousness,

perception of the stratification system is reduced to the
simple dichotomy of "we," one's class, versus "they," the
class enemies

(Sartori, 1969).

Marx dispels any notion

that he might consider the two approaches synonymous in
observing that only the "vulgar mind" treats "differences
in the size of purses" as class differences

(Dahrendorf,

1959: 11).
If one is properly convinced that status self
perception and class consciousness refer indeed to empiri
cally independent phenomena, questions arise concerning the
significance this situation holds for a theory of class
action.

It can be shown that indices used to measure ob

jective class conditions, such as levels of occupation and
income or variations in life-styles, correlate highly with
indicators of status self-perception.

Thus, the transition

from objective class conditions to some form of status
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self-perception does not appear to be problematic.

Rather,

the theoretical crunch hinges instead upon the transition
from status self-perception to some form of political
action.

While one can see quite easily how class conscious

ness may lead to political action, it is by no means clear
that status self-perception is capable of inducing such
action as well.
In dealing with this latter problem, it has been a
fairly common practice among sociologists to assume that
primary relationships among individuals sharing objective
class characteristics, rather than the objective class
conditions themselves, lead to political action.

The use

of the primary interaction variable here does have some
advantage.

Simply stated, it

stipulates

that personal in

teraction networks accrue high degrees of conformity and
solidarity among their respective members.

To the extent

that these sorts of relationships can be shown to appear
among those sharing given objective class characteristics,
this strategy stands as a theoretically plausible alterna
tive.
However, this formulation falls somewhat short of
expectations on two counts.

First, the strategy would still

be insufficient in explaining why identical class conditions
often lead to different kinds of action.

In this respect,

the strategy shows little improvement in correcting problems
incurred by simply assuring that class characteristics in
and of themselves lead to political action.

Secondly,

FIGURE 1
DIAGRAM OF SOCIAL CLASS AS A CONCEPT IN A THEORY OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION
AND AS A CONCEPT IN A THEORY OF SOCIAL CHANGE
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primary interaction networks are, by implication if not
definition, relatively small in size and limited to indi
viduals who are well known to each other.

Since many of

the types of political action in which sociologists are
interested involve large categories of individuals, many of
whom are unknown to each other, one may realistically won
der about the adequacy of informal, personal networks as
the key intervening variable.
The distinctions between social status and social
class developed in this section are depicted in figure 1.
Much of the current confusion regarding the concept of
class stems from the fact that it has become what Rosenberg
(1965: 17) has termed a "global concept," that is, the
concept as commonly used by sociologists has more than one
referent.

Put within the context of the introductory re

marks, the term social status refers more nearly to what
is intended by the stratification approach to class, while
the term social class intimates the change approach to
class.

Furthermore, while the sharing of similar life

styles and status self-perceptions may lead to primary in
teraction networks, this development is not theoretically
useful in accounting for the occurrence of political action.
Rather, the study of political action requires the study
of class organizations as a device for generating and
mobilizing class consciousness.
Race and Political Action.

The discussion in this

section has thus far dealt with social class as the dimension
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of social differentiation.
totally unintentional.

This concentration has not been

As suggested earlier, the concept

of social class has been accorded exhaustive, quasisystematic attention in sociological thought.

Of course,

numerous other features of social differentiation have re
ceived extensive consideration as well.

Dominant among

them is the analytical concern focused upon race.
If it can be said that empirical instances of class
consciousness, that is, the polarization of individuals in
to the "we" vs. "they" dichotomy, occur in rather weakened
dosages in this country, such is certainly not the case
with the racial variable.

Perceptions of racial differ

ences and the ensuing constraints placed upon interactional
patterns have figured prominently in the history and culture
of the U.S.

The tone and tenor of these patterns may be

gleaned from sociological writings earlier this century
which characterized the system of black-white relationships
as being "if not a caste, at least castelike," to use
Warner's

(1936: 234) phrase.

was advanced by Myrdal

A similar characterization

(1944: 674-675).

Key (1949: 5) was

likewise led to assert in the introduction to his classic
work that "whatever phase of Southern politics one seeks
to understand, sooner or later the trail of inquiry leads
to the Negro" and his place in society.^
Interest in the relationship between race and
stratification, or more specifically, race as a dimension
of stratification, has been extended since the early

statements of Warner and Myrdal through the "debate" between
Cox and Berreman concerning the applicability of the term
caste to stratification in contemporary America.

Cox

(1945: 362-368) has argued that the American system of stra
tification varies significantly from the caste prototype
in a number of basic respects.
among these differences.

Two factors are primary

First, the concept of caste has

generally implied the existence of heredity groups consti
tuting a hierarchy of occupational specialties.

Further,

the systematized inequality engendered by distinctions
among castes has been portrayed as normatively acceptable
and legitimated by religious authority and tradition.
In contrast, blacks in the U.S. have theoretically
been expected to embrace the work/achievement ethic as are
whites, although structural barriers may in fact have pro
hibited them from fulfilling this expectation.

Of equal

or even greater importance, the constitutionality and
legitimacy of blatantly discriminatory aspects of the system
have been shown to stand in serious question.

In fact, it

is this discrepancy between the ideal and interactional
norms which Cox identifies as the distinguishing feature
of the American stratification system on the criterion of
race.
Berreman
Berreman,

(1960: 120-127) disagrees.

According to

it is highly unlikely that persons near the

bottom of any stratification system fully accept the "ra
tionales" intended to justify their comparatively meager
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lots.

Conversely, those occupying favored positions can

be expected to employ and perpetuate an elaborate series
of values and sanctions conducive to the maintenance of
their advantage.

Given these considerations and the

relative rigidity of the ascribed racial proscriptions,
the American "class" system is argued to vary little from
the Indian "caste" system in several important respects.
Whichever viewpoint is more valid, the racial issue
clearly continues to register highly upon any list of
attributes by which individuals in this country are likely
to be differentiated.

Further, the mere suggestion of the

term caste arouses considerable interest given the develop
ing context of this study.

The term projects the image of

a stratification system containing an independent racial
dimension in addition to the one based upon class character
istics.

Likewise, the usage serves as a heuristic device

leading one to entertain the notion that many of the same
sorts of mechanisms operating in the conversion of objective
class characteristics to class action may be indigenous to
the social reification of racial attributes as well.
Political Action and the Organizational Factor.
From the preceding discussion, it seems clear that some
respecification is necessary in order to meaningfully ex
press the relationship between objective characteristics
of social differentiation and ensuing political action.
Sartori

(1969: 84-86) has argued strongly for the consid

eration of an organizational factor in just such a
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respecification.
(1963: 289-290)

In a critical assessment of Alford's
conclusion that England represents a

relatively "pure" case of class voting, Sartori notes that
almost one-half of the Conservative Party electoral support
has traditionally come from the working class.

This

support constitutes the deviation of fully one-third of the
working class vote.

Other .national studies show further

apparently bewildering variations in the class vote.

How

ever, consistency of sorts is to be found by the introduc
tion and interpretation of an intervening organizational
variable.

For example, class voting in the English case

is correlated with union membership; that is, union members
vote overwhelmingly for the Labour Party, while nonunion
members split their vote almost evenly between the Conser
vative and Labour parties.

Further comparative data

strongly suggest that!' the direction of the vote is often
a product of the relationship between the organizational
variable

(for example, labor union membership) and the

larger socio-political context
form).

(such as local governmental

Thus, through their organizational identifications

and ties, members in one specific setting may vote to the
"left," while their associational counterparts in another
setting may vote to the "right."
Summarizing these data, Sartori

(1969: 84) asserts:

To put it bluntly, it is not the "objective" class
[class conditions] that creates the party, but the
party that creates the "subjective" class [class
consciousness] . . . . The party
is not the conse
quence of the class.
Rather, and before, it is the
class that receives its identity from the party.

21
Hence class behavior presupposes a party that not
only feeds, incessantly, the "class image," but
also a party that provides the structural cement
of "class reality."
The model implicit in this discussion is that
certain sources of social differentiation may be said to
receive salience and direction through an organizational
factor, leading in turn to forms of political activity.
In any population, there are obviously a wide range of
objective features which could be used to identify and
classify individuals into socially meaningful categories.
It is being argued here that this definition process occurs
in the organizational structure of the community.

This

formulation seems to hold promise in treating many of the
questions left unanswered by other of the theoretical
strategies raised thus far in this chapter.
Organizational Dimensions of the Urban Community
Organizations as a Prime Feature of Urban Life.
The term "mass society" is frequently heard in both public
and professional circles.

The referent of this term appears

most often to be modern, or more specifically, urban
g

society.

This usage is apparently intended to emphasize

certain commonly assumed characteristics of contemporary
urban social structure, primarily its size, complexity,
and heterogeneity.

Much of the sociological literature

applicable to the urban scene bears this theme.
formulations of Toennies

(1940) and Simmel

The classic

(1940) almost a

century ago and the more recent statements of Wirth

(1938)
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and others tend to emphasize urban structure as hetero
geneous, impersonal,

fragmentary, and, hence, destructive

of enduring social relations.
words of Wirth

Concerning this point, the

(1938: 12-13) are particularly instructive:

The contacts in the city may indeed be face-to-face,
but they are nonetheless impersonal, superficial,
transitory, and segmental.
Whereas the individual
gains, on the one hand, a certain degree of emanci
pation or freedom from the personal and emotional
controls of intimate groups, he loses, on the other
hand, the spontaneous self-expression, the morale,
the sense of participation that comes with living
in a integrated society.
This constitutes the state
of anomie. . .
However, research concerning the interactional
patterns of urban dwellers in recent years indicates that
life in the city may not be as isolated and purely con
tractual as some of these latter theorists seem to imply.
The efforts of Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee
Whyte

(1955), Wilensky and LeBeaux

and Laumann

(1954),

(1965), Babchuck

(1965),

(1973), as well as the recent work of urban

anthropolotists

(Barnes, 1969), go a long way in establish

ing the identity and persistence of primary networks in
urban settings.

Objectively, the city-dweller may indeed

live in a complex, heterogeneous structure of considerable
size.

However,

from his perspective, day-to-day inter

action on the job and at home tends to be restricted to a
microcosm of peers and relatives.
Nor are all secondary contacts with the larger
social context inevitably fragmentary, segmented, and
destructive of integrative social bonds.

On the contrary,
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Tocqueville's (1963: 71) pronouncement almost one hundred
fifty years ago concerning the busy participation of sub
stantial portions of Americans in relatively stable or
ganizational structures indicates just the opposite to be
true:
In no country in the world has the principle of
associations been more successfully used. . .
than in America.
Besides the permanent associa
tions which are established by law. . . a vast
number of others are formed and maintained by
the agency of private citizens. . . .
If a
stoppage occurs in a thoroughfare. . . the
neighbors immediately form themselves into a
deliberative body; . . . if some public pleasure
is concerned, an association is formed. . . .
Societies are formed to resist evils (and) to
diminish vice(s).
In the United States, assoc
iations are established to promote the public
safety, commerce, industry, morality, and re
ligion.
There is no end which the human will
despairs of attaining through the combined power
of individuals. . .
Empirical evidence accumulated in the last few
decades favors de Tocqueville's early assessment.

In their

widely acclaimed study of "Middletown," for instance, Lynd
and Lynd (1929: 528) report that ninety-five percent of
the "business class" and forty-six percent of the "working
class" in their sample were members of one or more volun
tary associations.

Axelrod (1956: 13-18)

found strikingly

similar proportions in a more recent case study, and a
national sample placed the number of adults participating
in at least one voluntary association at sixty-one percent
(Wright and Hyman, 1958: 286).

Likewise, cross-national

comparisons with other industrialized countries have re
vealed participation levels of forty-seven percent and
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forty-four percent of adults sampled in Great Britain and
Germany respectively

(Almond and Verba, 1965: 249).

Organizational Structure as a Reflection of Social
Differentiation.

Hollingshead's (1952: 685-687)

appraisal

of New Haven, Connecticut, provides apt illustration of the
presumed relationship between social differentials and or
ganizational structure.

The intent of the study was to

identify class distinctions,

in part through the examina

tion of the associational patterns of a sample of respond
ents.

Interestingly, Hollingshead reports finding vertical

social divisions based upon racial, ethnic, and religious
differences in addition to the expected horizontal cleavages
due to social class criteria.

An important conclusion of

the study is that these vertical and horizontal divisions
create highly compartmentalized subsystems of interaction
vividly reflected in the composition of voluntary associa
tions in the New Haven community.

In short, these organ

izations demarcate imaginary social grids within which
interaction among socially, ethnically, and religiously
compatible individuals routinely takes place.
It does not appear that Hollingshead has stumbled
across an isolated phenomenon.

Warner and Srole

(1945)

earlier documented such an occurrence in a study appro
priately entitled, The Social Systems of American Ethnic
Groups.
Gans

Similar findings are reported by Greer

(1962) and Wolfinger (1965).

(1962) ,

Nor has the emergence of
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suburbia as a dominating feature of the urban scene
necessarily altered the basic picture.

After analyzing

ten metropolitan areas, Lieberson (1962: 681)

is led to

conclude that the same groups which are the most highly
segregated from "native" whites in the central city are
also the most residentially concentrated in the suburbs.
This finding, he suggests is an indication that interac
tional patterns thought endemic to the central city persist
to a large extent in suburbia as well.
Parenti's

(1967: 717-720; 1969: 173-180) comments

regarding observed patterns of acculturation and assimila
tion provide a helpful perspective for assessing this
situation.

Specifically, a cultural system refers to an

ideational or belief set, while a social system denotes a
behavioral or interactional set.

If one can assume that

there is "no inevitable one-to-one relationship between
the various processes" in the two systems and that "imper
atives in one system are not wholly dependent upon the
other"

(Parenti, 1967: 718), then it is theoretically de

fensible to expect that groups which are segregated socially,
that is, in terms of their interactional patterns, may
nonetheless exhibit a high degree of integration culturally,
that is, in terms of shared values and beliefs.

Hence,

individuals may be culturally assimilated yet also "segre
gated" as evidenced, among other things, by participation
in socially, ethnically, racially, or religiously homogeneous organizations.

7

To the extent that these observations
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are valid, the organizational structure of the community
may be viewed as an expression of its salient features of
social differentiation, including class and racial differ
ences.
The Mediating Capacity of Organizations.

A further

set of implications contained in the organizational struc
ture of the urban environment
capacity of organizations.

lies

in the mediating

Durkheim (1964: 27-32) has

stressed the view that organizations in the modern setting
have the unique capacity to stand as a counterbalance be
tween the isolated individual and the larger social context.
To Durkheim, this mediating capacity is of importance in
toro basic respects.

On the one hand, organizations provide

the social mechanism for integrating scattered individuals
into a common stream of values, beliefs, and sentiments
g

in settings otherwise often conducive to anomie.

On the

other hand, this mediating capacity helps insure indi
vidual emancipation and freedom from the domination of the
state.
This interpretation by Durkheim attributes a stab
ilizing function to the mediating capacity of organizations.
For those who do not share his optimistic appraisal of or
ganizations, it is generally not the mediating capacity or
the internal integrative potentials which are objects of
contention.

The dissensus involves the probable role with

which these characteristics are said to be most amenable.
As the tone of this disagreement implies, the dispute may
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be characterized as falling within a pluralist-elitist
clash of perspective.
In the spirit of Durkheim's critique of organiza
tions, pluralists are apt to emphasize several positive
aspects of the mediating potential of organizations
(Truman, 1951; Almond and Verba, 1965; Smith, 1966).
Pluralists, for example, are more likely than elitists to
assert that membership and participation in organizations
is fairly widespread.

Thus, if organizations are indeed

selective in terms of who is representated, the wide range
of social origins from which participants are drawn never
theless equalizes the effect.

The statements of Rose

(1967: 244) in this respect are typical:
. . . a significant portion of the lower classes
is organized into labor unions, an increasing
proportion of the middle class is assuming leader
ship in the social-influence associations, the
ethnic minorities have organized their own socialinf luence groups, and all of these are taking
stronger interest in politics.
Thus power has b e 
come more widely distributed through greater
participation in voluntary associations.
Pluralists likewise resist the notion that organizations
are an inherently conservative force.

They note that or

ganizations potentially may be utilized either to induce
change or to defend the status quo.

Whichever the case,

what is of importance they claim, is that organizations
do provide an effective and powerful medium for gaining
access to the political process.
Shifting the focus to this political process, plura
lists further contend that the interests represented by any
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number of competing organizations merit consideration
apart from potential power differentials, such as organi
zational size, force, or resources.

Incumbent with but

not restricted to this position is the belief that the
exercise of power resides for the most part in the formal
machinery of government.

In a critique of various

strategies in measuring power, Bonjean and Grimes

(1974:

378) summarize this contention as follows:
. . . the question, "Who Governs?" (and, by impli
cation, who has power?) was answered very much in
the same manner by social scientists and the lay
public.
Those persons occupying important offices
. . . were assumed to be those making key community
decisions and thus exercising power.
Broad access to these positions of power is further pur
ported to be well insured by a public electoral system,
by a widespread acceptance of a core of "democratic"
values, and by open competition among polycentric, socially
diverse organizations
134).

(Rose, 1967: 55-58; Truman, 1968:

Obviously not all organizations are equally effec

tive in gaining access to these positions of power.

How

ever, given the alleged democratic spirit of the organi
zational competition, pluralists argue that organizational
participation has positive consequences in and of itself.
Independent of the "success" of the organization, organi
zational identification and participation is thought to
provide a sense of political efficacy and a satisfaction
with democratic processes among its latent and active mem
bers.

Elitists, on the other hand, are more likely to

dote upon the question of who tends to benefit most from

29
the mediating capacity of organizations.

Turning first to

the question of "who participates" in organizations,
elitists admit that participation is indeed fairly wide
spread.

But, they add, participation also tends to be

consistently and positively correlated with social class.
The empirical findings quoted earlier concerning organi
zational participation support this interpretation

(Lynd

and Lynd, 1929; Axelrod, 1956; Wright and Hyman, 1958;
Almond and Verba, 1965).

To summarize, the studies show

relatively substantial levels of participation in organ
izations, proportions ranging from forty to sixty percent
of samples including representation from all classes.
However, the distribution is clearly skewed by class, in
dicating greater participation among upper status individ
uals.

Lipset (1963: 201), for example, notes that the

higher participation level "of the more privileged" in
organizational activities has been documented in virtually
every comparison between those of higher and lower status.
Therefore, if the political system is in fact responsive
to the operation of organizations, and if persons partici
pating in various organizations can reasonably be assumed
to pursue their own interests, the mediating role of
political and parapolitical organizations may indeed operate
in favor of the higher classes by virtue of differential
participation.
Elitists are apt to delineate other discriminating
aspects of organizational life as well.

The classic treatise
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of the Italian sociologist Michels

(1959) over fifty years

ago has alerted subsequent social scientists to the
oligarchic proclivity of organizations.

Michels avered

that organizational control is inevitably reduced to the
hands of a few, even in democratically contrived organi
zations.

This oligarchic tendency is said to be rooted

in a number of factors, most notably man's "inherent"
craving for power, the apathy of rank-and-file members, and
the natural desire of the leadership to strengthen and
buttress its position of authority.

Thus, the very prin

ciple of organization itself contains elitist trends.

A

number of contemporary sociologists and political scientists,
therefore, contend that organizations are not truly capable
either of bringing about change or of defending the status
quo.

Rather, they assert that organizations which persist

and wield political clout are mostly conservative in their
orientation to the status quo (Schattschneider, 1960;
Edelman, 1964; Parenti,

1970).

According to Dye and Zeigler

(1972: 234-235):
Organizations perform a conservative, stabilizing
function for the society. . . . Of course, the goals
of organizations vary, some being more radical than
others.
But in general, organizations that survive,
even if they began as radical, become more moderate
as organizational perpetuation and maintenance of
bureaucracy displace the original goals. . .
Pressure for substantial social change [thus] comes
from forces outside the associational structure.
Finally, elitists are in basic agreement with the
pluralist contention that participation may instill feelings
of political efficacy among organizational members even when
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personal and political returns are substantially negligible
or purely symbolic (Edelman, 1964).

However, given their

perspective of organizational life, it is not surprising
that many elitists state additionally that such intangible
rewards constitute a delusionary enterprise, diverting
attention of rank-and-file members and nonparticipants
alike from the basic issue:

the perpetuation of the status

quo by vested interests.
In summarizing the conflicting contentions reflected
in these two viewpoints, the following observations seem
most appropriate.

First,

it does not appear that the

mediating potential of organizations is a matter in ques
tion.

A wide range of literature, theoretical speculation,

and empirical evidence are in basic agreement about this
point.

Secondly, it seems fair to say that while relative

ly large numbers of individuals participate in organizations,
this number is not proportionately representative of
several important groups within the population.

For exam

ple, it is clear that the organizational variable is
positively correlated with social class, thereby raising
the question of whether organizations tend to represent
specialized interests, in this case those of the higher
classes.

Finally, the matter of whether organizations re

inforce the status quo or provide an effective medium for
social change appears largely a matter of perspective and
thus a contention to be verified.

The tendency here will

be to lean toward the elitist position and seek substantia
ting and refutory evidence accordingly.
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Organizations and Politics
Strategies in the Analysis of Organizations.

It

has almost been an unstated assumption in the history of
organizational analyses that organizations should be
conceptualized and evaluated in terms of their respective
goals.

As indicated in the introductory chapter, this

procedure is embedded in the organizational perspectives
advanced by Weber (1957) and Michels

(1962) earlier this

century and, subsequently, a goodly number of efforts have
been patterned after their lead.
for employing this approach.

There are sound reasons

Organizations may be char

acterized as formal groups in which the' relationships are
rationally defined' in terms of positions and concommitant
linkages.

This rationalization of relationships serves as

a means of legitimizing social relationships in the absence
of traditional or personal bonds and, as emphasized by this
perspective, provides a regimen for the efficient pursuance
of desired goals.
However, several problems seem to persistently
accompany this approach.

For instance, there has often been

confusion concerning exactly "who" defines the goals of an
organization.

Cartwright and Zander

(Mohr, 1973: 470-471)

have noted that one may conceivably distinguish at a minimum
(1) the goals an organizational member may hold for his own
ends,

(2) the goals an organizational member may hope the

organization will pursue or achieve,

(3) the goals of or

ganizational members as a group, and finally

(4) the formally
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stated organizational goals.

The first two of these

distinctions comprise goals which are held individually
while the latter two identify collective orientations.
Further, only the second two distinctions refer to goals
which may be collectively attained.

Validly enumerating

organizational goals is of particular importance when such .
specification is meant to provide the rationale and cri
teria for the ensuing analysis.
The difficulties encountered in this matter of
specifying goals raise the more general problem of adequate
ly and formally accounting for the distinction between
"intent" or "motive" and "function."

It is clear that the

structure of social arrangements may indeed engender a
series of consequences beyond those intended, serve some
purposes yet also constitute disruptions for others, or in
other ways vary from its subjectively perceived or desig
nated design.^
Etzioni

(1960; 1975) and others

(Gouldner, 1959;

Yuchtman and Seashore, 1967) have articulated further crit
icisms from this base of dissatisfaction with the goal model
of organizations.

By now it almost goes without saying

in organizational research that organizations will most
often be judged as inefficient; that is, they will be found
to fall short of stated goals and to be pursuing objectives
other than formalized goals.
in the writings of Etzioni
assert

An alternative strategy is found

(1960) and Gouldner (1959) who

that organizations may be more meaningfully viewed
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as miniature social systems in which goal attainment is
but one of a number of important functions.

Perhaps the

most obvious yet most frequently overlooked of these im
portant functions is that organizations "seek" to survive;
that is, the behavior of individuals occupying key organi
zational roles is principally, though not exclusively,
guided by considerations pertaining to organizational
maintenance and enhancement

(Wilson, 1973: 13).

Of course, the systems model is not without its
critics either.

If the goal model has been tagged as con

taining an inherent rationalist bias, the system model is
most often accused of harboring a functionalist bias.
This latter accusation stems from the maxim "what exists,
is functional," which is often erroneously identified as
summarizing the core of the functionalist position.
accurately,

"what exists, exists."

More

Existant social arrange

ments which persist over time presumably meet some basic
minimum of survival requirements, for instance, attracting
and holding members.

Obviously, no members, no organization.

However, such arrangements may be functional, dysfunctional,
or even afunctional in any number of ways, including perpet
uating deleterious consequences upon those who gladly
embrace them.
The conceptualization of organizations within the
context of the systems model is not meant to exclude the
Weberian notion that organizations are rationally formed
for the stated purpose of attaining certain goals.

Rather,
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it is presented here to attune the inquiry to other functions
or consequences which the organizational structure of the
community might entail.

For example, political organizations

as a rule represent calculated attempts to gain access to the
formal machinery of government, most often in this country
through influencing the outcome of elections.

Thus, any

analysis of political organizations would do well to at
least tangentally consider such stated purpose.

However, a

political organization may wittingly or unwittingly be "do
ing" other things as well, one of which might well be the
pacification of its members through providing only a guise
of meaningful access to the presumed positions of power. Or,
in keeping with the considerations presented earlier in this
chapter, political organizations may purposely or inadver
tently solidify potential lines of social differentiation,
thereby functioning to support endogamus subsystems of in
teraction within the community setting.
Organizations as Reference Groups.

In an earlier

section of this chapter, the mediating capacity of organi
zations was presented and analyzed from a structural per
spective.

Briefly, it was argued that organizations

constitute interactional subsystems which stand between the
"isolated" individual and the larger socio-political struc
ture, thereby providing a medium through which individuals
may be integrated into a cultural stream, gain access to
the decision-making apparatus, and so forth.

The substance

of these claims, as well as the nature of the influence
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exerted by organizations, can receive further explication
by momentarily viewing the problem from another perspective.
One of the more central themes in sociology is that
individuals gain standards or perspectives with which to
view and evaluate the world from groups of which they are
members.

Merton (1968: 339-340) has posited the following

conditions as prerequisites for group membership:
First of all. . . the concept of a group refers to
a number of people who interact with one another in
accord with established patterns. . . .
A second
criterion of a group. . . is that interacting persons
define themselves as members, i.e., that they have
patterned expectations of forms of interaction which
are morally binding on them and on other members. . . .
The correlative and third criterion is that the per
sons in interaction be defined by others as "belong
ing to the group". . . .
The problem is only slightly modified if the concern
is focused upon organizations.

As formally constituted

groups, the (varying) criteria for memberships are ostensi
bly a matter of technical qualifications,

for example,

paying dues, attending meetings, and so forth.

From an

analytical standpoint, however, the basic criteria for
membership is the same as that specified for groups in
general, that is, members can be recognized by the fact
that their association with the organization has affected
their behavior.

This being the case, the influence of or

ganizations upon the activities of members is well grounded
in theoretical expectations.
The applicability of the influence exercised by
groups and organizations, however, is not necessarily

limited to their immediate memberships.

The concept of

reference g r o u p s h a s been developed to account for this
apparent tie often found between groups, their members, and
some nonmembers as well.

The basic assumption underlying

the reference group concept is that individuals may inter
nalize group perspectives through psychological identifi
cation even in the absence of formal group membership and
participation.

In these instances, the affinity which

exists between nonmember and group may establish the group
as an occasional or even consistent focal point for gaining
information about the world in which one lives.

This fac

tor is of particular importance to the discussion of organi
zations, for it permits the handling of organizational
influence far beyond formal organizational boundaries.
Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955: 31-34) have documented
and attempted to account for one aspect of this phenomenon
in a "two-step flow of influence" paradigm.

Lazarsfeld

and his associates had earlier studied the effects of mass
media advertising upon the purchasing patterns of consumers
and of mass media campaigning upon candidate preferences of
voters.

In each case, a rational model of choice was

posited, that is, individuals were assumed to glean infor
mation from media sources in a diligent manner and to make
prudent decisions about products and candidates after care
fully weighing the evidence.

However, the data gathered in

these studies suggested quite a different process.

Indi

viduals were found to derive information about the world in
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a systematic but nonrational manner, typically by relying
upon and accepting uncritically the interpretations of media
messages.

"Opinion leaders," usually respected members of

groups in which individuals participated, were found to
supply these interpretations by attaching meanings and conno
tations to "objective" information.

It has been shown in

previous discussion, however, that the role of opinion
leader is not restricted to group co-members.

Rather, this

function may be also fulfilled by groups in which the in
dividual is not a formal member

(reference groups) and by

individuals not personally known to the individual

(refer

ence persons).
The Structure of Political Organizations.

Up to

this point, organizations have been simply characterized as
structures in which interaction is highly formalized and is
formally goal oriented.

Though adequate for many purposes,

this preliminary definition does not completely depict the
referent usually intended by the use of the term organiza
tion.

By way of clarification, the term social group, is

commonly used to denote structures in which recurrent, direct
relationships exist among all members.

Social groups, there

fore, are theoretically limited in size by the requirement of
direct relationships.

By contrast, organizations are multi

group structures

(Bertrand, 1972: 132-135; Bates and Harvey,

1975: 142-144).

Thus, individuals in an organization are

critically linked to one another by sets of indirect as well
as direct relationships.
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This distinction points to further key characteris
tics of organizations.

Organizations typically reflect a

well-developed division of labor, with the various sections
devoted to the performance of specific tasks.

Direct re

lationships among section leaders and other "staff" personnel
provide co-ordination and indirect links to individual sec
tion members.

Direct links join individuals within sections.

The formalization of proceedings also translates the normatively specified interaction within the organization into
relationships between positions and ranks rather than be
tween individuals.

For example, the relationship between a

supervisor and a foreman or between a foreman and a worker
in a given plant should be identical, irrespective of the
individual supervisors, foremen, or workmen there encounter
ed.

Thus, as is the case with social systems in general, it

is exactly because the behavior of these individuals is
predictable by virtue of the positions they occupy that
social organization can be said to exist (Bertrand, 1972: 3).
Applied to the problem at hand, political organiza
tions are expected.to be multi-group structures oriented
most generally to the acquisition of power or the formal
positions of power (Etzioni, 1975: 107).

As indicated

earlier, these organizations most often consist of politi
cal professionals, activists, and occasional workers in the
various leadership, staff, and line (general membership)
positions, and larger numbers of formally inert psycholog
ical identifiers.

Central to this dissertation is the
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notion that organizational participation and identification
leads to types of political action, that is, there is some
thing about the nature of the organizational variable which
prompts certain kinds of political activity.
Burstein

(1972) has argued that social networks in

general may be ranked on a "voluntariness" continuum.

This

characteristic implies that membership in certain kinds of
social networks tends to reflect varying degrees of volun
tary action by those involved.

Some networks, for example,

are purely ascribed and are, therefore, completely involun
tary.

Thus, associations based upon one's age, sex, race,

ethnicity, and so forth, involve statuses which are a matter
of birth.

Other networks are quasi-voluntary.

These refer

to the interplay between ascribed and achieved statuses,
such as the type of education one obtains or the sets of
relations one encounters.

A third set refers more nearly

to voluntary attributes, or the formal roles one plays, such
as one's occupation, marital status, or participation in
organizations.

Finally, voluntary behaviors constitute the

fourth category of choosing, to the extent possible, the
circumstances of interaction.
According to this scheme, organizational participa
tion is viewed as a voluntary type of action.

There is at

least one other consideration as well, namely, that some
types of networks are more closely tied into— are more
central to— the concentration of societal resources.

Thus,

from a structural point of view, one's degree of political
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access is expected to be affected by two factors:
participation (or nonparticipation)

(1) one's

in political organiza

tional networks, and (2) assuming participation, the cen
trality of the political organization in which one is a
member to key societal resources
1095; Bierstedt, 1975: 237-240) .

(Burstein, 1972: 1092As has been shown in this

chapter, participation is likely to be correlated with social
class and race.

To the extent that the line of reasoning

presented here is correct, the organizational factor stands
as a critical variable in the emergence of kinds of politi
cal action.
Types of Political Organizations.

Another useful

strategy in explicating the structure of political organi
zations involves identifying political organizations within
a spectrum, or typology, of organizations.

The major pur

pose here is to focus upon the way in which political organi
zations may be viewed vis-a-vis other organizations and the
way in which different varieties of political organizations
themselves may be distinguished.

A number of influential

organizational theorists have advanced typologies potential
ly useful for these purposes.
Blau and Scott

(1962: 43-57), for example, have

suggested classifying organizations in terms of their primary
beneficiaries.
organizations

They have distinguished mutual benefit
(members are prime beneficiaries), business

organizations (owners or directors are prime beneficiaries),
service organizations

(definite clientele is major beneficiary),
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and commonwealth organizations
beneficiary).

(public at large is primary

While interesting and useful in dealing with

a wide range of organizations, this typology does not seem
especially sensitive in distinguishing political organiza
tions in which the interest here is focused.
A more useful conceptualization— the compliance
thesis— has been advanced by Etzioni

(1975).

This typology

begins with the notion that compliance with organizational
directives is reducible to the relation in which one actor
acquiesces to expectations of a superordinate actor.
relation is composed of:

(1) the ability of the superordi

nate actor to elicit conformity to directives
(2)

This

(power), and

the orientation of the subordinate actor to the power

of the organization

(involvement).

This being the case, the

nature of compliance may be plotted along these two dimen
sions.
Etzioni

(1975: 3-19) argues that there are three

basic kinds of power which might be employed in the organi
zational context.

These power options reflect the types of

sanctions which might be utilized in exercising social con
trol over organizational participants.

Coercive power rests

in the application, or the threat of application, of physical
sanctions— food, creature comforts, beatings, or even death.
Remunerative power is based upon control of material re
sources.

Salaries, fringe benefits, fines, or termination

of employment are appropriate illustrations of material sanc
tions.

Finally, normative power refers to the manipulation
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of symbolic resources, especially those of acceptance,
prestige, and rejection.

An organization may, and typical

ly does, employ more than one type of power option.

However,

the organization usually relies most heavily upon one type
of option at the expense of the other two.

As Etzioni

(1975: 6-8) has pointed out, it is difficult to simultan
eously and effectively emphasize more than one power option
since this tends to neutralize their respective effects.
Just as there are three modes of power, so also
there are three main types of involvement, that is, the in
tensity and direction of the orientation of the subordinate
actor to the organization.

Alienative involvement refers

to an intense, negative orientation, calculative involvement
to a mild positive or negative orientation, and moral in
volvement to a highly positive orientation to the organiza
tion.

Taken together— the power applied by the organization

and the orientation of the actors to the organization— there
are three major types of compliance modes.

Generally, or

ganizations with coercive power tend to have actors with
alienative involvement

(coercive compliance) .

Remunerative

power is most often combined with calculative involvement
(utilitarian compliance) .

Finally, normative power is most

often found with moral involvement (normative compliance.)
Locating political organizations within this typology
proves to be a worthwhile endeavor.

To begin with, political

organizations potentially may fall within any one of the
three major compliance modes outlined above, depending upon

their style of organization and their goals.

Etzioni

(1975: 107-108) argues that the goals of the organization
often give some clear indications of the compliance struc
ture.

Thus, a political organization which seeks to con

trol or reallocate the means of coercion can be viewed as
focusing upon problems of order.
often stand as empirical examples.
mode is most frequently coercive.

Revolutionary groups
Here the compliance
On the other hand, eco

nomic goals, as sought by unions, local political "machines,
and other political organizations, deal with the realloca
tion of goods and services and are most compatible with the
utilitarian compliance structure.

Finally, normative organi

zations usually pursue cultural goals.

Examples include

political organizations touting "good government" themes
or advancing the cause of any one of a number of "-isms" as
a central concern.
In this dissertation, the utilitarian and normative
compliance modes are expected to be most useful in the
analysis of political organizations in New Orleans.

This

distinction between the normative and utilitarian compli
ance structures is closely related to the "public- vs.
private-regardingness" dichotomy of Wilson and Banfield
(1964: 876-877).

They use the term public-regardingness to

refer to a value complex based in some conception of the
"public interest" or the "common good," whereas the term
private-regardingness taps the value complex centered in
self-interest.

Wilson and Banfield have found that certain
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categories of individuals, as reflected in voting patterns
by class and ethnicity,

seem more predisposed toward one

value complex over the other.

Of critical importance here

is their conclusion that the observed relationship holds
only for those in a subculture clearly definable in ethnic
or income terms

(Wilson and Banfield, 1964: 884-885).

The

central argument in this chapter has focused upon the role
of organizations in just such a circumstance.
A Proposed Model of Political Action
Political participation is the type of political
action which is of greatest interest in this study.

One may

object that this category of political action implicates
activity taking place solely within the normative confines
of the existant socio-political system.

More precisely,

the concentration upon political participation appears to
preclude consideration of revolutionary actions, resort to
terrorist tactics, and the like.

However, it is for this

exact reason that the emphasis upon political participation
is preferred.

Simply stated, participation in the system

is argued to be the modal category of political activity.
Specification of Theoretical Perspective.

Previous

discussion of the objective conditions of social differen
tiation and their subsequent conversion into categories of
political action may suggest to some an interactional thesis
focusing upon individuals' cognitive assessments of socio
political situations.

In point of fact, a complete expla

nation of this conversion process may not be possible without
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considerable attention directed towards this interactional
dimension.

For purposes of this study, however, the focus

of the analysis is placed squarely upon distributions of
characteristics and patterns of behavior without regard for
the subjective definitions and perceptions of the individuals
involved.

This precondition is not meant to denigrate the

importance of subjective dynamics intrinsic to all human
behavior.

However, such dynamics are neither here defined

nor treated— they are simply accepted as "given" and are
assumed to be operating.
The ecological approach is consistent with this
strategy.

This approach is based upon the premise that

certain distinctive facets of areal units may provide major
clues in accounting for particular patterns of observable
behavior.

This type of analysis permits the researcher to

establish the likelihood that certain types of behavior
will take place under a specified set of contextual circum
stances.

One might even argue that the range of viable

behavioral and structural options available within any areal
unit is distinctively interrelated with and delimited by its
salient ecological
Heberle

(contextual) characteristics.

(1951: 210) has elaborated the logic of this

approach in applying the perspective to the study of polit
ical behavior:
The sociologist. . . merely reverses the process of
thinking which.every politician uses in calculating
his chances of winning an election.
The political
candidate knows approximately which social groups
are his best potential supporters. . . in (each) area
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of his election district; knowing this, (he) will
attempt to predict in which of these areas he is
likely to have a safe majority. . . . On the other
hand, the social scientist knows the returns in an
election precinct by precinct. . . .
By taking
the percentage of the total vote case in each area
for each candidate and comparing it with the rela
tive size of certain significant groups in each
area, the sociologist can infer which groups gave
the main support for the candidate or party.
An error often associated with this approach has
been the designation of individual motives and individual
behaviors on the basis of the observed aggregate character
istics

(Robinson, 1950).

As is clear from the debate

stirred by Robinson's article, this point poses a problem
mainly to the extent that one erroneously insists upon
generalizing beyond the group data to individual activities.
Proper use of the ecological approach on the other hand can
provide a valuable perspective for investigating the prob
lem under study, namely, determining the sets of objective
class and racial characteristics and the organizational
conditions in which certain types of political participa
tion are likely to occur.
Specification of the Theoretical M o d e l .

The model

developed in this discussion states that certain sources
of social differentiation, in this case those of class and
race, are said to receive salience and direction through
an organizational factor, leading in turn to forms of po
litical action.

In any population, there are obviously a

wide range of objective features which could conceivably be
used to identify socially meaningful categories of
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individuals.

One could, for example, distinguish between

individuals on the basis of parentage, shoe size, region of
residence, height, occupation, or any other discernible
factor.

It is being argued here that the specification of

which differences are worth noting occurs in the organiza
tional structure of the community.
This model is depicted in figure 2.
general level

At the most

(Level 1), it stipulates that the potential

features of social differentiation within a community pro
vide aggregates of individuals to which emergent or existant organizations may orient themselves.

These aggregates

represent potential members and organizational identifiers
who may be attracted through a collective appeal couched
in terminology and issues relevant to the conditions of
differentiation.

Attempts by organizations to generate

support through defining and publicizing such issues sub
sequently lead to the emergence of distinctive patterns of
action by the various categories of differentiated indi
viduals.
Translating these assertions into the more specific
analytical categories of class and race

(Level I I), it is

claimed that class and racial characteristics form the
prime objective features of social differentiation.

These

class and racial characteristics, therefore, are expected
to provide the themes and substance of the organizational
structure found in the modern community.

Insofar

as the

organizations are active and are guided by the special

FIGURE 2
PROPOSED MODEL OF POLITICAL ACTION
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interests of their respective population bases, distinctive
forms of political action by class and race will be found
to exist.
The model is not meant to imply that the objective
distributions of class and race "cause" or in some other
way induce the emergence of the organizational structure.
No specific statements have been made in this chapter de
fining the etiology of such structures.^

The model simply

assumes that, however an organization emerges or is struc
tured, an important aspect of organizational maintenance is
that of extending influence to appropriate categories of
sympathetic nonmembers and of retaining the interest of
current members.

The proposal suggests, at this point,

that aggregates of those sharing objective class or racial
characteristics provide an especially convenient and po
tentially responsive target population for these tasks.
It should also be noted that the class or racial
appeal of an organization may occur independently of any
formally stated goals.

It is by now well known that any

social arrangement may engender a series of consequences
beyond those intended, or in other ways vary from its sub
jectively perceived or designated design
115).

(Merton, 1968:

In other words, organizations may be wittingly and

unwittingly doing a number of things, including purposely
or inadvertently solidifying potential lines of social
differentiation.

Whatever the intention, an organizational

factor is deemed necessary for the emergence of distinctive
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patterns of political action.
This latter observation stands at the core of the
model, namely, that objective categories of social differ
entiation here class and racial characteristics, do not in
and of themselves lead to distinctive patterns of activity.
From a social psychological point of view, such action is
contingent upon the attachment of meaning to otherwise
inert characteristics.

From a structural perspective,

forms of action emerge only in the presence of the organi
zational factor as an intervening variable in the transi
tion from aggregates to conscious groups.

Either by

accident or by design, organizations stand between isolated,
undifferentiated individuals and the larger socio-political
context and, thereby, function as reference groups for both
active members and psychological identifiers alike.

In

this process, the organizational structure of the community
contains the appropriate mediating capacity to convert
aggregates of individuals into politically active categories
of individuals.
Footnotes
^It should be noted that this passage employs
"income" and "occupation" as empirical indicators of social
class.
This usage is worth noting because it represents a
widely accepted procedure both in terms of how class is
commonly perceived by American sociologists and in terms of
how they have often attempted to measure it.
The convention
stems originally from the efforts of Lynd and Lynd (1929) to
analyze "Middletown" within the framework of a two-class
system composed of a business class and a working class.
The attempted linkage with Marx's concept of class is
obvious.
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2

Dahrendorf's (1959) Class and Class Conflict in
Industrial Society represents the most definitive reformu
lation-©!' Marx's theory of social class developed within
the context of the dialectic.
3
Nisbet (1966: 180), for example, states, "The
major controversy in the study of stratification. . . (is)
the subtler and theoretically more fundamental one of
social class versus social status: of a view of the new
society resting upon the assumption of the erosion of
class and its replacement by fluctuant, mobile, status
groups and by status-seeking individuals.
4
Kahl (1953: 9) is among those sociologists who are
not plagued by such doubts.
For example, he states, "The
degree to which people at a given stratification level. . .
are explicitly aware of themselves as a distinctive social
grouping is called their degree of class consciousness
(Sartori, 1969: 98).
5
Although the patterns described in these early
works have clearly undergone change, the extent and signif
icance of that change are too many a matter of debate.
Handlin, for example, summarizes the progress of blacks in
the 1960's towards equality with the words " . . . Negroes
have advanced far more in these ten years than any other
comparable group in the past," while Clark counters with
the following assessment (Davidson, 1972: 4):
The homicide rate and delinquency rate in Negro
ghettos. . . have not decreased. . . . Negroes
are still restricted to ghettos by income and
white resistence. . . . Unemployment and under
employment are high. . . . The welfare system con
tinues to reinforce family instability. . . . The
educational system of the ghetto has decayed even
further. . . .

g
The two terms— mass society and urban society— are
not, however, completely interchangeable.
Kornhauser (1959:
13-17), for example, has advanced the thesis that the state
of mass society, an anomic conducive to numerous horrors, is
not necessarily identical with nor limited to urban indus
trial society.
7
These assertions call into question the often
espoused notion of the American "melting pot."
This popular
bit of folklore suggests that the American way represents a
single, uniformly accepted culture comprising the blended
contributions of any number of its constituent groups.
In
this spirit, former president Woodrow Wilson once observed:
"America does not consist of groups. A man who thinks of
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himself as belonging to a particular national group in
America has not yet become an American" (Handlin, 1963: 121).
o

Durkheim (1964: 28) argues, "A nation can be main
tained only if, between the state and the individual, there
is interrelated a whole series of secondary groups near
enough to the individuals to attract them strongly in their
sphere of action and drag them, in this way, into the general
torrent of social life."
g
Merton (1968: 115) has admonishmgly observed:
. . . scrutiny of current vocabularies of functional
analysis (shows) how easily, and how unfortunately,
the sociologist may identify motives with functions.
It (is) further indicated that the motive and the
function vary independently and that failure to
register this fact in an established terminology has
contributed to the unwitting tendency among socio
logists to confuse the subjective categories of
motivation and the objective categories of function.
■^The term was introduced by Hyman (1942) in analyz
ing the influence of certain groups upon a sample of students
and their perceptions of their own status.
11Dahrendorf (1959) provides an excellent analysis
of the conditions conducive to the emergence of such
structures.

CHAPTER III
DESIGN OF THE STUDY
Introduction
It has been theorized in the previous chapter that
certain objective features of social differentiation are
converted into modes of political action through an in
tervening organizational variable.

In this chapter, the

intent is to specify the considerations and procedures
relevant to the testing of this basic proposition.

As with

much sociological research, the problem under investigation
here does not lend itself to direct manipulation.

For

example, one cannot select subjects and randomly assign
them to treatment groups to be exposed, in turn, to vary
ing levels of class conditions or to increments of racial
characteristics.

This situation is hardly unique.

Inde

pendent variables in which sociologists are typically
interested are rarely amenable to true experimental manip
ulation, usually because it is either physically impossible
or morally objectionable to do so.
This might not necessarily be regarded as a prob
lem.

However, there is a rather persistent theme in the

methodological literature which suggests that true experi
mentation is the most desirable of research strategies.
54
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The implication is that other modes of analysis are to be
only grudgingly employed.

The main advantage attributed

to the experimental method is the degree of control intro
duced in isolating the anticipated effects of independent
variables upon the dependent variable.

The randomization

procedure itself serves to nullify the presence of some
extraneous variables and the experimental manipulation of
variables lends credence to the inference that observed
effects are indeed attributable to specified variables.
These assertions are accepted here as essentially
correct.

It is also clear, however, that some procedure

other than the experimental method must be used.

The pro

position under consideration may be subjected to an
appropriate form of empirical testing through a strategy
of comparative analysis.

This strategy involves the com

parison of the independent and dependent variables in a
series of naturally occurring situations in order to assess
the presence, consistency, and strength of the hypothe
sized relationships.

An advantage of this strategy is that

it provides a framework having some control features for
pitting expectations against empirical evidence given the
limitations

of

nonexperimental variables.'*'

It does, how

ever, lack the precise control capabilities of the experi
mental method, chiefly because the effects of the independent
variables take place prior to the study and, hence, are
outside the realm of the direct control of the researcher.
Thus, one can never really be certain that observed "effects"
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are in fact the result of independent variables specified
in the study.

However, lack of complete confidence that

a relationship is real should not preclude attempts at
control and empirical testing.

As Rosenberg (1965: 38)

has correctly pointed out, science is built upon "degrees
of confidence rather than certainty."
As specified in the previous chapter, the ecologi
cal perspective shall be used to direct the course of the
proposed comparative analysis.

Census publications con

stitute the most comprehensive and systematic compilations
of data covering a variety of areal units from census
tracts to entire states.

Likewise, a good deal of aggre

gate information is available which taps the political
activity patterns of areal units.

These data have been

recorded from the precinct to the state level in special
reports of election returns and in the rolls of voter
registration offices.

These sources, especially when

supplemented with survey data, contain a wealth of infor
mation appropriate for the comparisons of areal units
intended in this study.
Operationalization of Terms
Objective Class and Racial Characteristics.

The

distributions of objective class and racial characteristics
within selected areal units comprise the initial indepen
dent variables of interest.

Objective class characteris

tics are measured in an index consisting of the following
four indicators

(Murray and Vedlitz, 1975: 4):

(1)
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percentage of adults in an areal unit who are high school
graduates,

(2) median family income per areal unit,

(3)

percentage of adults in the labor force who are employed
2
in nonmanual occupations per areal unit, and (4) per
centage of families in an areal unit who are classified
as being above the poverty level.

3

Possible score values

for this index range in size from 0 to 100, with each in
dicator contributing a maximum of twenty-five points to
the overall score (see section 1 of figure 3) .

The per

centage measures are awarded one point for every four
percentage units and one point is assigned for each one
thousand dollars of family income up to a maximum of
twenty-five points.

The racial characteristics of an areal

are operationally defined as the percentage of residents
who are nonwhite

(see section 2 of figure 3).

These two main indicators— the class index and the
percentage of residents who are nonwhite— may also be com
bined to form a single three dimensional measure of social
differentiation.

Howard, Long, and Zdrazil

(1971: 45-47)

have noted that in recent urban elections in the South,
the black vote has been relatively consistent across class
lines while the direction and variation of the white vote
has fluctuated by class.

On the basis of this observation,

Howard and his associates suggest the use of a race/class
variable consisting of b l a c k , lower white, and upper white
dimensions.

This can be accomplished by considering as

black all areal units whose population exceeds fifty percent
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FIGURE 3
SUMMARY OF VARIABLES UNDER STUDY AND THEIR RESPECTIVE INDICATORS

Variable

Empirical Indicator

(1) Objective class
characteristics

Objective class index, 100 possible points,
with maximum of 25 points for each of
the following:
(a) percentage of adults in areals
unit who are high school graduates
(b) median family income for areal unit
(c) percentage of adults in areal unit
who are employed in nonmanual occupations
(d) percentage of families in areal
unit above poverty level

(2) Objective racial
characteristics

Percentage of residents in areal unit who
are nonwhite.

(3) Race/class

Race/class index, 3 point scale:
(a) black: areas in which more than 50%
of residents are nonwhite
(b) lower white: areas in which less
than 50% of residents are nonwhite
and in which objective class index
score is less than 59
(c) upper white: areas in which less
than 50% of residents are nonwhite
and in which objective class index
is more than 59

(4) Organizational
composition

Race/class designation, three classifi
cations :
(a) black: majority of reported mem
bership are blacks
(b) Lower white: majority of reported
membership are whites and working
class constituency is claimed
(c) upper white: majority of reported
membership are white and middle or
upper class constituency is claimed

(5) Organizational
effectiveness

. Organizational Effectiveness Indices
based upon:
(a) ranking of organizations by organ
izational leaders
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FIGURE 3 - Continued

(b) ranking of organizations by
candidates for office
(c) composite ranking derived from
(a) and (b)
(6) Political
participation

Measured as three separate dimensions:
(a) registration: percentage of
eligibles who are registered to
vote
(b) turn out: percentage of those
registered who vote
(c) candidate choice: percentage who
vote for each candidate

nonwhite, and by classifying the remaining units as upper white
if falling in the top one-third of the class index distribution,
lower white if in the bottom two-thirds of this distribution
(see section 3 of figure 3) .
A main advantage of this typology is that it is sensi
tive to important shifts and trends in the composition of a
community's political coalitions.

For example, one can easily

identify and trace four logical coalition outcomes:
and lower whites versus upper whites

(populist coalition), (2)

blacks and upper whites versus lower whites
paternalism coalition),

(1) blacks

(moderation-

(3) upper and lower whites versus blacks

(segregation-white supremacy coalition), and (4) no pattern,
instances in which the three groups split their support for
three different candidates or issues
1971: 52).

(Howard, Long and Zdrazil,

All three indicators, namely, the class index, the
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percentage of residents who are nonwhite, and the threedimensional race/class index, will be employed in subsequent
analysis.
Political Organizational Structure of the Community.
The initial question to be confronted here is that of spec
ifying how a community's political organizations can be
adequately identified.

The hierarchy of organizations for

the purposes of this study is defined as comprising those
which can be shown to have been active in the elections un
der consideration.

Activity is said to have taken place

if (1) it can be shown that the political organization so
licited electoral support either for itself or a political
candidate by contacting potential voters, by producing cam
paign propaganda, or by financing or otherwise backing such
4

efforts, or (2) it is known to a reference person,

candi

date for office, or leader of a "rival" organization that
electoral involvement took place.

Two basic dimensions of

a community's political organizational structure are argued
to be of special significance, namely, organizational com
position and organizational effectiveness.

The first deals

with the composition of organizational membership and non
member constituencies, and the second with perceived organ
izational effectiveness.
Organizational composition is indicated by the
proportions of members by race and class as claimed by or
ganizational leaders.

The nonmember constituencies are

assessed by noting the target populations claimed by
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organizational leaders

(see section 4 of figure 3) .

It

is admitted that such claims are no guarantee that actual
ties exist between organization and nonmember.

However,

the claim would seem at least to indicate categories of
nonmembers
its appeals.

to which the organization consciously directs
Finally, the organizational leaders are

asked to specify the areal units of residence from which
these members and nonmembers are drawn.

At first glance,

this may seem to constitute an unrealistic request.

How

ever, it is assumed at this point that organizational
leaders are able to specify quite readily within which
precincts or areas organizational strengths lie.
The effectiveness of political organizations is
ascertained from ratings supplied by two independent sources.
First, the leaders of the organizations themselves are asked
to rank the community's political organizations in terms
of their perceived ability to exert an influence upon the
outcome of elections.

Secondly, candidates for office in

selected elections are asked to perform the same task.
Both are requested to indicate the areal units in which the
organizations are thought

to be effective.

The two rank

ings are then used to compile a composite rating or organ
izational effectiveness

(see section 5 of figure 3).

Political Participation.

Participation in the

established political system may include a variety of acts
reflecting degrees of involvement in or commitment to the
system.

Milbrath

(1965: 18-22), for example, has
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distinguished four major categories of activity ranging
from gladitorial activities

(being an active party member,

soliciting campaign funds, being a candidate for office,
etc.), to transitional activities

(making monetary contri

butions, attending political events, etc.), to spectator
activities

(exposing oneself to political stimuli, voting,

engaging in political discussions, etc.).
prise the fourth category.

Apathetics com

From this perspective, voting

represents a minimal amount of engagement in the political
process.

However,

from another point of view, voting

stands as the modal type of participation in which the bulk
of the populace has actually partaken.

The percentage of

those who turn out to vote in this country is small when
contrasted with the pool of those eligible to vote, but not
when compared with the proportions involved in the higher
levels of political participation specified by Milbrath.
The operationalization of political participation
is centered around aspects of voting.
dicators are employed:

Three empirical in

(1) the percentage of eligible

individuals within a given areal unit who are registered
to vote,

(2) the percentage of those registered per areal

unit who voted in specific elections, and (3) the percen
tages of votes cast per areal unit for various candidates
(see section 6 of figure 3).

What is being argued in this

case is that voting as a form of political participation
begins with formally qualifying oneself by complying with
registration requirements and procedures.

Areas where
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larger proportions of individuals take this step are regarded
as exhibiting higher degrees of political participation than
those with lower levels of registration.

The relative size

of the voter turn out is the second level of this partici
pation process for areal units, with actual candidate choice
constituting an indication of the apparent purpose intended
by given categories of individuals.
Statement of Hypotheses
The basic propositions to be tested

5

in this disser

tation may be stated in question form as follows:
(1)

do levels of voter registration, voter turn out, and
candidate choice increase in areal units with higher
objective class indices and larger proportions of white
residents?

(2)

are the varieties of organizational composition related
to areal class index and racial composition?

(3)

does organizational effectiveness vary by areal class
index and racial composition?

(4)

are levels of political participation consistent across
varieties of organizational composition and degrees of
organizational effectiveness in these areal units?

The anticipated answer to the first three of these questions
is "yes."

The fourth is expected to be answered negatively.

Turning to the first question, a wide range of re
search has established the relationship of class and racial
characteristics with levels of political participation.

The

average voter has been shown to be "unyoung, unblack, middle
income, middle educated, and middle class"
Wattenberg, 1972: 45-58).

(Scammon and

Cast in terms of rates of partic

ipation, those with higher incomes, higher educational
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levels, and employment in managerial, professional or
other white collar occupations have been found to be more
involved politically than those ranking lower on these
scales.

Further,

it has been shown that whites have been

much more likely to participate politically than have
blacks

(Lipset, 1963: 185-189).

The hypotheses suggested

by these data and previous discussion are:
(1)

Areal units with higher
have higher percentages
vote, turn out to vote,
choice than areal units
scores.

objective class indices will
of individuals registered to
and unanimity in candidate
with lower class index

(2)

Areal units with larger proportions of nonwhite
residents will have lower percentages of individuals
registered to vote, turn out to vote, and unanimity
in candidate choice than areal units with smaller
proportions of nonwhites.
Previous research likewise illustrates the close

relationship of class and race with organizational partici
pation.

The national surveys of Wright and Hyman

(1958)

as well as the cross-national studies summarized by Almond
and Verba

(1965) indicate the persistent tendency among

those of higher objective class rank to become more ac
tively engaged in the organizational structure.

In a

similar vein, whites have been found to participate more
actively in organizational life than have blacks
and Hyman,

(Wright

1958; Lipset, 1963: 185), although there is some

evidence that the relative level of organizational partic
ipation of blacks vis-a-vis whites has been slightly
underestimated
Therefore,

(Babchuck and Thompson, 1962: 647-649).

it is expected that organizational composition
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shall be primarily a reflection of the distribution of
class and racial characteristics in various areas.

Formally

stated:
(3)

Areas with higher proportions of whites and higher
class index scores will have greater representation
in the political organizational structure than areas
with lower proportions and scores respectively.
Participation in organizations is only one aspect

of the interest here in the organizational dimension.

Of

great concern also is the effectiveness of the various
organizations in exerting influence upon the course of po
litical events in the community.

As stated earlier, the

pluralistic conception of the organizational structure has
been that organizations represent a wide range of special
interests and that each works to advance its own interests
within the constraints of a spirit of democratic competi
tion

(Rose, 1967: 55-58; Truman, 1968: 134).

Elitists,

however, emphasize that the influence of organizations is
closely allied with power bases, an important one of which
is the class structure itself

(Schattschneider, 1960: 35-

42; Parenti, 1970: 259-263).

They suggest that the re

sources which organizations might bring to bear in conducting
day-to-day affairs vary considerably.

Although there are a

number of ways in which organizational resources might be
enhanced, organizations of higher class composition are
argued to have greater access to structural controls natural
ly appropriate to such increases.

The theoretical bias in

the dissertation for the elitist position has already been
expressed.
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One of the ways in which a political organization
might be considered as influential is in terms of the
electoral support it is able to marshall.

This could

ostensibly cover a wide range of activities including
raising funds, establishing ready pools of volunteer work
ers, staging political rallies, formulating campaign pro
paganda and strategy, supplying poll watchers, and so forth.
In this study, organizational effectiveness as alleged by
rival organizational leaders and candidates for office will
be assessed by the levels of political participation found
within the areal limits of organizational activity.

Inso

far as an organization is able to perform effectively as a
mediator and reference group for its corresponding target
population of members and identifying nonmembers,

it is

expected to increase political participation within rec
ognizable areal units.
These relationships involving organizational effec
tiveness are stated as follows:
(4)

Areal units with higher objective class indices and
larger proportions of white residents will have higher
organizational effectiveness ratings than areal units
with lower class indices and smaller proportions of
whites.

(5)

Areal units with higher organizational effectiveness
ratings will have higher percentages of individuals
registered to vote, turn out to vote, and unanimity
in candidate choice than areal units with lower organ
izational effectiveness ratings.
Figure 4 contains a summarization of the basic re

lationships contained within the five formalized hypotheses.
Areal units which are classified as upper white are expected
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FIGURE 4
SUMMARY OF EXPECTED RELATIONSHIPS AS EXPRESSED
IN THE RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
I.

Race/Class Index

Black

Lower White

Upper White

Aa

B

C

Organizational
Effectiveness

Expectation: C > B > A

II.

Race/Class Index
Organizational
Effectiveness -

Organiza
tional
Effec
tiveness

High/3

A°

B

C

ABC

Low

D

E

F

DEF

AD

BE

CF

Race/Class
Index-Column
Effects

Expectations:

(1)

CF > BE >

(2)

ABC > DEF

(3)

A > D, B >

AD

E, and C > F

All cell entries represent anticipated level of organi
zational effectiveness.
Organizational effectiveness variable dichotomized into
"High" and "Low" for this presentation.
c
All cell entries represent anticipated levels of po
litical participation.
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to have the highest levels of organizational effectiveness,
while lower rates are expected in lower white and in black
areas.

Further,

it is anticipated that observed levels of

political participation will increase as one moves across
the race/class index as applied to areal units.

Specifical

ly, the highest rates of political participation are expected
in areal units predominated by upper whites, while succes
sively lower rates of participation are anticipated among
lower white and black areas respectively.

Should the dis

tribution of race/class characteristics fail to be a factor
in affecting levels of organizational effectiveness or po
litical participation, there will be no differences among
the column effects indicated in section I and II of the
table.
However, the anticipated effect of race/class upon
political participation is not thought to be consistent
across levels of organizational effectiveness.

Areas where

organizational effectiveness is said to be high are expected
to exhibit higher levels of political participation than
areal units where organizational effectiveness is low, re
gardless of whether the area be black, lower white, or
upper white.

What is being argued is that organizational

effectiveness stands as an intervening variable between
distributions of objective race/class features and categories
of political action by race and class.

Should organizational

effectiveness exert no significant influence upon political
participation levels across race/class categories, there will
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be no difference between the row effects indicated in
section II of the table.

Sources of Data
The Setting.

Partly by design and partly by cir

cumstance, the study involves an analysis of recent local
elections in Orleans Parish.

There are, first of all, good

theoretical reasons for dealing with local politics using
Orleans Parish as a case study.

As stipulated in the intro

ductory chapter, the American political system is highly
decentralized

(Dye and Zeigler, 1972: 199-200).

Consequent

ly, attempts to define its structure and analyze its pro
cesses require full and thorough treatment at the local
level

(Riker, 1959: 11-12).

Furthermore,

it has been

suggested that political decisions most immediately affec
ting everyday life take place locally.

Hence, local issues

are often hotly contested in a manner which gives flesh to
potential cleavages otherwise dormant in state and national
elections.

On the other hand, Orleans Parish, comprising

essentially the city of New Orleans, happens to be a readily
accessible area containing features suitable for examining
the problem under study.

The city's cultural and histori

cal heritage marks the confluence of French and Spanish
traditions with those of the Old and New South producing, it
is argued, a basic politics of class and race.
The most current and comprehensive sources of data
relevant to the present study may be found in the following
items:
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(1)

selected 1970 publications
released by the United
States Bureau of the Census (1972),

(2)

the registration rolls of the Orleans Parish Registrar
of Voters,

(3)

voting returns compiled by the Orleans Parish Demo
cratic Executive Committee (1973) and the Office of
the Secretary of State for the State of Louisiana
(1972, 1974).

These materials contain detailed information concerning the
city's social, racial, economic, and political character
istics commensurate with the purposes of this study.

Of

equal importance, these data are presented in forms amenable
to the analysis of New Orleans by specific areal units.
The census data, for example, are available by
census tracts.

Such tracts constitute the units into which

metropolitan areas have been divided for statistical pur
poses by the Bureau of the Census in co-operation with local
committees.

As a rule of thumb, tracts generally contain

an average of approximately 4,000 residents and are drawn
in such a way to comprise relatively homogeneous units.
Data enumerated by tracts which are of particular relevance
here include population size by age and race, income char
acteristics for individuals and families, schooling and
educational attainment levels for adults, and detailed
occupation and employment classifications.
The political divisions within New Orleans are de
fined in terms of the city's seventeen wards and their
respective subdivisions, the precincts.

Vital political

information available for these political units include
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voter registration figures, voter turn out levels, and the
compilations of the vote for each candidate in selected
elections.

Fortunately, comparison of wards, precincts,

and census tracts is possible in the case of New Orleans
since the boundaries of each of these divisions, while not
perfectly coterminous, do nonetheless permit matching
without gross distortions.

Therefore, although wards are

much larger in size than any given census tract, a number
of tracts may be combined to indicate significant ward
characteristics indirectly through census materials.

Like

wise, precincts are generally smaller than census tracts
but can be combined in order to supply the political data
for any given tract.

The rationale behind the matching of

census tracts with political divisions, therefore, is the
hope of producing areal units which are well-defined in
terms of both ecological and political characteristics.
A map containing the matching of census tract and politi
cal ward boundaries is presented in appendix 1.
However, the matching of tracts and precincts seems
to be the more desirable of the two strategies.

Such a

grouping will yield fairly small and relatively homogeneous
units.

This would not be the case with the larger, more

compositionally diverse wards.

With this purpose in mind

then, one hundred and sixty-three census tracts and four
hundred twenty-three precincts were subjected to initial
examination.

Several highly irregular tracts comprising

warehouse districts and industrial zones were eliminated
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from consideration.

Further, several emergent tracts with

extremely small populations were combined with appropriate
adjacent tracts of the more usual size.

Finally, in a

small number of instances, two or three tracts were com
bined into single areal units in order to achieve a more
harmonious fit of precinct and tract boundaries.

A final

tally of four hundred nineteen precincts were combined with
one hundred thirty-one census tract units.

A listing of

these matched tracts and precincts is presented in appendix
2.

It is these matched tracts and precincts which consti

tute the areal units of New Orleans for the purposes of
this study.
The Elections.

Earlier in this chapter, political

participation was said to comprise voter registration,
voter turn out, and candidate choice in specified areal
units.

These indicators may be concretely measured only

within the framework of specific elections.

Two basic

considerations are invoked in choosing these elections,
namely, the time frame of the election and, two, the
visibility of the election.

Concerning the issue of when

selected elections took place, "recent" elections are pre
ferred since interviews with organizational leaders and
candidates for office are planned as a supplement to census
materials and precinct returns.

Asking respondents to re

call details concerning organizational activity and effec
tiveness from elections too distant in the past runs greater
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risk of inaccurate or incomplete responses due to under
standable lapses of memory.
On the other hand, the time element must be balanced
with considerations for the number and qualities of local
elections available for such analysis over recent time spans.
Elections included in the study should involve races for a
variety of vital local offices and comprise broad based
interests found engaging by organizations from a crosssection of the community.

This strategy is not meant as a

systematic sample of available elections but rather concen
trates upon selecting out types of elections which relevant
forms of organizational activity are expected, and, hope
fully, cleavages among organizations are exposed.

In this

vein, special attention is directed towards those elections
which forced run-offs and, hence, organizational realign
ments for the second election.

Further, contests featuring

black and white candidates for office or candidates having
clearly defined class ties are given greater consideration.
Following these guidelines, eleven elections have
been selected for consideration in this study.
of these elections is presented in figure 5.
two elections are the First

A summary
The first

(August 19, 1972) and Second

(September 30, 1972) Democratic Primaries for the position
of Supreme Court Justice, First District, State of
Louisiana.

This election was somewhat unusual since it

featured races for two associate justice positions which
had become available simultaneously through retirements
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FIGURE 5
SUMMARY OF ELEVEN RECENT NEW ORLEANS
ELECTIONS SELECTED FOR ANALYSIS

Year
1972

1973

1974

Position Contested

Candidates

(1) Supreme Court Justice, First
District, a State of Louisiana,
First Democratic Primary

Pascal F. Calogero, Jr.
Revius 0. Ortique, Jr.
William V. Redmann
Leon Sarpy

(2) Supreme Court Justice, Second
Democratic Primary

Pascal F. Calogero, Jr.
Leon Sarpy

(3) District Attorney, Orleans
Parish, First Democratic Primary

Harry Connick
Jim Garrison
George W. Reese
Ross T. Scaccia

(4) District Attorney, Second
Democratic Primary

Harry Connick
Jim Garrison

(5) Civil Sheriff, Orleans Parish,
First Democratic Primary

Johnny Jackson, Sr.
Alvin J. Sargent
Milton A. Stire

(6) Clerk of Criminal Court, Orleans
Parish, First Democratic Primary

Herman J. Bustemente
Daniel B. Haggerty
Edwin A. Lombard

(7) Clerk of Criminal Court, Second
Democratic Primary

Daniel B. Haggerty
Edwin A. Lombard

(8) Supreme Court Justice, First
District, State of Louisiana,
First Democratic Primary

Pascal F. Calogero, Jr.
Alwynn J. Cronvich
Jim Garrison

(9) Supreme Court Justice, Second
Democratic Primary

Pascal F. Calogero, Jr.
Alwynn J. Cronvich

(10) Judge, Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals, First Democratic
Primary

Peter H. Beer
Joseph R. Bossetta
Dcminic C. Grieshaber
George W. Reese

(11) Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals,
Second Democratic Primary

Peter H. Beer
Joseph H. Bossetta

^irst District is comprised of Jefferson, Orleans, Plaquemines,
and St. Bernard Parishes.
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prior to their scheduled expiration dates.

One seat

carried a term expiring December 31, 19 80, and the second
seat was due to expire on December 31, 1974.
the latter position is
reasons.

The race for

included in the study for three

One, the 1974 expiration date allows for a com

parison two years hence of an election involving an ex
tremely important judgeship position.

Two, the candidates

for that position, Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., Revius O.
Ortique, Jr., William V. Redmann, and Leon Sarpy, are in
dividuals whose origins and categories of potential support
cover the range of class distinctions in New Orleans.
Calogero and Redmann,

for example, both claim ties with

the working class and organized labor while Sarpy's membersips in the Krewe of Rex and the Boston Club attest to his
upper class status.

The racial issue is also a factor in

this election.

Ortique is one of the city's better known

black lawyers.

Two, the failure of any of the four can

didates to carry a majority of the votes in the first
primary forced a run-off election between Calogero and
Sarpy, thereby presenting an interesting situation for
analyzing votes in these two elections by class and race.
A total of five elections are selected for analysis
from the 1973 First and Second Democratic Primaries held on
the tenth of November and the fifteenth of December respec
tively.

The race for Orleans Parish District Attorney

pitted challengers Harry Connick, George W. Reese, and Ross
T. Scaccia against controversial incumbent Jim Garrison.
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The highly visible campaign marked Connick's second attempt
to unseat Garrison and the race was further intensified by
the complex of "law and order" issues with its attached
racial overtones.

The second primary featured a run-off

between Connick and Garrison.
The Orleans Parish Civil Sheriff race was also
drawn from the 1973 Democratic primaries.

This contest

found long-time incumbent and old-style politician Milton
A. Stire faced by two black candidates, Rev. Johnny Jackson,
S r . , a well known pastor and community leader, and the
lesser known Alvin J. Sargent.
out a run-off.

Stire won the election with

The election is of interest here in terms

of the distribution of both Stire's support and those of
the respective black candidates.

The final two elections

from 1973 involve the race for the position of Clerk of
Criminal Court (Orleans Parish).

Daniel B. Haggerty, like

Stire an incumbent of long standing and a politician of
the old school, was challenged by Edwin A. Lombard and
Herman J. Bustemente.

It was generally felt within the

city's political circles that Lombard, a respected and
articulate lawyer, had a good chance of becoming the first
black to win a city-wide elective office since Reconstruc
tion.

Bustemente was not regarded as a serious candidate.

This speculation proved to be essentially correct.
Bustemente polled less than six percent of the vote in the
first primary and a second primary was necessary to settle
the issue between Haggerty and Lombard.

The 1974 Democratic primaries were held on August
seventeenth and September twenty-eighth.

The first two

elections of interest involved the second run in two years
for the Supreme Court Justice seated vacated by retirement.
Pascal Calogero, who had successfully sought the position
in 1972, now faced challenges from Jim Garrison, recover
ing from his defeat by Connick in the 1973 District
Attorney's race, and Alwynn J. Cronvich, Criminal Sheriff
of Jefferson Parish and self-styled "law and order" can
didate.

This race obviously invites comparisons with the

same election of 1972.

It also proved to be one of the

more heated and less dignified campaigns in recent years.
A second primary was necessary to decide this election as
well.
The final two elections are drawn from the race
for Judge of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, a posi
tion also made available by retirement and carrying an
expiration date of December 31, 1983.

The four contest

ants were City Councilman Peter H. Beer, Municipal Judge
Joseph R. Bossetta, Civil Court Judge Dominic C. Grieshaber,
and lawyer George W. Reese, also a candidate in the 1973
District Attorney race.

Beer, who was viewed as repre

senting "uptown New Orleans" on the City Council, promised
an open campaign in which no money would be paid by him
for organizational endorsements and support.

On the other

hand, Bossetta, a George Wallace elector in 1968 who re
portedly "softened" since that time, actively sought the
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involvement and support of political organizations.

The

appropriate role of the city's political organizations
thus became somewhat of an open campaign issue through
both the first and second primaries of this race.
With the selection of these elections, it is now
possible to apply the operationalization instructions to
the indicators of political participation.

Turning first

to the problem of voter registration levels, it is noted
that the Orleans Parish Registrar of Voters Office com
piles the numbers of those registered to vote by precinct
and by ward on a monthly basis.

State regulations con

cerning voter eligibility require that an individual be
registered at least thirty days prior to an election before
being allowed to participate.

Conversations with personnel

at the Registrar of Voters Office reveal that the number of
persons registering between first and second primaries in
any given year is negligible.

Therefore,

the decision was

made to determine registration levels on the basis of the
rolls as established one month prior to the first primary
of each of the elections involved, that is, July of 1972,
October of 1973, and July of 1974, respectively.
The registration rolls for these months provide
the absolute numbers of those registered to vote.

In raw

form, these numbers are not useful due to variations in the
sizes of the base populations by area and year of all those
eligible to register.

Further, no estimates of the per

centages registered from the pool of all those eligible to
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register are attempted by the Registrar of Voters Office.
These percentages, however, may be crudely estimated from
census data associated with the previously defined areal
units.

As the minimum age for registration is eighteen

years and the most recent census data available are for
the year 1970, the pool of those eligible to vote per areal
unit is defined as the absolute number of individuals six
teen years of age and older per areal unit for the 1972
estimate, fifteen years of age and older for the 1973
estimate, and fourteen years of age and older for the 1974
g

estimate.

The level of voter registration for each areal

unit then is computed by dividing the actual number regis
tered in an area by the estimate of the total number
eligible to register.

A summary of these procedures is

presented in figure 6.
The registration information also provides some
basis for standardizing the measurement of voter turn out
in the various elections.

The compilation of the ballots

cast in each precinct and ward are available through the
Orleans Parish Democratic Executive Committee for all
elections except those dealing with the Supreme Court
Justice seat.

Data for the 1972 and 1974 versions of this

race are, however, obtainable through the Louisiana Sec
retary of State's office.

The basic procedure involves

combining these voting returns by precinct to match the
appropriate tracts.

Voter turn out per areal unit is com

puted by dividing the total number of votes cast in an area
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FIGURE 6
MEASURES OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Dimension

Indicator of Participation

Operational Definition

Percent registered per
areal unit, 1972

Total number of persons
per areal unit registered
in July 1972 divided by
total number of persons
16 years of age and older
enumerated in census per
areal unit

Percent registered per
areal unit, 1973

Total number of persons
per areal unit registered
in October 1973 divided
by total nurrfoer of persons
15 years of age and older
per areal unit

Percent registered per
areal unit, 1974

Total number of persons
per areal unit registered
in July 1974 divided by
total number of persons
14 years of age and
older per areal unit

(2) Turn out

Percent turn out (computed
for each election)

Total number of votes cast
per areal unit divided by
the total number of persons
registered per areal unit.

(3) Candidate
Choice

Percentage of votes cast
for candidate (computed
for each candidate)

Total number of votes cast
for a candidate per areal
unit divided by the total
number of votes cast for
all candidates per areal
unit

(1) Registration

81
by the corresponding number of individuals registered to
vote.

Measures of candidate support are assessed by di

viding the number of votes cast for each candidate per
areal unit by the total number of votes for that area.
These latter procedures are likewise specified in figure 6.
The Organizations.

The identification of relevant

political organizations and the subsequent collection of
pertinent data are more problematic here than was the
gathering of information for areal units discussed in the
previous section.

Preestablished lists of such organi

zations and compilations of their characteristics relevant
to the purposes of this study do not exist.
some systematic procedure must be instituted:

Therefore,
(1) to

identify the population of political organizations operating
in New Orleans during specified elections, and (2) to form
ulate an appropriate questionnaire and schedule of inter
views by which their activities and influences can be
assessed.
A preliminary review of New Orlean's major newspapers
was conducted as a means of generating a list of the city's
active political organizations.

The newspapers consulted

include the New Orleans Times-Picayune,

the daily morning

newspaper and the paper with the city's largest circulation,
the New Orleans States-Item, the daily evening newspaper,
The Louisiana Weekly,

a weekly newspaper expressly oriented

toward the black community, and finally two weekly news
papers of popular local readership, Courier and Figaro.
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This effort yielded a list of organizations indicated as
active in news articles or shown to be active by the publi
cation of advertisements or endorsements in these news
papers.

The basic list was expanded and further annotated
7

through initial interviews with several reference persons.
These two steps produced a list of fifty-two organizations
(see appendix 3).
The initial interviews pointed to the operation of
a rather interesting phenomenon.

It was indicated that

literally hundreds of political organizations tend to emerge
during

(recent) elections in New Orleans.

Some of these

organizations appear to be formed to represent special issue
or neighborhood interests, either by attracting candidate
attention or by actively supporting a favored candidate.
Many, however, seem to be simply instituted by individuals
offering to "work" selected areas in behalf of given can
didates if supplied with sufficient funds to cover campaign
expenses.

This suggests that elections constitute a highly

competitive and serious "game," that is, they comprise in
stances of organizational struggles for various social,
political, and/or economic rewards.

Many of these political

organizations defined as active "close shop"
exist between elections.

and cease to

A further number do not survive

more than one or so elections.

The basic point is that

the population of active political organizations varies de
pending upon how one wishes to specify limitations in terms
of size, purpose, and duration.
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The decision was made at this point to stay with the
original guideline in constructing the population of organ
izations, that is, a list of those political organizations
known to be active during the time frame under study are
included regardless of size, purpose, and so forth.

Realis

tically, however, resource limitations preclude the study
of all known active political organizations in New Orleans.
The more salient question, therefore, involves how these
organizations to be studied shall be selected.

The prefer

ence here is to single out for analysis the "major" organi
zations rather than drawing a probability sample of
organizations for study.
simple:

The justification

is perhaps too

if organizations are indeed mediators as predic

ted, then the capacity is expected present at the very
least among the major political organizations.

Given this

purpose, the list is thought certainly to contain the major
political organizations operating in New Orleans during
the elections being considered.
The basic list of political organizations with which
interviews are attempted is presented in figure 7.

These

political organizations are those judged most active and/or
influential on the basis of newspaper reviews and initial
reference interviews.

They represent a wide range of in

terests in the community, including, hopefully, those of
class and race.

By and large, they are organizations which

seem to maintain at least a modicum of formal operations
between elections and are those which have survived the
elections under study.
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FIGURE 7
POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS T.N NEW ORLEANS
SELECTED FOR ANALYSIS

1 - Alliance for Good Government

(AGG)

2 - Association of Independent Democrats

(AID)

3 - Black Organization for Leadership Development
4 - Community Organization for Urban Politics
5 - Cresent City Democratic Association

(BOLD)

(COUP)

(CCDA)

6 - Cresent City Independent Voters League

(CCIVL)

7 - Criminal Courts Bar Association
8 - Development Association of Wards and Neighborhoods
(DAWN)
9 - Greater New Orleans AFL-CIO
10 - Independent Women's Organization

(IWO)

11 - League of Women Voters
12 - Mid-City Democrats (MCD)
13 - New Orleans Bar Association
14 - New Orleans Coalition

(NOC)

15 - New Orleans Voters Association
16 - New Orleans Young Democrats

(NOVA)

(NOYD)

17 - Ninth Ward Citizens Voters League

(NWCVL)

18 - Orleans Parish Democratic Executive Committee
19 - Orleans Parish Progressive Voters League

(OPPVL)

20 - Regular Democratic Organization (RDO)
21 - Southern Organization for Unified Leadership (SOUL)
22 - Tough-Minded Independent Leadership Tribunal
23 - Treme Independent Political Society

(TIPS)

24 - University of New Orleans Young Democrats
25 - Uptown Democratic Association

(UDA)

(TILT)

(UNO-YD)
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A second set of problems involves the procedure for
obtaining the desired organizational data.

The interview

ing of a designated leader from each of the organizations
was selected as the most feasible strategy for obtaining
this information.

This strategy is not without its short

comings, principally that the revelation of each organiza
tion's characteristcis by an actual member is entrusted to
a single interview.

The problem here is not so much that

one suspects the falsification of information but it is
the potential variability among organizational members'
perceptions of what an organization actually does and/or
seeks to do which is worrisome.

On the other hand, a rank

ing leader within an organization may be more readily aware
of a wide range of organizational characteristics and be
more directly involved in the sorts of considerations and
happenings which guide organizational activity.

Further,

this strategy restricts the number of resultant interviews
to a limit within the logistics of a single interviewer.
The candidates seeking office in the speicified
elections constitute another important source of informa
tion concerning organizations.

Unlike the data derived

from interviews with organizational leaders, this informa
tion is more likely to be "reputational" in nature.

How

ever, if the hypotheses guiding the research are correct,
these candidates for office are in a position to divulge
unique observations about local organizational activity.
Not only are such individuals expected to be intimately
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acquainted with the New Orleans political scene, but also
many of them will have been directly affected by such
activity.

By interviewing both successful and defeated

candidates alike, it may be possible to construct some
balanced assessments of the organizations and their ac
tivities from this perspective.

The views of the candi

dates may likewise serve to counter some excesses reported
by organizational leaders.

The intention here, therefore,

is to interview at least the major candidates in all eleven
elections.
The questionnaire designed for interviewing organi
zational leaders is presented in appendix 4.

An earlier

version of the questionnaire was pretested in interviews
with three organizationally affiliated individuals.

Al

terations and improvements suggested by the pretest are
incorporated into the present questionnaire.

As it now

stands, the questionnaire takes from forty to forty-five
minutes to administer, although it can easily run to an
hour if the respondent is encouraged to give more extensive
elaborations.

Specified.clusters of items within the

questionnaire are intended to ascertain the following in
formation:
(1)

the basic structure of the organization
18 - 21)

(items 1 - 7 ,

(2)

the organizational affiliations and occupational ties
of organizational leaders (items 23 - 32)

(3)

the composition of organizational membership (items
5 - 15)
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(4)

specification of organizational membership by areal
units (items 8 - 1 0 )

(5)

target groups of non-members to which organization
orients itself (items 16, 52, 53)

(6)

specification of target groups by areal units
(items 17, 56)

(7)

the process by which candidates were endorsed in
elections under consideration (items 33 - 51, 54)

(8)

types of campaign activities performed

(9)

sources of organizational revenue

(items 55, 58)

(items 59, 60)

(10)

ratings of the city's political organizations
(items 61 - 64)

(11)

specification of organizational influence by areal
units (item 61a)
A second questionnaire was prepared for the inter

viewing of candidates who sought office in the elections
under consideration.

The solicitation of information from

the candidates is necessarily oriented toward the types
of observations and evaluations made a£ candidates.

This

questionnaire addresses the following issues:
(1)

motivation for seeking office

(item 1)

(2)

conception of the "average" voter in New Orleans
(items 2, 3)

(3)

assessment of the role of political organizations in
the election(s) in which the candidate participated
(items 4, 5)

(4)

specification of organizational influence
election(s) by areal unit, (item 6)

in candidate's

(5)

ratings of the city's political organizations
6-9)

(6)

specification of organizational influence
unit (item 6a)

(items

by areal
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The brevity of this questionnaire results from a conscious
effort to limit its length.

Simply,

it was felt that ob

taining appointments with the candidates might be facili
tated if the amount of time requested for an interview
were reduced in this case to twenty to twenty-five minutes.
Footnotes
^"The rationale for the comparative approach is well
expressed by Durkheim (1966: 125):
"We have only one way
to demonstrate that a given phenomenon is the cause of
another, viz., to compare the cases in which they are
simultaneously present or absent, to see if the variations
they present in these different combinations indicate that
one depends on the other.
When they can be artifically
produced at the will of the observer, the method is that
of [the] experiment. . . When, on the contrary, the pro
duction of facts is not within our control and we can only
bring them together in the way that they have been spon
taneously produced, the method employed is that of indirect
experiment, or the comparative method."
2

Nonmanual is here defined as including those em
ployed in the following occupational categories:
(a)
professional, technical, and kindred workers, (b) managers
and administrators (except farm), and (c) nonretail sales
workers (retail sales workers specifically excluded).
3
Families classified as falling below the poverty
level are those earning less than $4,000 per year.
4
A reference person is defined as an individual con
sidered by the researcher to possess particular knowledge
about the New Orleans political scene. Where utilized,
such persons will be identified in footnotes.
5
The comparison of areal units in this study involves
an entire population as derived from census and precinct
data.
Descriptive techniques, including those of correla
tion and regression, shall be used in evaluating these data.
Analysis of variance, an inferential statistic, shall also
be used.
In this case, the statistic indicates more cor
rectly the probability that differences of the observed
magnitude would occur by chance alone given a hypothetical
set of like circumstances.
Technically, the parameters are
observed rather than estimated.
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g
This procedure admittedly involves undetermined
amounts of error.
For example, the procedure tacitly
assumes that death and migration rates by areal unit are
relatively constant— an improbable assumption.
However,
in the absence of further alternatives, this strategy is
argued acceptable for generating at least crude estimates
needed for the comparisons indicated.
7

Mr. James Chubbuck, Institute of Politics, Loyola
University, New Orleans; Mr. Joe Walker, Walker Associates
(a local polling research firm); and Mr. Freddie Warren,
prominent black lawyer and former assistant district
attorney.

CHAPTER IV
THE ORGANIZATIONS
Introduction
Chapters four and five contain a presentation and
analysis of ecological/survey data collected in accordance
with the design of the study.

As indicated in the previous

chapter, an assessment of the organizational factor is
complicated by a variety of problems, including the ex
post facto character of the study, the indirect nature of
the "influence" variable, resource limitations, and so
forth.

Nonetheless, it is felt that a considerable amount

of interesting and usable evidence has been generated
which allows for an appropriate testing of the research
problem.
According to the plan specified in the previous
chapter, interviews were attempted with the leaders of
twenty-five local political organizations.

Organizational

leaders were questioned about both their own and other
political organizations.

Additionally, candidates for

office in selected elections were interviewed about the
operation of political organizations for the elections in
which they participated.
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Four organizations— the League of Women Voters, the
Criminal Courts Bar Association, the New Orleans Bar Associ
ation,

and the Orleans Parish Democratic Executive

Committee— were found to depart somewhat from the criteria
established for inclusion in the study.

For example, by

laws of the League prohibit that organization from endorsing
candidates or dispensing partisan campaign information.
The two bar associations were found to be "politically
active" only in the sense that the preferences of the mem
bership, as indicated by a straw vote, are made public in
judicial races.

Their charters likewise forbid further

action or formal dissemination of information during cam
paigns.

Finally, the Orleans Parish Executive Committee

was found to be solely an administrative body instituted
primarily to referee electoral proceedings and to oversee
the proper and accurate recording, tallying, and publica
tion of voting returns.
A brief synopsis of the remaining twenty-one organ
izations , and the outcome of a contact with each is
summarized below.

There are two purposes in presenting

these initial summaries.

First, they provide a working,

descriptive account of the political organizational struc
ture of New Orleans.

Such information is plainly of his

torical interest and can be appreciated solely at the
descriptive level.

It further stands as a basis for com

parison with other works dealing with the New Orleans
political scene.

Secondly, the summaries allow for a brief
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but

systematic format to acquaint the reader with the

empirical evidence upon which latar generalizations and
characterizations of the organizations are based.

In keep

ing with the promise of confidentiality, information is
reported in grouped or anonymous form.^

Appendix 5 con

tains a list of those persons with whom interviews were
conducted.
Descriptive Summaries
Alliance for Good Government (AGG).

The Alliance

was founded in 1967 as an organization officially devoted
to "the principles of good government" and "the elimina2
tion of corruption."
It was expressly meant to be a
politically-oriented organization which would openly en
dorse and support candidates "committed to reform."

In

addition, it intended "to encourage high ethical standards
of conduct" among politicians by instituting an annual
award for the legislator from the New Orleans area who best
exemplified such standards.

Literature published by the

Alliance stresses the independence of the organization
from vested political ties and emphasizes the personal
qualities of their preferred candidates, especially those
of "honesty and integrity."
The membership of the Alliance is reported to be
composed primarily of white, well-educated, young profes
sionals and businessmen.

The handful of blacks who have

joined the group are likewise described as well-heeled.
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Membership strengths and organizational influence are said
to be concentrated in the "middle and upper-middle class"
sections of Uptown, Gentilly, and New Orleans East.

This

particular composition is most likely attributable to the
organization's preoccupation with the "good government"
theme, rather than the result of any restrictions delimit
ing membership.

This view is expressed in the words of a

leader from a rival organization:

"Political reform is a

middle class luxury."
The endorsements made by the Alliance reflect its
reformist concerns.

The group has on occasion supported

black candidates over white opponents, the most recent
example being their choice of Edwin Lombard over Daniel
Haggerty in their 1973 race

(considered in this study.)

A

nonpartisan orientation towards reform is claimed by virtue
of their endorsement

of Republican David Treen over

Democrat Charles Grisbaum in the 1974 Congresssional elec
tion.
The Alliance does accept money from candidates to
help pay the costs of advertising endorsements.

Their

efforts to keep these transactions open and above suspicion
may be further evidence of the reformist impulse.
candidates,

Several

for example, revealed that the Alliance pro

vided them with itemized tabs
money was spent and,

indicating how campaign

in at least one instance, they re

turned money left over from the campaign to the candidate.
Apparently,

such bookkeeping and scruples are rare, accord4
ing to the reimbursed candidate.

3

94
The Alliance is generally well-regarded by other
organizational leaders and candidates alike.

It is typi

cally described by them as "honest" and "forthright."
However, the matter of the organization's influence is
another question.

The consensus is that its endorsements

and support are "nice to have," but that their actual im
pact in any given election is slight.

The candidates as

a group do rate the organization more highly than do the
other organizational leaders.
Association of Independent Democrats

(AID).

AID

is also a "good government" group, but is known to a far
lesser extent among the candidates and organizational
leaders than is the Alliance.

The organization was char

tered in 1970 under the leadership of now-City Councilman
Joseph DiRosa with the expressed purpose of instituting
"real change in government."

The basic promotion made by

the group encourages the citizen to "be independent, vote
the person, not the party 1"
AID claims a biracial, multi-class membership con
centrated primarily in the fifth and ninth wards.

The

headquarters for the group is located on Bourbon Street
in the French Quarter, and their political rallies are
said to draw "quite well" among Quarterites.

The appeal

of the group in their designated area among blacks is
probably slight.

As shall be shown, several black organ

izations of high regard operate in these two wards.
Further, the group did not endorse any of the four black
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candidates

(Ortique in the 1972 Supreme Court race, Lombard

in the Clerk of Court race, and Jackson or Sargent in the
Civil Sheriff election) entered in the recent elections
under consideration here.
Like many organizations, AID does invite candidates
to speak to their rallies.

This format is generally re

garded by the candidates as a "useful tactic" for making
personal contact with potential supporters.

However, the

impact of AID, that is, the group's ability to reach, con
vince, and activate potential voters, is thought to be
minimal in any particular election.

Neither the candidates

nor the organizational leaders considered AID to be an in
fluential organization, although several expressed their
personal and professional respect for its current chair
person.
Black Organization for Leadership Development (BOLD).
BOLD came into being following the 1969 mayor's race, an
g

election in which the racial issue was a central question.
For the founders of BOLD, the issue boiled down to a single
question:

"will blacks have a voice in local politics?"

The organization is thus viewed by its leaders as a mode of
political expression for the black neighborhoods of the
Uptown area.

It is also conceived as having a wider "ser

vice function."

In addition to on-going registration

drives, and political education classes, it sponsors a jobplacement program, a Christmas toys program for neglected
and needy Uptown children, and a counselling program.
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The high educational attainment and the professional
occupational status of several BOLD leaders stand in con
trast to that of the bulk of their target group.

BOLD con

siders its area of operation to be the black neighborhoods
of the first, second, tenth, eleventh, twelfth, and seven
teenth wards.

The area contains both medium and low income

black neighborhoods,

including several housing projects.

Historically, Uptown black neighborhoods have been polit
ically fragmented.

White political candidates have for

years approached ministers and a myriad of other neighbor
hood leaders and influentials on an individual basis in an
attempt to sway a black precinct here and there.

The or

ganization hopes to consolidate the Uptown black communities
into a solid bloc.
BOLD has admittedly been modeled somewhat after
other successful black organizations, namely, the Community
Organization for Urban Politics

(COUP) of the seventh ward

and the Southern Organization for Unified Leadership
of the ninth ward.

(SOUL)

It has, however, experienced much less

success than these latter two organizations.

It is rated

by both the candidates and other organizational leaders
alike as being influential only on occasion, and then at a
relatively low level.

Candidates endorsed and supported

by the organization have often shown poorly in Uptown black
precincts, including the one in which BOLD is headquartered.
Critics of the group state that its leaders are often side
tracked by ideological issues irrelevant to the immediate

concerns of the blacks who make up their constituency.

In

BOLD's defense, it has been argued that decision-making
should be guided by certain issues as a matter of princi
ple rather than by baldly pragmatic concerns.
An illustration of this apparent controversy may
be drawn from the 1972 Supreme Court race.
Ortique because

BOLD endorsed

(a) he was regarded as a qualified b l a c k ,

and (b) it was thought that a black should fill that slot.
However, Calogero, a white liberal, was endorsed by several
other black organizations under the argument, at least in
part, that

(a) Ortique could not possibly win, and (b) a

solid black vote for Ortique, while gratifying, might in
sure the election of a white conservative.

Of course,

however real this issue, BOLD's problem of ineffectiveness
may or may not be reducible to this question of strategy.
Community Organization for Urban Politics

(COUP).

As in the case of BOLD, the emergence of COUP (pronounced
"coo") upon the New Orleans political scene is closely tied
to the 1969 mayor's race.

The middle 1960's marked a

period of growing black voter registration and eventually
g

candidacy for office.

It seems natural then that a po

litical organization should emerge in the seventh ward
where, in addition to the poorer black neighborhoods found
throughout the city, the black well-to-do and middle status
residential areas are located.

Following the 1968 defeat

of black candidate Charles Elloye for the seventh ward's
state legislative post, COUP was formed to organize the
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black voters of the Ward into a "politically effective"
group.

Although the organization is primarily political

in orientation, it does attempt to attend to the wider
social and economic needs of the area.

Indeed, its leaders

regard the political arena as the locus for dealing with
these larger problems.

One COUP member put it this way:

"If you're not there when the pie is sliced, you don't
get a n y !"
In 1969, the organization backed Maurice "Moon"
Landrieu, the eventual victor m

the mayor's race,

9

on his

promise of bringing a black voice into city government
with his administration.

Since this election, COUP has

come to be regarded by the candidates and organizational
leaders as one of the most influential and successful po
litical organizations in New Orleans.

There is, for

example, general agreement among them that COUP endorse
ments have had a strong impact in recent election upon the
strength and direction of the seventh ward's black vote.
Among several of those interviewed, COUP has the reputa
tion of being able to "deliver the vote," a phrase his
torically assigned to the prototype urban machine.
COUP sources do not disclaim the solid image of
the group.

They do, however, describe the relationship be

tween the organization and the black voter as one of
"trust."

As one leader elaborates this point:

The voters will rely upon the endorsements of
organizations whom they trust for guidance. . . .
In this matter of trust, actions speak louder
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than words. Good organizational leaders don't have
unlisted (telephone) numbers.
They're there when
you need them.
They're there at two in the morning
when you need bail or whatever. They live in
the
community, they're visible. . . (An organizational
leader) can't drive in from New Orleans East into
the neighborhood and say, "I'm here, I've come to
save you from all this!"
COUP expects endorsed candidates toprovide
campaign expenses.

money

for

It also conducts fund-raising drives,

particularly to help black candidates.

Unlike a number of

other organizations examined here, COUP does not "merely
advertize" its endorsement.

Its success in persuading the

black voter is attributed to extensive door-to-door cam
paigning— "the personal touch"— as well as telephone
canvassing.

Both types of activity, particularly when

carried out on a large scale, involve mounting expenses
for sample ballots, telephone banks, paid workers, and so
forth.^
COUP's reputation may be measured in other ways as
well.

Local

(and state) governmental positions are now

dotted with COUP members and affiliates.

Examples include

Criminal Magistrate Robert Collins, Mayor's Aide Robert
Tucker, city

Finance Committee member Henry Simon, Aviation

Board member Nolan Marshall,

Sewage and Water Board-member

James Beverly, Policy Planning Committee member Emmon
Mouton, Magistrate Clerk Emilo Dupre, and State Senator
Sidney Barthelemy.

Concerning the group's relative success,

one COUP member stated:

"When (Victor) Schiro was mayor

(1962-1969), the only blacks to be seen in City Hall were
standing behind brooms.

We've helped change all that."
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The sheer number of educated and professional status blacks
associated with COUP and its area of operation appears to
have extended the organization's sphere of influence inde
pendent of its actual clout.

Several black organizations

have been able to exert some political pressure upon can
didates through the ballot box.

However, none have had the

supply of members with the education and experience to take
advantage of the opening positions as has COUP.
COUP'S reputed rise has not been without difficulty
or dissension.

For example, their endorsement of Calogero

over Ortique in the 1972 Supreme Court race raised the
issue of a sell out in the minds of some blacks.

It is

likely that a number of factors were considered by the COUP
leadership, not the least of which being the fact that
Calogero and Mayor Landrieu are close friends and former
law partners.

One leader summed the "practical politics"

issue this way:
Sometimes you have to bite the bullet.
You can't
only wear black, red, and green, and run around
with a clinched fist.
You can accomplish much
more with a little give-and-take, with establish
ing yourself as a principled known quantity.
Crescent City Democratic Association

(CCDA).

CCDA

was founded in 1946 by deLesseps S. "Chep" Morrison follow
ing his stunning upset victory in the mayor's race over
incumbent Robert Maestri.

Prior to the election, Maestri

was considered unbeatable.

He had not been an unpopular

mayor.

Further, he was the undisputed leader of the Regular

Democratic Organization

(RDO, discussed later), a reputedly
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well-oiled and powerful city-wide organization which had
dominated local politics almost uninterrupted since 1896.^
On the other hand, Morrison had been urged into the race
at the last minute by a desperate and disorganized com
mittee of business and professional men opposed to Maestri.
So reluctant was anyone to run against Maestri that the
committee actually rummaged through the telephone directory
at one point in search of potential challengers
1974: 64).

(Parker,

Committee member Jacob Morrison eventually

suggested that his younger brother, a colonel about to be
discharged from the Army and a returning war-hero, might
be interested.
Morrison ran on a platform of political reform.
He assailed the incumbent's organization as an entrenched,
corrupt, and unresponsive political machine.

Though a

slow in city services was probably attributable to the
war years and war effort as much as anything else, Morrison
placed the blame squarely upon the complacent "machine."
His charges apparently struck a responsive chord.

House

wives took to the streets armed with brooms, symbolic of
their desire to "clean up" New Orleans
69).

(Parker, 1974: 67-

Maestri's campaign effort also fueled the charge of

complacency.

His organization worked without apparent

urgency, and he himself delivered only one radio broadcast
during the campaign.

Morrison won by over 4,000 votes.

Though elected as a reform candidate, Morrison
moved quickly after his election to build an effective
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organization of his own.

CCDA was a city-wide organization

comprising a number of seemingly incompatible groups, rang
ing from professional politicians

(including some RDO

defectors), middle class housewives
pendent Women's Organization,
businessmen

(enrolled in the Inde

IWO, discussed later),

11
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(the Cold Water Committee), and blacks

(Orleans Parish Progressive Voters League, OPPVL, discuss
ed later).

Like RDO, however, the main structure of the

organization consisted of representatives and their staffs
from each of the city's seventeen wards

(Parker, 1974:63).

Morrison was elected mayor of New Orleans for four
consecutive terms.

In 1955 and again in 1959, he unsuc

cessfully ran for governor of the State of Louisiana.

The

second defeat, experienced at the hands of segregationist
Jimmie Davis,

13

ended all gubernatorial aspirations.

Further, the rejection of a referendum by New Orleans voters
which would have allowed Morrison to run for a fifth term
as mayor terminated further local options.

Nine months

before his fourth term as mayor expired, Morrison accepted
an appointment to the Organization of American States from
the Kennedy administration.

According to the city charter,

an interim successor could be chosen only from two city
councilmen elected at-large.

Victor Schiro of the CCDA was

selected by a close margin as interim mayor.
Mortison's departure and the ensuring organizational
chaos, which intensified with the 1961 mayor's race, was
viewed by many as evidence that (a) CCDA had been slipping
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badly during Morrison's fourth term,
was CCDA.

15

14

and (b) Morrison

In his absence, the diverse factions which

made up the organization polarized over issues, procedures,
and, of course, Morrison's successor.

Unable to unite be

hind a single candidate for the mayoralty election, CCDA
eventually fielded two candidates
Duplantier)
A. Comiskey.

(Schiro and Adrian

in the primary against RDO representative James
In a bizarre turn of events, it was reported

that Morrison briefly advocated Comiskey's candidacy be
fore the Cold Water Committee.

Comiskey was, however,

eliminated in the first primary, and Schiro defeated
Duplantier in the run-off, chiefly by capitalizing upon
segregationist sentiment stirred by court-ordered school
desegregation in New Orleans.
The current structure of CCDA only vaguely resem
bles that of the organization at its peak under Morrison.
IWO and OPPVL are now completely separated from CCDA.
Although the caucus still retains representatives from
each of the seventeen wards, present leadership claims
some strength among whites in only the tenth, eleventh,
twelfth, and fifteenth wards.

The decline of the organi

zation may be further evidenced by the observation that
CCDA has "not held regular meetings in over a year."

The

group is, however, planning to meet and work in up-coming
city council and gubernatorial elections.
Several factors are cited for the decline of CCDA
and other "old-line organizations in general."

The prime
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reason given for the drop in organizational importance is
the changing role of the news media in campaigning over the
years.

Says one CCDA leader:

The role of the news media, especially television,
is much stronger now than before.
People are more
personally oriented toward the candidate.
They
want to see him on TV and hear his pitch.
They
want to see for themselves.
Perhaps related to this is the overall decline in organi
zational importance, as distinguished from the decline of
the organization.

One leader observed:

took away a lot of our patronage."

"Civil service

Implied here is a loss

in the organization’s unique ability to provide opportunity
and service to those loyal to it.

Whereas the organization

was previously capable of providing the link between the
individual and the larger political structure, bureaucra
tization of the relationship is said to relegate the
organization to secondary importance.
A final factor thought to have affected the status
of CCDA is the rise in the registration of black voters,
coupled with the movement of large numbers of white ones
to the suburbs.

The combined effect is that "all neighbor

hoods in the city now have large percentages of black
voters, and, of course,

in some they hold a majority."

Successful organizations are said to be closely attuned to
the neighborhoods making up the wards.

CCDA has not been

able to tie into these networks in black areas, largely be
cause of their reluctance to alter long-standing traditions
dividing blacks and whites in the city.

The strategy

105
utilized by Morrison during the 1950's of incorporating
blacks, albeit in a secondary status, within the organiza
tion has been totally ineffective since that time.

Indeed,

what was once progressive is now regarded by blacks as
part of the problem.
Candidates and other organizational leaders gen
erally agree that CCDA is in a serious state of decline.
One candidate remarked:

"They still distribute sample

ballots, but it's an organization on paper only.
just don't have the horses any more."

They

The organization is

not regarded by the candidates and organizational leaders
as having had a significant impact in any of the elections
under consideration.

Organizational leaders, however, do

hold a more favorable opinion of CCDA than do the candi
dates for office.
Crescent City Independent Voters League

(CCIVL).

One of the city's oldest black organizations, CCIVL is
the political arm of General Longshore Workers Local #1419.
According to AFL-CIO by-laws, a union may formally support
only those candidates selected by a representative council
of all local unions.

Since whites have dominated the

council, the black longshore local was prevented political
expression as an organization, at least to the extent that
it sought changes in the interest of the black community.
Black longshore leaders, originally working in the Orleans
Parish Progressive Voters League

(OPPVL), formed CCIVL in

1951 to enable the utilization of union resources in behalf
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of candidates favorable "both to labor and the betterment
of the black community."
The most pressing task facing CCIVL at the time of
its inception was that of increasing voter registration
among black voters.

Both the "grandfather clause" and the

"understanding clause"

16

had been effectively employed over

the years to delimit black registration.

A further re

striction used occasionally permitted blacks to register
only as Republicans, thus precluding their meaningful
participation in local and state elections.

Two CCIVL

leaders, the late Clarence "Chink" Henry and current presi
dent Waifred Daliet, were reportedly among the first blacks
to register as Democrats in the ninth ward.

The organiza

tion stressed registration among union and

nonunion blacks

alike, and participated in state-wide registration drives
as well.

One dollar from the annual dues of each CCIVL

member was funnelled to the NAACP to further the registra
tion cause.
Although CCIVL attempted a city-wide organization
in the past, it presently claims active membership in only
the ninth, tenth, eleventh, and seventeenth wards.

The

organization holds regular political meetings only during
elections.

However, since the leadership of CCIVL and the

Longshore Local are identical, it would be misleading to
assert that the organization is totally inactive in the
black community between campaigns.

In addition to spon

soring political rallies, CCIVL makes its endorsements
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known through advertisements in the Louisiana Weekly and
the publication of sample ballots.
The candidates and organizational leaders do not
rate CCIVL as having been influential in recent local elec
tions.

This is not to say that they hold no respect for

the organization.

On the contrary, several expressed ad

miration of CCIVL leadership, particularly for its efforts
over the years.

It was also suggested that the impact of

the organization is difficult to assess.
quite a sizable group

Although it is

(more than 1500 paid members), its

members reside in black neighborhoods throughout the city.
However, the ratings may not be totally incorrect either.
Like CCDA, CCIVL may be starting to show its age.

Many

older blacks doubtlessly remember the organization and its
history.

However, the young black, whether he be poor or

upwardly mobile, seems more likely to associate the group
and its tactics with past wars.
Development Association of Wards and Neighborhoods
(DAWN).

DAWN was founded in 1971 by two well-known and

respected black leaders, the Rev. Johnny Jackson, Sr. and
his son, State Representative Johnny Jackson, Jr.

The

younger Jackson had previously been associated with the
Southern Organization for Unified Leadership

(SOUL), but

left to form his own organization in his bid for the state
legislature after a dispute over SOUL endorsements.

For

mally, DAWN is a civic rather than a political organization,
and hence qualifies for funds under a number of neighborhood
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improvement projects.

The organization is centered in the

one hundred and first legislative district, comprising
eighteen precincts from the eighth and ninth wards, includ
ing the notorious Desire Housing Project.

Organizational

activities revolve around those of the Jacksons,

who are

involved in a number of efforts to deal with the problems
of Desire and the surrounding area.
Statistically, portions of the one hundred and
first district are among the poorest in the city.

.

Median

family income for 1969 in Desire was $2315 as compared with
a median of $9536 for the city
the Census, 1972: 58,66).

(United States Bureau of

It is estimated that approxi

mately twenty-five percent of able adults are unemployed.
Problems of crime and drug abuse are said to be acute,
making it a highly patrolled area with frequent confronta
tions with police and concommitant racial animosities.

By

virtue of his positions held with the Desire Community
Housing Corporation
Area Council, Osei

(funded under Model Cities), Desire
(which operates three day-care centers),

and the Urban Squad Advisorty Board, rather than DAWN per
se, Rev. Jackson is often viewed by many residents and by
officials as a link between the area and the authority
structure.
Ratings of DAWN as an organization tend to reflect
this situation.

While the Jacksons are generally well-

known to the candidates and organizational leaders, DAWN
itself is not well-known among them.

Several who have
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dealt with the organization consider it to be "fairly
effective" in its own area.

An overall impression is that

the organization itself is minimally developed, and that
its impact resides mainly with the personal qualities of
its leaders.
Greater New Orleans AFL-CIO.

In terms of sheer

numbers alone, the AFL-CIO constitutes a strong potential
force in any election.
the port
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The city's central employers are

and the tourist trade.

Most occupational fields

are organized, including service workers, and the council
claims over 85,000 union members in Greater New Orleans,
an area comprising Orleans, Jefferson, and St. Bernard
Parishes.

In New Orleans, approximately fifty-five per

cent of union members are black.

However, overall member

ship for the Greater New Orleans area is predominately
white.
AFL-CIO endorsements for city elections are made by
a vote of a council representing all union locals.

By-laws

prohibit any local from making counter-endorsements.

Gen

erally, the AFL-CIO itself does not actively endorse or
support candidates.
the union locals.

Rather, such activities are left to
Occasionally, the council will make

financial contributions to candidates for office, the can
didates often promote AFL-CIO endorsements themselves.
The council and its recent log of decisions and endorsements
are generally regarded by black leaders as "unresponsive"
to the black community, despite the growing black membership
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among the union rank-and-file.

The council claims to

preoccupy itself with "labor" issues.
The impact of the AFL-CIO in recent elections is
difficult to access.

Although a given candidate is en

dorsed by the council, the endorsement typically receives
varying degrees of support from the locals.

Further,

blacks apparently often participate in campaigns in their
own political organizations rather than through unions.
Finally, the membership is residentially diverse.

Although

one might be able to locate "working class" neighborhoods,
membership in and exposure to the organization is likely
to be uneven.

This problem is commonly shared in the

ecological data collected here for many of the organiza
tions, but is particularly acute for those organizations
not oriented to specific neighborhoods.
Candidates for office and organizational leaders
consider the AFL-CIO to have been influential in recent
elections.

A negative endorsement, that is, the claim by

the organization that a candidate is "anti-labor," is seen
as having particular consequences.

In the words of on©

candidate:
An AFL-CIO endorsement is certainly helpful.
It
establishes your acceptability for a lot of
people.
If they like what else they see and hear,
or even if all other things are equal, they'll
vote for you over the other guy. . . . But (the
AFL-CIO) is most effective when they are out to
defeat a particular candidate.
Independent Women's Organization

(IWO).

IWO emerged

in 1946 as a formal organization from the "broom brigades,"

Ill
groups of women who signified their desire to "clean up
city hall" by parading on Canal Street armed with brooms
in support of Morrison.

Following his election, the group

formed a close alliance with CCDA.

IWO itself was not

structured along ward lines, but rather was concentrated
in "white middle and upper middle class" residential areas.
At times, it numbered upwards of one thousand members and
constituted a highly motivated and available volunteer
force.
IWO proved to be a fairly effective political force.
In 1952, Mrs. Logan Brown of the organization was elected
*

to the state House of Representatives.

Morrison himself

may have underestimated their strength on occasion.

In

1956, he ignored their suggestions in a school board race.
IWO worked vigorously against his choices and defeated
them at the polls.

The organization is presently much

smaller than in past y e ars, but retains its higher status
membership composition.

It has actively sought to recruit

black members and the small number of black women who have
joined come basically from "old-line, wealthy black fam
ilies."

The area of operation is restricted to the tenth,

eleventh, twelfth, fourteenth, and sixteenth wards.
The organization has, however, undergone some recent
changes.

While the older members tend to be "leisured

women of the upper middle class," newer members tend to be
employed, often in career-oriented rather than terminal
positions.

IWO has also become more "issue conscious"
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beyond the rather diffuse "improve government" goal of
years past.

It has actively worked for "basic women's

rights," including for the passage of ERA, and campaigned
for a wide range of specific social and environmental items
as well.
IWO's campaign strategy consists of providing
volunteer workers for endorsed candidates, concentrating
upon staffing campaign offices and canvassing neighborhoods,
rather than advertising endorsements.

On balance, IWO nets

a "moderately effective" rating from the candidates and
organizational leaders.

Several of those interviewed, how

ever, appeared to be somewhat hostile to the organization.
Rationales involved basically the "liberal" ideology of
the group and the close "association of the group with the
mayor."
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Others seemed to imply that a women's group

could not really be a political organization.
Mid-City Democrats

(MCD).

MCD is truly an organ

ization from the old school of politics.

Each Wednesday

evening, MCD chairman (and municipal tax assessor) Lawrence
Comiskey, Jr., holds an open session at the organization's
headquarters on South Jeff Davis Drive.
from the first municipal district

People, mostly

(wards one, two, and

three), come one-by-one to relate their problem to Comiskey—
a traffic ticket, a cancelled building permit, needed bail
for a relative, or whatever.

Comiskey listens intently,

asks some questions to verify the situation, and then
reaches a course of action— a telephone call here, a
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promised check by his lawyer in the morning there.
his patrons go away grateful and smiling.

Mostly,

All Comiskey

asks in return is that they vote the MCD ticket in the next
election.
MCD was founded in 1962 by the late James A. Comiskey
(Lawrence's uncle) following his unsuccessful bid for mayor
as the Regular Democratic Organization

(RDO) candidate.

In

the course of that election, RDO and CCDA tried to form a
coalition, designated the Crescent Regular Democrats

(CRD) .

The effort sought to unite the best of the two once power
ful, but now floundering, organizations.

The coalition,

however, reportedly reached an impasse on the question of
whom to endorse for governor that year— Gillis Long or
John McKeithen— and it dissolved while still in the forma
tive stage.

The elder Comiskey then left both CRD and

RDO to institute his own organization.
Originally, MCD was situated in wards one through
six.

Now, however, it is confined to the first three wards.

The organization is predominately white, although it does
now have "a couple" of black precinct captains from the
district's black neighborhoods.

Composition of the dis

trict is said to be "basically working class."
purpose of the organization is simply put:

The stated

"to help the

people in the area, and to promote the Democratic Party."
The organization holds campaign rallies and distributes
sample ballots exhorting the voter to "stamp the rooster,"
"support MCD endorsements," and "be a loyal Democrat."
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MCD is the only of the city's old-line organizations to
support McGovern in the 1972 presidential election.
Comiskey explains that unpopular decision as follows:
He was the Democratic nominee, and we follow
the party line.
That's old-style politics.
It's
a matter of party loyalty— it's as simple as that.
MCD is rated by the candidates and organizational
leaders as being "moderately effective."

Generally, the

vote of the district is said to follow MCD recommenda
tions, especially in the white precincts.
his weekly "help sessions," Comiskey says:

Referring to
"The voters

here have fifty-two reasons to back our endorsements."
The lowered rating of the organization is most often
attributed to the small number of votes at stake in the
first district, especially in comparison with the numbers
of votes involved in other of the city's wards.

In 1974,

for example, wards one, two, and three combined had only
12,648 registered voters.

By comparison, ward seven alone

had 28,703 and city's largest ward, ward nine, had 47,224.
New Orleans Coalition

(NOC).

The Coalition began

at Loyola and Tulane Universities quite informally in 1968
as a "club" devoted to the discussion of political issues.
Interest sparked by the 19 69 mayor's race led to the cry
stallization and formalization of proceedings.

Originally,

the organization served as a clearing house for various
liberal groups in the city.

It published a newsletter

synthesizing the activities of local liberal groups, and
most of NOC participants were also frequenters of these
groups as well.
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The basic purpose of the organization was "to
raise the level of political awareness and participation."
It is described as having been very idealistic and greatly
concerned about issues such as education, integration, and
the "Great Society" programs.

The spirit of those days

is captured in incidents such as Coalition members taking
"great delight" in integrating Uptown bars.
tone of the group is more sobered these days.

The political
The organ

ization continues its political discussion format/ more
formalized now by the presence of guest speakers at vir
tually every meeting.

Also, money has been allocated to

conduct "Nader-type" research.

Finally, NOC seems to deal

in electoral activity more seriously and one or two of its
leaders are contemplating future bids for office.
NOC is still peopled predominately by "white,
college educated, upper middle class" individuals.

Black

members are reportedly "academic types" who commonly are
also active in black organizations as well.

NOC claims to

represent the "academic, preservationist, ecological,
liberal bag"— an impulse which in New Orleans delimits its
appeal to a rather small constituency.

The organization

does endorse candidates and supports these selections pri
marily by advertisements in Figaro and The Courier, news
papers with a young adult readership.

It also does some

canvassing, particularly in Uptown precincts near the
universities.

NOC is generally rated by candidates and-

organizational leaders as having been minimally effective
in recent elections.
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New Orleans Voters Association

(NOVA).

NOVA was

established in 1967 under the tutelege of now State Senator
Nat Kiefer.

The organization is centered in Kiefer's home

district comprising portions of the eighth and ninth wards,
including the rapidly expanding and developing New Orleans
East.

It is formally dedicated to electing officials to

local and state government who are "responsive to the peo
ple."

NOVA claims to draw its membership primarily from

the older, more established white areas of the two wards and
the newer, more suburban
of New Orleans East.

(and primarily white) neighborhoods

This constituency may be characterized

as containing both "working and middle class" voters.
NOVA appears basically to be the personal organi
zation of Senator Kiefer.

The group endorses candidates in

all elections, however, and supports its endorsements pri
marily through canvassing neighborhoods and shopping centers.
The name recognition of the group is fairly low among can
didates and organizational leaders, perhaps accounting for
its rather low rating.

Several of those interviewed, upon

being informed of the organization's identity, offered
stronger evaluations on the basis of their acquaintance with
the group as "Kiefer's organization."
New Orleans Young Democrats

(NOYD).

Several attempts

were made to set up an interview with the leader of this
organization.

The president had no office or home telephone

and had to be dealt with through an intermediary.
ly

Apparent

the leader declined the interview, either directly or
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unintentionally by failure to respond.

Organizational

leaders a n d :candidates for office rate this organization as
having had no significant impact in recent elections.
Ninth Ward Citizens Voters League

(NWCVL).

The

NWCVL was originally organized in 1958 as the "political
section" of the Ninth Ward Civic League, a group which
sought to confront and improve conditions in black neighbor
hoods of the ninth ward.

However, it quickly became

apparent that "a true political organization was needed if
anything was to be accomplished."

The political section

thus expanded and NWCVL became a separate entity in 1960.
The stated purpose of the organization is "to promote po
litical involvement" among ninth ward residents through
political education.

NWCVL regularly conducts registra

tion drives and classes.

Further, much of each monthly

meeting is devoted to speakers, projects, and seminars
dealing with neighborhood problems.
The group claims an interest in all black neighbor
hoods of the ninth ward, but is concentrated in "Lower
Nine," the residential areas south of the Industrial Canal.
Neighborhoods there range from "poor to working and lower
middle class."

Membership of the organization reflects

this composition, with the "lower middle class" predominant
among regular attenders.

Leadership of the group is com

posed primarily of those in

nonprofessional middle class

occupations, and there appears to be a pervading sense in
the group of working hard and biding one's time.

In this
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respect, the group seems to combine much more idealism
with its political pragmatism than do most of the other
black organizations under study here.

This may reflect

the political mood of the seemingly large proportion of
older individuals and retirees in the group.

For them,

enough change may have taken place in recent years for the
system to appear accessible.

Such does not seem to be the

perception of many younger blacks in the area.
NWCVL is rated by the candidates and organizational
leaders as being at least moderately effective in recent
elections, particularly in Lower Nine.

On occasion, it is

said to have had an impact in other areas of the ward, even
when opposed by such reputedly powerful organizations as
Southern Organization for Unified Leadership

(SOUL).

Examples of such organizational confrontations, and subse
quent good showings by NWCVL endorsed candidates, include
Harry Connick's 1970 run for District Attorney

(against

Jim Garrison), Bennett Johnston's 1972 gubernatorial bid
(against Edwin Edwards), and Peter Beer's 1974 Fourth Cir
cuit Court race

(against Joseph Bossetta).

One candidate

stated of the organization:
You can't help but be impressed with NWCVL.
They
have a straightforward, earnest demeanor. . . .
In my opinion, too, their (organizational) effec
tiveness is often overshadowed by the brassy image
of other organizations such as ,SOUL.
At least part of NWCVL's reputed level of success may lie
in its low-key presentation of self, which apparently many
white candidates and organizational leaders find assuring.
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Orleans Parish Progressive Voters League

(OPPVL).

OPPVL was founded in 1948 by now-city Councilman Rev.
Abraham Lincoln Davis.

At that time, only about thirteen

percent of black adults in the city were registered to vote,
as compared with sixty-six percent of white New Orleanians.
The organization was formed to mobilize black registration
and introduce blacks

("Negroes in those days")

mainstream of the political process.

into the

Like CCDA with which

it became affiliated for some time, OPPVL was structured
along ward lines and sought to mobilize black registration
efforts and voter turn out for the entire city.

The

association which developed between Mayor Morrison and
Rev. Davis led then Governor Earl Long to grump, "Morrison's
got himself a Baptist preacher who don't preach nothin'
but Morrison!"
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The most common strategy in those days among white
politicians was to deal solely with black leaders rather
than ever confronting the black electorate directly, a
practice which has often carried over to the present day.
While Morrison privately encouraged Davis to develop the
organization and strive for continued black involvement,
it became clear to many black leaders that white sponsor
ship itself was capable and willing of only the most modest
of advances.

Thus, despite some initial improvements, a

general move emerged to more directly challenge the segre
gationist stance of traditional social and political
relations.
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Paramount among these was the formation of the
Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) in 1957 at
a meeting in Rev. Davis' New Zion Baptist Church and the
election of Rev. Martin Luther King as its first president
(Davis was elected second vice-president).

Rev. Davis him

self was a regular spokesman for the black community as the
drive toward integration got underway in New Orleans and
he was on one occasion jailed for such activities.

However,

Davis' assimilationist goals and his willingness to work
with existing powers have led some more impatients blacks
over the years to brand him an "Uncle Tom."

Counters Davis:

"If sponsoring radical ideas of eliminating racial segrega
tion and saving a city is Uncle Tom-ing, then so be it."
OPPVL served as Davis' organizational base through
out these years.

Rev. Davis' own notoriety and the many

historic changes which were taking place in those years
coupled to make the organization a fairly unified politi
cal force.

However, it is acknowledged that OPPVL is not

as strong in all parts of the city as it once was, and
that other black organizations now challenge its leadership
role in several wards.

Nonetheless, the black voter enter

ing the polling place with a Rev. Davis sample ballot in
hand is said to still be a fairly common occurence.
Candidates and organizational leaders rate OPPVL
as having been a moderately effective organization in recent
elections.

They are skeptical of any claim of current city-

wide influence, but concede particular organizational
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strength in portions of the tenth, eleventh, twelfth, and
seventeenth wards.

They do suspect at least some latent

appeal remaining among many older black voters.
recent appointment to the city council
kindle some of those feelings.
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Davis'

may further en

On the other hand, there

is some evidence that time may have eclipsed OPPVL.

Many

of the newer black organizations seem to regard OPPVL en
dorsements and modus operandi with some disdain.

In the

words of one leader, "We're all indebted to Davis for his
long service to the community, but the organization is a
little too conservative.

. . the style smacks too much of

the old days."
Regular Democratic Organization

(RDO).

RDO claims

to be the second oldest of the big city political "machines"
which emerged in the U.S. during the nineteenth century.
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The organization evolved in 1876 from the Crescent City
White League, a white supremacist group formed two years
earlier to combat Reconstructionist rule.

In 1879, RDO

was able to gain control of the city following the election
of several of its members to key governmental positions.
However, a number of RDO candidates were defeated by reform
candidates in ensuring elections amid charges of corruption
and, by 1896, the Regulars had been dislodged from power.
A year later, RDO began a serious rebuilding program for
establishing its return to power with the founding of the
Choctaw Club, an extensive grassroots political organiza
tion instituted expressly "to recapture city hall and to
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disenfranchise the Negro"

(Reynolds, 1936: 32).

It is

difficult to exaggerate the success of RDO in achieving
these goals.

RDO thoroughly dominated city politics at

every level almost without interruption from the turn of
the century until Morrison's upset victory in 1946.

Fur

ther, they invoked a dramatic ninety-five percent reduction
in the number of blacks registered to vote in New Orleans
between the years 1896 and 1900

(Howard, 1971: 190).

RDO's organization during these years of rule may
be described as the prototype urban political machine.

The

caucus consisted of leaders from each of the city's wards.
Precinct captains generally were carried on the city pay
roll, thus allowing them to devote full-time to political
chores.

Principal among these chores was the task of cul

tivating voter loyalty to the organization by providing
services for precinct residents.

Affiliation with the

organization afforded jobs, preferential treatment in city
services, and the necessary connections to cut red-tape in
what could otherwise be an impersonal, bureaucratized city
government.
In 1927, RDO made the mistake of opposing the can
didacy of Huey Long in his successful governatorial bid.
Long brought the organization to its knees by cutting off
access to state patronage and state funds.

However, Long

had no desire to eradicate the machine— he merely wished
to make it responsive to himself.

He therefore elevated to
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the highest ranks those individuals who expressed their
loyalty to him, among them Robert Maestri.

Maestri's

eventual term as mayor marked almost a half-century of RDO
rule.

While the arrangement has been described as "bene

ficial and effective" for both organization and loyal
voter alike,
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it also remembered as often being greedy,

complacent, and ineffective.
RDO appears to have never fully recovered from its
1946 setback at the hands of Morrison.

However, the group

still does claim a city-wide organization.

More realis

tically, its strengths are said to be concentrated in the
"white working class" areas of the third, fourth, seventh,
eighth, ninth, tenth, and eleventh wards.

The organization

has no black members, although it claims to have supported
black candidates on occasion.
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Unlike CCDA, it conducts

regular monthly meetings of both the full membership
Choctaw Club) and the executive committee.

(the

RDO typically

distributes sample ballots and holds rallies in support of
its endorsed candidates.
RDO is rated by organizational leaders and candi
dates as having been moderately effective in recent elections.
This assessment is in keeping with the self-evaluation of
one RDO leader:

"Quite frankly, we're not what we used to

be, but we still win more than we lose."
by no means unanimous.

The evaluation is

One candidate stressed the decline

of the oldline organizations in general by stating empha
tically,

"RDO and CCDA endorsements are worth about thirty-

124
five votes apiece."

On balance, the overall assessment

by the leaders and candidates seems more nearly the correct
description.

A surprising number of RDO members and

affiliates may be found in state and local governmental
positions.

Further, RDO retains some measure of its appeal

in certain areas of the city, as the solid attendance at
many of its rallies attests.
Southern Organization for Unified Leadership

(SOUL).

SOUL is commonly regarded by the organizational leaders and
candidates for office as the "longest and strongest" po
litical organization in New Orleans.

It is also known

among them as being "extremely pragmatic."

Such pragmatism

apparently prompted SOUL leader Nils Douglas to refuse
participation in this study with the words,
nothing m

it for SOUL."
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"There's

Therefore, information con

cerning the organization was gathered from other written
sources and reference p e r s o n s . ^
SOUL, like COUP, emerged in the mid-1960's from
an unsuccessful bid for the state legislature, in this
case, by Douglas.

Following his defeat, Douglas established

the organization in the populous ninth ward.

According to

one interviewee:
The older black organizations were in a real stall
in those days.
Progress with them depended too
heavily upon white co-operation. . . (which) ceased
administratively when Schiro became mayor.
SOUL
hit at a time when blacks were frustrated and black
consciousness was rising.
The timing was right.
The 1969 mayor's rate proved to be critical in establishing
SOUL's reputation.

Jimmy Fitzmorris entered the race with
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the solid endorsement of the old-line white organizations.
Landrieu, however, won by drawing overwhelming support from
black and upper white precincts.

SOUL precincts showed

impressive support for Landrieu, some reporting ninety per
cent of the votes cast in his favor.
SOUL's reputation for pragmatic politics is long
established as well.

Several candidates and organization

al leaders have suggested that, for several years, the
organization's support has gone "to the highest bidder."
The label stems mainly from two factors.

One, as SOUL's

reputation has grown, so apparently has the price of its
support.

Gov. Edwin Edwards reported spending $60,000 for

their support in the 1972 gubernatorial election
1975).

(James,

Figures quoted more often are $30,000 in elections

dealing with major local offices, and $10,000 to $15,000
for lesser offices.
sourly,

One candidate remarked somewhat

"Thirty thousand is a lot of money to turn over to

an organization for just one stinking ward."

Secondly,

SOUL has occasionally supported candidates whose ideologies
and stands on the issues seemingly would have precluded
their support in the black community.

A prominent example,

from several which might be mentioned, is SOUL's endorse
ment in 1971 of Jamar Adcock, a wealthy north Louisiana
segregationist,

for lieutenant governor (Murray and Vedlitz,

1974: 34).
Several observations have been offered in explana
tion of SOUL's strategy.

It should be noted, for example,
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that SOUL did not invent this brand of politics.

The

habit of paying black leaders rather than dealing with the
black electorate directly originated with white politi
cians, most notably, Morrison.

More to the point, however,

is the observation that the strategy is only a slight mod
ification of the politics employed for years by white
organizations.

At the simplest level, the leaders of SOUL

wish to back candidates from whom they can extract tangi
ble rewards, presumably both for themselves and for their
constituency.

The argument is well taken that money is a

medium of exchange not likely to net direct benefit for
the constituency.

Unlike the situation where policy and

patronage considerations are delivered after the election,
the commitment of the candidate tends to end with the
monetary exchange.

However, one interviewee observed:

. . . building an effective organization requires
revenue.
SOUL has gotten a rather bad reputation
from the press as a money-grabbing operation.
But
if a candidate wants the full stroke— canvassing,
mail-out, ads and posters, transportation of voters
to the polls, etc.— let's
face it, that costs some
money.
So to begin with, SOUL has built a real
organization, not a paper one like so many others
around. . . for what?
Let's be cynical for a moment..
For most [white] candidates, the political reality
is that the interests of the black community are
intrinsically opposed to those of the white commun
ity.
In that case, what's a campaign promise worth?
This line of thought thus places the emphasis upon
building an organizational weapon.

In this respect, SOUL

differs little from successful organizations of the past.
Control of the organization is thought to reside in the
hands of three individuals, Douglas, Sherman Copelin, and
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Don Hubbard.

Much of the revenue generated by the organi

zation is clearly devoted to election activities.
for example,

SOUL,

is said to possess the most extensive telephone

banks of any organization in the city.

Further, SOUL is

known to have financed the campaigns of several black can
didates for office.

However, the recent indictments for

gross misuse of funds handed down against Copelin and
Hubbard in connection with their respective jobs with Model
Cities and the Family Health Foundation— both federal
poverty programs— have done little to quell the image of
"money grabbing" at the ultimate expense of the black
community.
SOUL has extended its area of operation in recent
elections, most notably into the fifteenth ward.

It's

actual level of effectiveness, as opposed to its reputation,
is a matter of some debate.

Analyses conducted by the

Institute of Politics at Loyola University show that can
didates endorsed by SOUL between 1969 and 1973 received a
mean of 72.6 percent of the votes cast in black neighbor
hoods of the ninth ward

(Murray and Vedlich, 1974: 35).

Although this figure is extremely impressive, its glitter
falls off somewhat when one realizes that several of these
candidates carried all black neighborhoods of the city by
wide margins.

One candidate for office summarized it this

way:
It depends.
Given a candidate who is basically
acceptable to the black community anyway, a SOUL
endorsement might produce 80-90 percent support.
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On the other h a n d , given an unknown or a candidate
with a bad racial stance, getting 40-50 percent
with their support might be a real accomplishment.
Of course, who knows that you couldn't achieve
similar results if you just spent $40,000.in that
ward on your own.
Tough-Minded Independent Leadership Tribunal

(TILT).

TILT endorsements appeared in Figaro in 1973 and gained
some notoriety due mainly to the strange composition of
their preferred ticket.

The slate of endorsed candidates

comprised a mixed bag of blacks, ultra-conservative whites,
and little known candidates, all topped off by an endorse
ment of local eccentric and perennial candidate, Rodney
Fertel, for mayor.

Attempts to locate the group revealed

TILT to be a good-natured hoax perpetrated by a local news
paper editor.

Alert readers no doubt suspected as much

following claims of organizational strength in "the area
of the Canal Street and Metarie cemetaries."
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TILT's

name was left on the list of organizations presented for
evaluation to organizational leaders and candidates as a
validity check.

They rated the organization as ineffective

in recent elections.
Treme Improvement Political Society

(TIPS).

TIPS

was founded in 1971 to support the candidacy of Louis
Charbonnet, the son of a black, well-to-do funeral parlor
operator, for the state legislature from the ninety-sixth
district.

The district comprises higher status whites

living in the French Quarter and lower Esplanade area,
"working class blacks" located in Treme and adjacent
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neighborhoods, and "working class whites" in the FaubourgMarigny and City Park areas.

The stated purpose of this

organization is to "improve the conditions of the districts
unique neighborhoods."

The needs of the neighborhoods vary

and while Charbonnet himself deals with the wider concerns
of the district, TIPS is devoted to the black neighbor
hoods.

One critical problem facing the city is revenue

and, of course, ways of generating more of it.

In a recent

session of the legislature, Charbonnet introduced a contro
versial bill to convert the old U.S. Mint located at Decatur
and Esplanade into a gambling casino for revenue purposes.
TIPS does not hold regularly scheduled meetings be
tween elections, although it does on occasion sponsor
activities and the board of directors is "on call" for any
problem.

As with DAWN, the organization and its activities

seem closely tied to a dominant, publically known person,
in this case, Charbonnet.

Organizational leaders and can

didates rate TIPS as having been only minimally effective
in recent elections.

It appears that Charbonnet himself

was elected with the support of blacks and upper whites.
The latter group, however, does not figure in the organiza
tion nor is responsive to it.

Thus, the strength of the

vote which elected Charbonnet coalesces again only occasion
ally, and then outside the control and influence of TIPS
itself.
University of New Orleans Young Democrats

(UNO-YD).

The current chapter of UNO-YD was re-established in 1970
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following the demise of the original group at the University
of New Orleans campus during the middle-1960s.

The group

is affiliated with the national Democratic party, but
carries no formal ties with either state or local Democratic
organizations.

Membership is not restricted solely to UNO

students, but is limited to those less than 35 years of age.
The organization claims to represent what has been generally
termed "the youth vote."

Active campaign work is conducted

on campus and in surrounding areas where students are like
ly to live.
The size of the organization varies greatly, depend
ing mainly upon the interest generated by any particular
election.

Between elections, active membership may drop

off to as low as a dozen or so.

The organization operates

upon a rather severe budget, thus delimiting options which
it can exercise in behalf of endorsed candidates.

Its main

asset in this regard may be that it is able to sponsor
speeches and debates on campus as an organization officially
registered with the university.

Such activities typically

draw quite well, particularly in the more heated of elec
tions.

The organization also contributes money to candi

dates, albeit on a small scale.

The group, for example,

contributed ten dollars in support of Baton Rouge newscaster
Jeff LaCaze's bid to unseat Congressman John Rarick.

Or

ganization leaders and candidates for office rate the YD's
as having had no impact in recent elections in New Orleans.
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Uptown Democratic Association

(UDA).

UDA is

located in the tenth and eleventh wards and operates from a
locally popular seafood restaurant and bar.

Its area of

concentration appears to be the white, working class neigh
borhoods of the Irish Channel in and around lower Magazine
Street.

The group advertizes its endorsements in a store

front on Magazine Street and, of course, in the bar.

An

interview with the leader of the organization was precluded
by illness in his family.

Organizational leaders and can

didates for office rated the organization as ineffective in
recent elections.

Due to this and the lack of other infor

mation, the organization was dropped from the study.

The

elimination of UDA and NOYD from the modified list of twentyone organizations left nineteen organizations for further
analysis.
Composite Organizational Ratings
As indicated in previous sections, organizational
leaders and candidates for office were asked to rate each
political organization in terms of its impact upon selected
elections.

As the questionnaire had been originally pre

pared, each respondent was to indicate which organizations
were most effective.

However, once interviewing began, each

respondent was instead asked to comment upon the effective
ness of each organization on the list rather than only the
most effective ones.

From these individual evaluations of

each organization, three overall rating scales were generated—
one for the organizational leaders, one for the candidates,
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and, finally, a composite ranking based upon these first
two ratings.
A summary of these ratings is presented in Table 1.
The rankings for each scale have been divided into four basic
categories on the basis of the individual evaluations:

very

effective, moderately effective, minimally effective, and not
effective.

The order in which the organizations are listed

within the first three of these categories indicates further
ranking of the organizations.

Thus, the first organization

in the moderately effective category was ranked higher than
the organization entered in the second slot of that category.
However, within the fourth category, that is, those rated not
effective, the organizations are merely listed in alphabetical
order.

Further differentiation within this category on the

basis of the evaluations rendered would have been extremely
arbitrary.
The first column of the table contains the ratings
of the organizational leaders.

SOUL and COUP, the well-

organized black groups of the ninth and seventh wards respec
tively, were said by them to be the most effective in,recent
elections.

Rated as moderately effective are the old-line

organizations of New O r l e a n s — in
RDO, IWO, and CCDA.

order, AFL-CIO, OPPVL, MCD,

The only other organizations founded

prior to 1960, NWCVL and CCIVL, were classified as minimally
effective and ineffective respectively.

Other organizations

reputed by the leaders to be minimally effective are BOLD,
NOC, NOVA, and TIPS, all groups of fairly recent origins.
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TABLE 1
RATINGS OF POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS IN NEW ORLEANS
BY ORGANIZATIONAL LEADERS AND CANDIDATES
FOR OFFICE, 1972-1974

Rating
very
effective

moderately
effective

minimally
effective

not
effective

Ratings by
Organizational Leaders
SOUL
COUP

Ratings by
Candidates for Office

Composite
Ratings

SOUL
COUP

SOUL
COUP

NWCVL
AGG
OPPVL
RDO
IWO
AFL-CIO

OPPVL
AFL-CIO
RDO
IWO
NWCVL
MCD

BOLD
NWCVL
NOC
NOVA
TIPS

BOLD
DAWN
MCD
NOVA

AGG
BOLD
CCDA
NOVA
NOC

AGG
AID
CCIVL
DAWN
TILT
UNO-YD

AID
CCDA
CCIVL
NOC
TILT
TIPS
UNO-YD

AID
CCIVL
DAWN
TILT
TIPS
UNO-Y1

. AFL-CIO
OPPVL
MCD
RDO
IWO
CCDA
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A G G f AID, DAWN, TILT, and UNO-YD were said by the organiza
tional leaders to have been ineffective in recent elections.
Ratings by the candidates for office are similar to
those of the organizational leaders, with a few important
exceptions.

Most dramatically, the candidates pronounced

AGG as a moderately effective organization as. opposed to an
ineffective classification by organizational leaders, and
CCDA as an ineffective rather than a moderately effective
organization.

Likewise, the candidates advanced a higher

rating of NWCVL and assigned slightly lower ratings to AFLCIO, MCD, and NOC than did the organizational leaders.

A

fairly strong correlation of .66 (Spearman rho) was found
between the ratings of the organizational leaders and those
of the candidates.
A composite ranking derived from the previous ratings
further reflects their basic similarities.

In the composite

ranking, most organizations are listed in the same effective
ness category as earlier specified by the two sets of respond
ents.

As indicated earlier, serious disagreement between the

organizational leaders and the candidates exists only in their
evaluations of AGG and CCDA.

The overall effect is that these

two organizations are both classified in the composite scale
as minimally effective organizations by default rather than
by consensus.
The disagreement over these two organizations is per
haps purely coincidental.

However, the discrepancy may be

symptomatic of the differing vantage points of the two sets
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of respondents.

AGG is not structured in the same manner as

other typical organizations regarded by organizational leaders
as effective.
club.

Rather, it is seen more as a businessmen's

By contrast, CCDA, at least in previous years, has had

the expected organizational form.

The candidates, on the

other hand, are attuned to the consequences of an endorsement
by a group such as AGG, particularly among higher status
voters.

This factor is illustrated by the memberships held

in AGG by several candidates prior to seeking elections.
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Simply, the "good government" image of the group is consider
ed a desirable social and political asset in grooming one's
credentials for office.
acceptably mainstream.

It also certifies one's politics as
In comparison, CCDA lacks such tran

sitivity now that it is viewed as lacking the organizational
muscle to literally turn out the vote, a major source of its
strength in the past.
Organizational Composition and Organizational
Effectiveness"
These latter comments raise the question of the vary
ing composition of organizational memberships and its relevance
to the problem at hand.

One strategy in arriving at some

answer to this situation is to classify the organizations on
the basis of their own identity claims.

Given the current

array of organizations, the most obvious criteria of differen
tiation is that of race.

While none of the organizations

interviewed openly forbid membership to persons on the basis
of skin color, most memberships are, nonetheless, racially
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restricted.

Several organizations further proclaim to present

or advance the interests of a racially defined group.

RDO,

for example, was originally a white supremacist organization.
BOLD's very name, Black Organization for Leadership Develop
ment, indicates a black target population, and so forth.
However, all of this seems a bit cautious.

The city has a

long history of racial segregation and, unsurprisingly, inter
action to the present day continues to be confined to racially
homogeneous groups, as the previous organizational descriptions
illustrate.
Class distinctions are likewise evident in the organi
zational descriptions advanced by the organizational leaders
themselves.

Target populations are commonly defined as "the

working class" of a given ward or an "upper middle class"
neighborhood.

On the basis of these observations, it is argued

that the organizations may be categorized as "black," "lower
white," and "upper white" in keeping with organizational
claims.

Table 2 contains a summary of New Orleans' major po

litical organizations categorized along race/class and organi
zational effectiveness dimensions.

Each listed organization

readily fits the assigned race/class designation, with the
exception of NOVA whose area of operation reportedly includes
both "lower" and "upper" white neighborhoods of the eighth
and ninth wards.
Two basic hypotheses were advanced in the previous
chapter concerning the expected composition of this table.
It was anticipated that:

(a) levels of the race/class
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TABLE 2
RATINGS OF POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS IN NEW ORLEANS,
BY RACE/CLASS AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS3

Race/Class Designation
Composite
Rating

Black

very
effective

SOUL
COUP

moderately
effective

OPPVL
NWCVL

AFL-CIO
RDO
MCD

IWO

minimally
effective

BOLD

CCDA

AGG
NOC

Lower White

Upper White

-NOVAnot
effective

CCIVL
DAWN
TIPS

AID

Excluded from this listing are TILT, the fictional
organization, and UNO-YD, whose campus orientation makes it
technically unclassifiable according to this scheme.

dimension would reflect varying degrees of political
organization, and (b) levels of the race/class dimension
would exhibit varying degrees of political effectiveness.
Specifically, upper white areas were expected to show the
greatest evidence of organization and effectiveness, while
decreasingly lower levels

of these characteristics were an

ticipated in lower white and black areas respectively.

Initial

inspection of the table indicates that neither of these hy
pothesized relationships is substantiated by the data.

Rather,

the data show that upper white organizations are conspicuously
few in number and sport rather tame reputations.

Lower white

organizations, while more

numerous and more highly

regarded,

are considered as a group

to be in a general state

of decline.

Finally, black organizations have been appearing recently in
greater numbers and, in many cases, are regarded as having
organized quite effectively.
These trends indicated in the table are not thought
to be distorted by the nonrandom nature of the sample under
study.

Each organizational leader and candidate was asked

during the interview to identify further political and non
political organizations considered influential in recent
elections.

All agreed that the major political organizations

of the city were included in the list under study.

While

several additional organizations were mentioned, the name of
only one was volunteered more than once
the Black Youth for Progress

(two times, actually)—

(BYP), a small, black, quasi

radical group centered in the St. Bernard Housing Project.

It
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is doubtful that any of these suggested organizations,
including BYP, would have received high effectiveness ratings.
Nor is it likely the proportions of upper white, lower white,
and black organizations are grossly distorted.

The inter

viewees expressed basic agreement with the ratio of organiza
tions contained in the race/class categories.

Thus, despite

the lack of a random sample, the enumeration of further or
ganizations known to exist would most likely only increase
in rough proportion the number of organizations listed in the
minimally effective and ineffective categories.
The scarcity of upper white organizations, of whatever
effectiveness status, deserves further mention.

As indicated

in chapter two7~a substantial amount of research has detailed
a positive correlation between socio-economic status and
organizational participation.

The data show here that, in

New Orleans during the early 1970's at least, participation
in formal political organizations does not follow this pat
tern.

However, the positive correlation between status and

participation may indeed hold within the broader organiza
tional structure of the community, that is, when the scope
of inquiry is extended beyond the range of purely political
organizations.

There is some evidence suggesting this trend.

Parker (1974: 68), for example, notes that the higher status
groups of New Orleans have traditionally left the operation
of the city's politics to the political organizations and
their lower status constituents.

Chai

(1971: 2-11) has

further exemplified this theme by claiming widespread, rapid
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participation of higher status Orleanians in the city's
social organizations, most notably Mardi Gras krewes, at the
expense of political participation.
Organizational Effectiveness as an Attribute of
Areal Units
In order to facilitate further analysis of the or
ganizational variable, a procedure was derived for measuring
organizational effectiveness as a characteristic of the areal
units under study.

Attempts were made to identify as clearly

as possible the areas of operation claimed by each of the
organizations to be analyzed.

Areal units which fell within

territories claimed by organizations with high or moderate
composite effectiveness ratings were classifed as areas of
high organizational efficiency.

A medium organizational

effectiveness classification was assigned to areas claimed
by minimally effective organizations and, finally, areas
occupied by ineffective organizations or otherwise devoid of
claimed organizational activity were categorized as low organ
izational effectiveness areas.

In cases where an areal unit

was claimed by more than one organization, the efficiency
rating of the stronger organization was used in determining
the areal rating.
A number of problems were encountered in applying the
organizational variable to areal units.

To begin with, the

orientation of some organizations was not easily translatable
into geographic terms.

UNO-YD, for example, claimed to seek

the "youth vote"— a characteristic almost impossible to
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isolate with any degree of accuracy utilizing census
materials.

A similar situation results when the area of

operation is only vaguely defined by the organizational
leader, either because he himself does not know or wishes to
keep the information secret.

In essence, the problem of de

fining the organizational characteristics of areal units is
simple and straightforward only when the organizational claims
specific precincts and these precincts match a set of defined
areal units reasonably well.
Secondly, individual exposure to organizational activ
ity is surely highly variable from area to area.

One might

argue that this variability is primarily a function of differ
ences in organizational effectiveness.

However, the researcher

has no firsthand evidence of (a) individual exposure to organ
izational activity, leading to

(b) individual behavior

commensurate with organizational exhortations, leading to (c)
the organization's reputation for effectiveness.

Thus, the

study deals primarily with the reputation for organizational
effectiveness since the areal units are being ranked on the
basis of claims by organizational leaders and candidates for
office.
These problems, no doubt, introduce some systematic
error into the procedure.

The overall effect of the first

problem is most likely that of inducing underestimations of
the organizational factor.

The second problem can be kept

within control by restricting generalizations to the repu
tation for effectiveness as opposed to actual effectiveness.

With these restrictions in mind, the nature of the organi
zational effectiveness variable as an ecological attribute
in relation to the race/class dimension of areal units is
shown in table 3.

Previous discussion has made clear the

expectation that varying levels of race/class characteristics
were anticipated to lead to varying levels of organizational
effectiveness.

The data in table 3 confirm the observations

made in the previous section, to wit, the race/class and
organizational effectiveness variables are indeed related,
but not in the previously hypothesized direction.
Black areas are claimed to have political organiza
tions which are, on the average, considered more effective
than those found in either lower white or upper white areas.
On a scale of one to three

(low, medium, and high effective

ness ratings respectively), black areas show an average
organizational effectiveness score of 2.15 as compared to
mean values of 1.70 and 1.52 for lower white and upper white
areas respectively.

Asterisks next to the race/class mean

square indicate that its corresponding F-value, derived by
dividing the race/class mean square by the mean square for
error, is statistically significant.

Thus, there is a true

overall difference among the organizational effectiveness
means across categories of the race/class variable.

Further,

contrasts between treatment means show that the difference
between the organizational effectiveness average for black
areas and the weighted average for all white areas is sta
tistically significant as well

(t = 4.02, p<.01).

However,
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TABLE 3
DATA SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVE
NESS RATINGS OF 131 AREAL UNITS, BY RACE/CLASS
DESIGNATION

Data Summary:

Mean Organizational
Effectiveness Score
Number of Areal Units
.!
Analysis of Variance:

Race/Class
Black

Lower White

Upper White

Total

2.15

1.70

1.52

1.85

54

50

27

131

Source of Variation:

df3

Total

130

Race/Class

2

Black vs. White
Lower White vs.
Upper White
Error

dfk

128

Mean Square

Contrast

4.45**C
128

4.02**

128

1.03
.55

Column entries associated with these degrees of freedom
are mean squares. Mean squares are interpreted in terms of
the corresponding F-value resulting from the ratio of mean
square for treatments with mean square for error.
^Column entries associated with these degrees of freedom
are t-statistics. The t-test is composed of the difference
between weighted contrast means divided by the standard error
of the difference between means.
£
Level of significance is indicated by asterisks:
no
asterick, p > .05; *, p < .05; **, p < .01.
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the size of the difference in organizational effectiveness
means between lower white and upper white areas was not
significant

(t = 1.03, p > .05).

The race/class and organizational effectiveness dimen
sions of areal units can be further explicated by examining a
correlation matrix of pertinent ecological characteristics.
This matrix includes the additional ecological variables of
percent

residents who are nonwhite, median school years com

pleted, percent

adults who are high school graduates, median

family income, and percent
occupations.

adults employed in nonmanual

The matrix of variables is presented in table 4.

As expected, the race/class dimension shows a strong
inverse relation (-.87) with the nonwhite variable.

The re

maining variables indicate that upper white areas contain
higher schooling, income and occupational advantages, while
decreasing levels of these attributes are found as one moves
to lower white and then to black areas.

Organizational effec

tiveness, on the other hand, is positively related to the
nonwhite variable

(.35), that is, black areas tend to show a

higher reputation for organizational effectiveness.

Corres

pondingly, then, areas of high organizational effectiveness
tend to be characterized by lower educational, income, and
occupational levels.

The relationship between race/class

and organizational effectiveness is moderate and inverse
(-.33).

These issues shall receive further amplification

with the analysis of elections in the next chapter.
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TABLE 4
CORRELATION MATRIX OF THE RACE/CLASS AND ORGANIZATIONAL
EFFECTIVENESS DIMENSIONS WITH OTHER ECOLOGICAL
CHARACTERISTICS, NEW ORLEANS

PHSG
MFIN
PNML
ORGEF

PNML

ORGEF

RACLS

-.63b

-.57

-.59

-.67

.35

.86

.86

.92

-.24

.71

.75

-.22

.65

-.17

.76

-.25

.81

•
CO

l

MFIN

00
CO
•

MSCH

PHSG

CM
00
•

NONW

MSCHa

-.33
Si

Abbreviations refer to ecological characteristics as
follows:
NONW - percent residents of areal unit who are non
white
MSCH - median school years completed for adults over
25 years of age
PHSG - percent adults of areal unit who are high
school graduates
MFIN - median family income for areal unit
PNML - percent adult residents of areal unit employed
in nonmanual occupations
ORGEF - organizational effectiveness rating of areal
unit
RACLS - race/class classification of areal unit

Correlations are computed for 131 areal units.
All
correlations in the table are statistically significant, that
is, the probability that the true relationship between any
two of the variables is really zero is less than .05.
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Utilitarian vs. Normative Compliance
Characteristics
It was argued in chapter two that compliance with
organizational directives comprises at least two dimensions
(Etzioni,

1975: 3-19):

(1) the type of power available to

the organization to enforce its directives, and (2) the
orientation of the members to the authority of the organiza
tion.

Briefly, three types of power— coercive

physical sanctions), remunerative
tions) , and normative

(the use of

(the use of material sanc

(the use of symbolic sanctions)— and

three types of orientation— alienative

(intensely negative),

calculative (mild positive or negative), and moral
ly positive)— were discussed.

(intense

It was noted that three major

types of organizations are likely to be found, namely,
coercive

(coercive power, alienative involvement), utilitarian

(remunerative power, calculative involvement), and normative
(normative power, moral involvement)

organizations.

Applied

to political organizations, it was shown that a political
organization may potentially fall in any one of the three
classification types. However, empirical reviews suggest that
they most often meet the credentials of the latter two com
pliance modes.

The old-line political machine, for example,

most closely resembles the utilitarian criteria, while the
national or state political party structure most often exhibits
traits of the normative type.
An attempt shall be made to tentatively apply the
typology to the political organizations discussed here.

This
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procedure shall rest largely upon a subjective evaluation
of the primary emphasis detected in the organizations.

Or

ganizations typically reflect the characteristics of more
than one compliance mode.

Further, the organizations may

reflect differing compliance modes in varying contexts.

For

example, it may reflect a normative compliance pattern when
operating in the public sphere, and a utilitarian mode in
its day-to-day operation.

As has been shown, however, one

compliance pattern tends to predominate.
With these qualifications in mind, it seems allow
able to state impressionistically that the upper white or
ganizations discussed here tend to resemble most closely the
normative mode, while black and lower white organizations,
with the possible exception of NWCVL, AID, and NOVA, appear
to reflect the utilitarian mode.

Thus, the "good government"

and "elect candidates of integrity" themes— regardless of
their intrinsic truthfulness in contrast to the strategies
of other organizations— are reflections of an appeal to the
realm of political ideals for guiding activities.

By con

trast, the recurrent references among black and lower white
organizations to campaign funds, considerations for political
positions, and performance of service considerations suggest
the salience for them of the practical and material benefits
at stake in these elections.

This by no means is meant to

imply that upper white organizations have little interest in
such "mundane" considerations or that they do not benefit
materially from electoral activity.

On the contrary, they may
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simply be more clever in disguising their "true" intentions.
It is also possible that the material rewards for the upper
white category are realized in more subtle form.

Or they may

indeed be more "public-regarding," to use Wilson and Banfield's
(1964) term.

These themes shall receive further treatment

in the next chapter.
Footnotes
^Note, however, that much information about the organ
izations is public in nature.
For example, the organizations
themselves advertize their endorsements.
2

Unless otherwise specified or clear by context,
quotation marks in this section entitled "Descriptive Summaries"
refer to words used by an interviewee.
3

It is not illegal, apparently, for such funds to
exchange hands in Louisiana.
For a discussion of the election
laws in the state, see James' (1975) analysis of Gov. Edwin
Edwards' re-election campaign.
4
This candidate remarked:
"Believe me, it was the
first time I'd seen that happen in my thirty years in politics!"
5
The term influential could be possibly interpreted
in more than one sense. For example, an organization could be
extremely "influential" in a limited area of operation without
having an impact upon the overall election.
Respondents were
encouraged to evaluate the organizations in terms of their
perceived areas of operation.

g
For an analysis of the 1969 mayoralty election, see
Chubbuck, Renwick, and Walker (1970).
7
One such neighborhood leader is well-known local
political figure, Edna Mae Tickles.
For a discussion of the
political fragmentation of the Uptown area, see Synder (1975).
g

In 1944, for example, 63% of white adults were regis
tered to vote, compared to approximately 1% of black adults.
By 1948, the percentage of registered blacks increased to 13%,
to 26% by 1956, 27% in 1964, 47% in 1968, and 55% in 1974.
White registration levels for the same time frames stand at
approximately 70%. For a discussion of registration levels by
race in five Southern cities (including New Orleans) , see
Murray and Vedlitz (1975: 7-12).
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q

It is apparently also quite common for money secured
for campaign expenses to be utilized in support of more general
organizational activities.
This practice is by no means re
stricted to COUP.
■^With the exception of one term (1920 - 1925), a mem
ber of RDO has occupied the mayor's seat for every term from
1896 to 1946 (Parker, 1974: 69).
■^The Cold Water Committee was composed of a group of
wealthy businessmen who helped finance activities of CCDA.
Its name was derived from their attempt to dissuade Morrison
from running for governor - figuratively, throwing "cold water"
upon his plans (Parker, 1974: 81).
12

For a more detailed discussion of the special rela
tionship between CCDA and the black community see Parker
(1974: 86-88).
13

While Jimmie Davis himself did not run on an openly
segregationist platform in the first primary, third place
finisher, Willie Rainach, did so in the crudest of terms.
In
the second primary against Morrison, Davis made race an issue
and successfully gathered much of Rainach's support.
For a
discussion of this election, see Havard, Heberle, and Howard
(1963).
14

Morrison is generally regarded to have handled the
initial period of desegregation in the city quite poorly.
Morrison's general strategy seems to have been to ignore the
issue as much as possible— a seemingly unwise decision while
disorder reigned in the streets.
The agonizing controversy,
perhaps accentuated by the absence of strong leadership,
appears to have contributed to CCDA's growing reputation for
ineffectiveness (Parker, 1974: 118).
15

Iris Kelso, political reporter for the New Orleans
States-Item, offered this analysis (Parker, 19741 126) :
The main reason for the confusion is that for almost
sixteen years now Chep Morrison was New Orleans
politics.
It was all quite simple.
Either you were
for or against the former mayor.
Members of the
Crescent City Democratic Association were the good
guys.
Members of the Regular Democratic Organization
were the bad guys. . . I f you were a Regular, you. . .
waited patiently for the day he would be gone.
Now
suddenly that day has come and nobody knows what to
do.
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16

The grandfather clause stipulated that only those
whose grandfathers were registered voters could now themselves
register to vote.
Since the grandfathers of most blacks would
have been slaves, and, hence, not registered to vote, the
rule had the effect of disenfranchizing blacks.
Of course, it
technically also eliminated a number of whites from eligibility
as well. The understanding clause required the potential regis
trant to demonstrate knowledge of the U.S. constitution to the
satisfaction of the registrar of voters.
The level of knowlege required to "satisfy" the registrar typically varied,
depending upon who was attempting to register.
17

New Orleans is the second largest port in the United

States.

18

The group was, in fact, a strong supporter of the
mayor in the 1969 election.
Further, Phyllis Landrieu, the
mayor's wife, is a member of the organization.
19

The "rooster" is the symbol of the Democratic Party
in Louisiana.
20

A quote of this nature is found in both Parker
(1974) and Fredrichs (1967).

21

Rev. Davis was appointed to the post by Mayor Moon
Landrieu.
Elections for positions on the city council have
been temporarily suspended until a redistricting plan for the
city is completed.
22

Only Tammany Hall is said to be older.

23

The system is obviously not beneficial to those who
are excluded from access to the organization.
24

RDO claims to have endorsed Juvenile Court Judge
Israel Augustine in his bid for that post.
They also invited
the Rev. A.L. Davis to be one of the honored guests at the
centennial celebration of the organization (Katz, 1975).
25

Douglas' reputed pragmatism has by now reached
legendary proportions.
He reportedly told a national organ
izer from the McGovern 1972 presidential campaign who solicited
his support (Davis, 1973: 40):
"Let's get one thing straight:
I'm a political whore. . . what's in it for me?"
26

Davis

Sources here include Murray and Vedlitz (1974) ,
(1973), Bourg (1973), and selected reference persons.

CHAPTER V
THE ELECTIONS
Introduction
This chapter contains an analysis of eleven New
Orleans elections which were held between 1972 and 1974.
The rationale for selecting the particular elections under
study and the basic descriptions of the contestants and
issues involved in these elections are presented in chapter
three.

As further detailed in the operationalization of

terms section of that chapter,

local elections are consider

ed to be of particular relevance in studying a community's
political organizational structure.

Such elections typically

involve issues which most directly confront the individual
citizen.

Consequently,

they are often hotly contested and

serve as a forum in which potential cleavages within the
population may become actualized.

Of course, a major concern

here is to assess the role of political organizations in this
process.
Race/Class, Organizational Effectiveness,
and Voter Registration
Granted the assumption that political organizations
attempt to influence the way in which individuals cast their
votes, it seems clear that they likewise concern themselves
with qualifying potential supporters for action at the polls.
Indeed, the promotion of voter registration appears on the
151

152
agenda of virtually every New Orleans political organization
described in the previous chapter.

However, interest in the

registration variable stems from other motives as well.
According to evidence presented in the chapter dealing with
theoretical considerations, voter turn out in many locales
is often correlated with a number of characteristics, includ*

ing race, sex, class, participation in voluntary associations,
and so forth (Lipset, 1963: 75).

Not surprisingly, these

patterns generally hold as well for those who register to
begin with.

It is reasonable to expect that organizations

prey upon this factor, seeking either to accentuate or re
verse these reported trends in their favor.
Table 5A contains a summary of registration figures
in New Orleans for the years 1972 through 19 74.

Cell entries

for .each of these years'*" contain the average percent register
ed to vote of the estimated total number of individuals eightteen years and older for the 131 areal units comprising New
Orleans.

The registration means are cross-tabulated by both

the race/class designation and the organizational effective
ness rating of the areal units.

These means represent actual

registration levels as determined from voter registration
rolls, that is, they are not adjusted for the effects of the
race/class and organizational effectiveness variables.
The race/class designations of the areal units are
identical to those used in chapters three and four.

However,

for purposes of the analysis contained in this chapter, the
list of areal units has been dichotomized into high and low

TABLE 5A
VOTER REGISTRATION IN 131 NEW ORLEANS AREAL UNITS FOR 1972 , 1973, AND 1974, BY RACE/
CLASS DESIGNATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS RATING: MEAN PERCENT
ADULTS REGISTERED, UNADJUSTED MEANSa

Year:
1972

Race/Class
Black

Organizational
High
Effectiveness
Low
Column Mean

Lower White

Upper White

Row Mean

53.3
49.5
52.3

59.0
60.5
59.7

74.4
65.3
70.1

59.0
58.6
58.8

46.9
41.9
44.5

51.1
53.7
52.3

61.9
59 .7
60.4

52.2
51.8
51.9

42.7
37.3
41.2

49.0
45.4
47.1

62.7
52.9
57.9

47 .1
46.5
46.9

1973
Organizational
High
Effectiveness
Low
Column Mean
1974
Organizational
High
Effectiveness
Low
Column Mean

aRaw data used in generating this table were derived from the registration rolls
of the Orleans Parish Registrar of Voters.
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organizational effectiveness categories rather than the
three levels— high, medium, and low— of the previous chapters.
This procedure is necessary since the cross-tabulation of
three levels of race/class and three levels of the organiza
tional variable would generate a table with at least one empty
cell and several low frequency cells.

High effectiveness

areas are defined as those claimed by organizations themselves
rated as highly or moderately effective by organizational
leaders and candidates for office.

The low effectiveness

label is attached to areas claimed by organizations said to
be minimally effective or ineffective, or to areas without
organizational activity.
A two-factor analysis of variance is presented in
table 5B for assessing the registration figures.

This pro

cedure is particularly appropriate for testing the relation
ship between nominally scaled independent variables and a
dependent variable which is intervally scaled.

It allows

for the determination of the isolated effect of each inde
pendent variable upon the dependent variable and, addition
ally, a test for an interaction effect.

Since cells of the

two-way classification table used here do not have equal
2
frequencies,
a modification of the standard analysis of
variance is contained in this procedure.

Basically, each

effect— in turn, race/class, organizational effectiveness,
and interaction— is partitioned by adjusting for all other
effects.

Thus, the component sums of squares will not be

orthagonal, that is, the estimates of the main effects will

TABLE 5B
VOTER REGISTRATION IN 131 NEW ORLEANS AREAL UNITS FOR 1972, 1973, AND 1974, BY
RACE/CLASS DESIGNATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS RATING: ANALYSIS
OF VARIANCE OF MEAN PERCENT ADULTS REGISTERED

Year
Source of Variation

dfa

Total

130

dfb

2

Race/Class
Black vs. White
Lower White vs. Upper White

12 5
125

1972

1973

96.34**C

118.16**

97.12**

5.44**
3.68**

5.16**
3.52**

5.03**
3.06**

1974

Organizational Effectiveness

1

15.64

26.93

31.51

Interaction

2

25.52

30.62

45.45

19.13

16.90

15.75

Black
Low
Lower
Low
Error

vs. White, High,
OrgEff
vs. Upper White, High
OrgEff

125
9

125
125

aColumn entries for components associated with these degrees of freedom are
mean squares.
Column entires for components associated with these degrees of freedom are
t-statistics.
°Asterisks refer to the level of significance associated with the listed
statistic, as follows: no asterisk, p >.05; *, p <.05; **, p <.01.
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not be independent of each other and the estimate of the
interaction effect will not be independent of the main effects.
This situation reflects a characteristic of the estimation
procedure for unequal cell frequencies rather than any particular defect m

the analysis.

3

Estimates of the various

effects are reported in the analysis of variance table as
mean squares.

The standard F-test is computed by dividing

the mean square associated with any treatment effect by the
corresponding mean square for error.
A further tool available in the analysis of variance
repertoire is the computation of independent contrasts among
treatment means.

Such comparisons essentially involve a

further partitioning of the variation associated with the in
dependent variables.

The number of comparisons permitted

with any one independent variable is equal to the number of
levels of that variable minus one.

Thus, two comparisons--

black versus white and lower white versus upper white, for
example— are contained in the race/class variable.

Since

only one comparison— low versus high effectiveness--is allowed
with the organizational variable, the indicated F-value stands
as the test of this comparison.

With these two independent

variables, two further contrasts are possible, namely, one
for each of the two degrees of freedom associated with the
interaction component.

The t-statistic for testing the dif

ference between means is used to determine the level of signif
icance incurred with each contrast.

157
Turning to the actual registration data entered in
the table, it is first noted that an estimated 58.8 percent
of eligible Orleanians were registered to vote in 1972, while
51.9 percent and 46.9 percent were so registered in 1973 and
1974 respectively.

The eleven

percent reduction in the

proportion of those registered to vote is almost perfectly
consistent across both race/class and organizational effec
tiveness levels.

Examination of the raw figures constituting

the percentages indicate that the reduction is due both to
decrease in the numerator and to increases in the denominator.
Specifically, the absolute numbers of registered voters
actually declined between 1972 and 1974 and the pools of
eligibles in these years likewise increased in size.

In

1972, for example, 252,788 of the estimated 437,349 indi
viduals 18 years of age and older in New Orleans registered
to vote.

Corresponding figures for 197 3 are 234,567 of

451,960, and 217,278 of 465,264 for 1974.
Several possible explanations may be advanced to
account for this pattern, although none can be clearly sub
stantiated by the data.

An employee of the Orleans Parish

Registrar of Voters suggested that the decline is not a
long term one.

Rather, registration increases occurred in

the late 1960's and early 1970's, probably due to growing
black registration and heightened interest in the 1969 mayor's
race.

Periodic checks of the registration cards are conduc

ted in order to verify continued residence in the precinct
of registration among those

who have not voted in the past
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three years.

Those who have moved to addresses outside

the city boundaries or who cannot be located are eliminated
from the rosters.

Apparently, registration levels in 1973

and 1974 did not offset such losses.
Another possible explanation involves some basic
error in the estimation of the total number of those elibible
to vote.

Since these estimates are based upon census mater

ials, no adjustment is included for differences in mortality
rates and migratory patterns among areal units.

However,

this factor would appear much more plausible if the differ
ences from year to year, or from one level of the independent
variables to another, were wildly divergent or reflected in
consistently biased trends.

This is decidedly not the case.

The observed patterns of decline are relatively uniform.
Thus, the assumption that mortality and migratory differences
among areal units will cancel each other out still seem
acceptable.
Whatever the reasons for the decline, registration
levels are clearly correlated with the race/class dimension
of areal units.

Upper whites are in each instance registered

in greater proportion than are either lower whites or blacks.
In fact, the mean difference in registration levels in upper
white areas is approximately 12 percentage points higher than
in lower white areas and 20 percentage points higher than in
black areas.

The statistics associated with the isolated

effect of the race/class variable on voter registration levels
confirm these observations.

The magnitude of the race/class
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mean square shows the differences to be highly significant,
that is, to reflect a significance level indicating that
differences of this magnitude occur by chance alone less than
one time out of one hundred in identical situations.

The

orthagohal contrasts indicate that differences between black
and white areas and differences between lower white and upper
white areas are both statistically significant aspects of the
race/class differences.
However, the same patterns do not hold for the organ
izational variable.

Examination of row totals suggest that

there is only a negligible difference in registration levels
between areas designated as containing highly effective or
ganizational ratings and those having the low effectiveness
ratings.

Consequently, the mean square associated with

these observed differences in registration across levels of
organizational effectiveness is even smaller
square for error.
not warranted.

than the mean

An orthagonal comparison, therefore, is

Further, since the observed patterns are

fairly consistent within treatment dimensions, the interaction
component is also well within chance expectations.
These findings are only partially consistent with
hypothesized expectations.

Positive relationships were ex

pected between race/class and registration and also between
organizational effectiveness and registration.
support only the former expectation.
further complication.

The data

However, there is a

The race/class and organizational

effectiveness attributes of areal units were also originally
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expected to follow a positive relationship pattern.

Instead,

as the data of the previous chapter show, an inverse pattern
prevails there.

Thus, from the standpoint of its composi

tion, the high organizational category is made up primarily
of black areas,

followed in number by lower white and upper

white areal units.

Specifically, the high organizational

effectiveness category contains thirty-nine black, twentyseven lower white, and fourteen upper white areal units.

The

low organizational effectiveness group consists of fifteen
black, twenty-three lower whites, and thirteen upper white
areas.
The central feature being tested in this dissertation
is the mediating capacity of the organizational variable.
Therefore, if the relationship between the race/class desig
nation and the organizational effectiveness characteristics
of areal units is inverse, the following two conditions

must

hold for the mediation role to be substantiated:
1) an inverse relationship must exist between the race/
class characteristic and the participation variable
(registration or voter turn out), and
2) a positive relationship must exist between the or
ganizational effectiveness rating and the participation
variable.
As detailed earlier in this section, neither of these
conditions holds in comparisons of the registration figures
across levels of the race/class and organizational attributes
of areal units.

To summarize, upper whites exhibit the

highest levels of registration.

However, the high effective

ness category of the organizational variable contains primarily
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black, not upper white, areal units.

Upper white areal units

rated as highly effective are therefore expected to exhibit
higher registration figures than upper white units rated as
low effective areas, but lower registration figures than
either lower white or black neighborhoods.

Thus, the super

ior registration proportions of the upper white areas are
apparently obtained in the relative absence of effective
political organization as measured here.

This situation

accounts to some extent for the poor showing of the organi
zational factor vis-a-vis the registration data.
Race/Class, Organizational Effectiveness, and
Voter Turn Out
One can expect that organizational activity will be
reflected in varying degrees of voter turn out.

Table 6A

contains a summary of voter turn out levels classified by
race/class and organizational effectiveness characteristics
for the years 1972 through 1974.
is presented in table 6B.

Analysis of these data

As stipulated in chapter three,

the voter turn out percentages were computed by dividing
the total number of votes cast per areal unit by the total
number of persons registered to vote for each unit.
Looking first at the 1972 figures, average voter turn
out in the first primary stands at 41.6% and at 45.4% for the
secondary primary.

However,

levels of voter turn out are not

uniform across levels of the race/class variable.

Upper

white areas show the highest average turn out levels, exceed
ing in both elections those levels found in lower white areas

TABLE 6A
VOTER TURN OUT IN 131 NEW ORLEANS AREAL UNITS FOR 1972, 1973, AND 1974, BY RACE/
CLASS DESIGNATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS RATING: MEAN PERCENT
TURN OUT, UNADJUSTED MEANS3

Second Primary

First Primary

Race/Class

Race/Class

Year:
1972:
OrgEffb

High
Low
Column Mean

Black

Lower
White

Upper
White

Row
Mean

Black

Lower
White

Upper
White

Row
Mean

38.2
38.2
38.2

44.7
43.8
44.3

53.1
43.1
48.4

43.0
42.0
42.6

41.9
40.8
41.6

47.1
46.6
46.8

54.7
44.9
49.9

45.9
44.4
45.4

56.1
55.8
56.0

57.5
56.9
57.2

56.5
52.6
54.6

56.7
55.5
56.2

56.9
58.3
57.3

55.9
56.6
56.2

61.1
54.4
57.9

57.3
56.6
57.0

39.5
41.3
40.0

48.5
47.3
47.8

54.7
47.0
50.7

45.1
45.4
45.2

39.6
42.2
40.3

45.2
46.3
45.7

52.6
46.1
49.5

43.8
45.0
44.3

1973:
OrgEff

High
Low
Column Mean

1974:
OrgEff

High
Low
Column Mean

Raw data used in generating this table were derived from the Office of the
Secretary of State, State of Louisiana (1972, 1974a, 1974b), the Orleans Parish Demo
cratic Executive Committee (1973a, 1973b, 1973c), and the United States Bureau of the
Census (1972: 1-18).
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The abbreviation "OrgEff" refers to the organizational effectiveness variable.

TABLE 6B
VOTER TURN OUT IN 131 NEW ORLEANS AREAL UNITS FOR 1972, 1973, and 1974, BY RACE/
CLASS DESIGNATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS RATING: ANALYSIS
OF VARIANCE OF MEAN PERCENT TURN OUT

dfa

Total

130

Race/Class

dfb

2

Black vs. White
Lower White vs.
Upper White

1972

15.55*C

1973

5.69

15.14**

5.39

1974

20.34**

6.31**

6.03**

125

2.45*

1.71

2.16*

1.98*

3.48

1.24

2.33

Interaction

2

24.64**

1.58

aColumn entries for

18.43**

1973

6.73**

.10

125

1972

6.22**

l

Black vs. White,
High, Low OrgEff
Lcwer vs. Upper
White, High, Low
OrgEff

1974

125

Organizational
Effectiveness

Error

Second Primary

First Primary

Source of
Variation

17.13**

20.93**

.78
3.09

7.08
18.43**

125

2.15*

2.28*

2.16*

1.79

125

2.86*

1.87

3.37*

2.08*

4.63

3.24

4.51

3.31

2.57

5.78

components associated with these degreesof freedan are mean squares.

Column entries forcomponents associated with these degrees of freedcm are t-statistics.
°Asterisks refer tothe level of signifiance associated with the listed statistic,
as follows:
no asterisk, p >.05; *, p < 0 5 ; **, p <.01.
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by about four percentage points and those of black neighbor
hoods by approximately twelve percentage points.

The mean

squares associated with the main effects of the race/class
variable indicate statistical significance at the .05 level.
Turn out figures in 1972 are quite consistent across
organizational effectiveness levels.

The variation in mean

voter turn out in high versus low organizational effective
ness areas is only about one- percentage point.

The extremely

small mean squares for the organizational variable confirm
the absence of significant differences in turn out levels.
However, F-values associated with the interaction component
of race/class and organizational effectiveness do indicate
significant variation.

Inspection of the turn out averages

listed in the respective cells of the table quickly reveals
the locus of the interaction.

Turn out figures for black

and lower white areas are almost identical, regardless of the
level of organizational effectiveness considered.

By c o m - .

parison, upper white areas show voter turn out to be almost
ten full percentage points higher in the high than in the
low organizational effectiveness a r e a s /

Further comments

concerning this matter shall be presented after considering
the voter turn out data for 1973 and 1974.

A check of the

orthagonal contrasts reveals that the observed differences
in turn out are significant for the black versus white,
lower versus upper white, and, with one exception, for the
interaction comparisons.
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In 1973, voter turn out levels for New Orleans rose
dramatically by an overall average of approximately eleven
percent.

The average turn out in the first primary stands

at 56.2% and at 57.0% for the second election of that year.
The major portion of this increase is contributed by the
black and lower white neighborhoods.

The mean turn out among

upper whites is approximately seven percentage points higher
in 1973 than in 1972.

However, turn out in the lower white

areas is about eleven percentage points higher than in 1972,
and, in black neighborhoods, the average turn out increased
by nearly seventeen percentage points.

The overall effect

is that turn out in the three race/class areas approaches
parity, with the lower white and black areas actually show
ing a higher turn out than upper whites by two or so points
in the first primary.

The F-values indicate that the sizes

of the differences in turn out means by the race/class
variable are not statistically significant.

Likewise, the

small differences in turn out figures across levels of organ
izational effectiveness are below significance thresholds
and no interaction effect is noted.

Under these circumstan

ces, no orthagonal comparisons are warranted.
Voter turn out levels in 1974 returned to magnitudes
comparable with the 1972 data.

In the first election of

1974, 45.2% of those eligible voted in the first primary and
44.3% participated in the second.

Upper white neighborhoods

again had the highest turn outs in both primaries, exceeding
turn outs in lower white and black areas by about three and
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ten percentage points respectively.

The F-ratios indicated

by these overall differences are statistically significant.
However, the orthagonal contrasts indicate that the average
difference in turn out between lower and upper whites is
not significant in the first primary.

Turn out differences

associated with the organizational variable are again neg
ligible.

In both elections, however, an interaction effect

is detected among levels of the independent variables.

As

in the 1972 data, this effect is centered in the turn out of
figures of upper whites, high organizational effectiveness
areas which show nearly seven percentage points beyond that
listed for low organizational effectiveness, upper white
areas.
The turn out data thus reflect two basic trends.

One,

voter turn out figures are, in general, positively correlated
with the race/class dimension of areal units.

This finding

is contrary to the expectations revised on the basis of the
observed inverse relationship between race/class and organi
zational effectiveness.

If organizational effectiveness were

the mediating variable, black areas would be expected to show
the highest turn out percentages,

followed then in participa

tion by lower white and upper white neighborhoods.

This

pattern is approached only in the 1973 elections, a year in
which black and lower white turn out levels significantly ex
ceed those of the other two election years examined here.
These and other data suggest that the 1973 pattern is the ex
ception rather than the rule.
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The second trend contained within the data concerns
the interaction effect observed in the 1972 and 1974 figures.
The second corollary of the mediation hypothesis is that
voter turn out will be highest in areas rated as organization
ally effective.

Generally, this is not supported by the data,

except in upper white a r eas.

Turn out in lower white and

black neighborhoods is shown to be roughly identical in both
high and low organizationally effective units.

The upper

white pattern may be a reflection of the composition of high
ly rated upper white areas, located primarily in Uptown New
Orleans and the Lakefront, as opposed to that of lower rated
upper white areas, situated mostly in the newer suburban
neighborhoods of New Orleans East and the West Bank— in
short, a distinction between status areas of older versus
newer vintage.
Race/Class, Organizational Effectiveness, and Votes
Cast in Selected Elections
Perhaps the ultimate test of organizational effective
ness lies in the relation between the array of organizational
endorsements and the distribution of votes cast for endorsed
candidates.

As has been shown in the organizational descrip

tions of the previous chapter, such campaign activity forms
the nucleus of what New Orleans' political organizations
typically consider themselves to be all about.

Further, can

didates and organizational leaders alike considered local
political organizations to play an important role in recent
elections and were able to talk readily about the organizations
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in terms of their reputed impact upon elections.

Indeed,

the concept of "organizational effectiveness" as adopted
for the study is drawn from the definition commonly held
among these respondents.

In short, the organizations operate

primarily within the electoral context.
The assessment of the mediating role of organizations
follows the expectations specified earlier in this chapter,
with one modification.

This refinement is necessitated by

the fact that organizations do not always endorse the same
candidate.

Thus, the expected direction of the relationship

between the race/class dimension and the distribution of
votes cast is defined in each election by the particular
pattern of

organizational endorsements.

Likewise, the di

rection of the relationship expected between organizational
effectiveness ratings and the distribution of votes cast is
subject to this endorsement pattern.
1972 Louisiana State Supreme Court Race.

The 1972

Louisiana Supreme Court election featured four candidates
seeking to fill a two year unexpired, associate justice term.
The election district for this seat actually extends beyond
Orleans Parish to include Jefferson, Plaquemines, and St.
Bernard Parishes.

Analysis is restricted here to Orleans

Parish to maintain continuity and comparability with other
electoral data presented in the study.
Preliminary descriptions of the candidates— Pascal
Calogero, Revius Ortique, William Redmann, and Leon Sarpy—
and the conditions surrounding the election were presented
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in chapter three.

The election is of particular interest

because of its racial and class overtones.

Both Calogero

and Redmann, for example, emphasized their "working class"
ties.

Ortique reminded audiences that he would be the first

black justice elected to the court.

Sarpy, a Tulane law

professor, Boston Club member, and former King of Rex, was
cast as the Uptown, silk-stocking candidate.
Calogero, a close friend and former law partner of
Mayor Landrieu, actively sought the support of the city's
political organizations. Landrieu himself had won the 1969
mayor's race with strong black and upper white organizational
support, and many of the same apparently saw virtue in back
ing a candidate of a similar mold.
class origins

Calogero's own working

in the city's eighth ward., graduation at the

top of his class at the Tulane Law School, and work as an
attorney and Democratic office holder combined to project a
"local boy makes good!" image attractive to many organiza
tions.

The Landrieu connection was likewise said to be very

persuasive.
Ortique, on the other hand, encountered considerable
difficulty marshalling the support of even black organizations.
Several black organizations had recently experienced a measure
of electoral success and its spoils in the 1969 election.
The wisdom of backing a winner was apparent and fresh in
mind.

Further, Ortique's upper status background and exist

ence, seemingly removed from that of the average black, were
mentioned as obstacles in generating enthusiasm for his
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candidacy.

The issue of black solidarity, however, took

precedence in the considerations of some organizations.
S arpy's campaign strategy concentrated upon the
media approach.

He tended to view the judicial race and his

own campaign as standing above the political fray incumbent
to the typical New Orleans election.
vision commercials,

The tone of his tele

filmed in the well-appointed living room—

chandaliers, for example, hung conspicuously overhead— of his
Uptown home, seemed particularly to impart an air of aloof
ness.

He addressed a number of rallies sponsored by political

organizations, but seldom asked directly for organizational
support and universally refused to provide funds for organi
zational endorsements.
The final candidate, Redmann, sought some organiza
tional support, but received little— most likely because he
was given little chance of winning the election, given the
nature of his opposition.

The AFL-CIO did rate him as very

friendly to and compatible with labor.
Endorsements of the city's political organizations
are summarized in table 7.

In the first primary, the black

organizations split their endorsements, with the more highly
rated organizations of this group favoring Calogero and
those rated as less effective, excepting CCIVL, siding with
Ortique.

Calogero drew the support of all lower white and

upper white organizations.

With the elimination of Ortique

and Redmann from the race, all organizational support was
lined up behind the candidacy of Calogero in the second
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TABLE 7
ORGANIZATIONAL ENDORSEMENTS, 1972 LOUISIANA
STATE SUPREME COURT RACE

First Primary

Organizations
Race/Class
Designation

Calogero Ortique

Redmann

Second Primary
Sarpy

Calogero

B lack:
SOUL
COUP
OPPVL
NWCVL

X
X
X
X

BOLD
CCIVL
DAWN
TIPS

X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

Lower White:
AFL-CIO
RDO
MCD

X
X
X

X
X
X

CCDA
NOVA
AID

X
X
X

X
X
X

X

X

Upper W hite:
IWO
AGG
NOC

X
X

X
X

Sarpy
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primary.

On the basis of these endorsements, expectations
l

consistent with the mediating hypothesis indicate that
Calogero should carry the areas of high organizational rat
ings over those areas rated as less effective, and that the
distribution of votes cast for Calogero should be inversely
related to the race/class designation of areal units.

Fur

ther, the levels of support found among the other candidates
should be equally distributed over both race/class and or
ganizational effectiveness categories.
Presentation and analysis of the votes cast in the
1972 Louisiana Supreme Court race are given in tables 8A and
8B.

In the first primary, Sarpy received 33.7% of the votes,

only a fraction more than the 33.3% collected by Calogero.
Ortique managed to get 24.1% and Redmann finished a distant
fourth at 9.2%.

Turning to the race/class variable, Sarpy,

without organized political support as defined here, received
the largest share of votes within any of the race/class areas—
55.7% of the

upper white vote.

With only the claimed support

of the lower rated black organizations, Ortique gained 45.8%
of the black vote.

Thirty-two percent of the remaining vote

in black areas was cast for Calogero and 17.6% was given to
Sarpy.

Calogero managed 39.4% of the lower white vote, only

one tenth of one percentage point more than the 39.3% of that
vote cast for Sarpy.
The F-ratios associated with the race/class variable
indicate that the average number of votes

c a s t

in each of

the race/class levels are significantly different in all cases

/

TABLE 8A
VOTES CAST IN 1972 LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT RACE FOR 131 NEW ORLEANS AREAL UNITS,
BY RACE/CLASS DESIGNATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS RATING: MEAN
PERCENT VOTES CAST PER CANDIDATE, UNADJUSTED MEANS3
Candidate:

Calogero
OrgEff

High
Low
Column Mean

First Primary

Second Primary

Race/Class

Race/Class

Black

Lcwer
White

Upper
White

Rcw
Mean

Black

Lower
White

Upper
White

Row
Mean

30.9
34.9
32.0

42.2
36.1
39.4

19.4
30.3
24.7

32.7
34.2
33.3

74.8
70.7
73.5

54.1
52.1
53.3

33.3
43.5
37.7

60.6
55.1
58.4

48.5
38.6
45.8

12.3
9.5
11.1

4.2
5.1
4.7

28.6
17.0
24.1

4.5
6.1
5.1

9.2
12.1
10.5

14.0
16.0
15.0

7.8
11.3
9.2

16.3
20.2
17.6

36.6
42.3
39.3

62.4
48.3
55.7

31.3
37.4
33.7

25.1
30.7
26.7

49.1
45.7
47.3

66.7
57.5
62.3

39.4
45.9
41.9

Ortique
OrgEff

High
Low
Column Mean
Redmann

OrgEff

High
Low
Column Mean
Sarpy

OrgEff

High
Low
Column Mean
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Raw data used in generating this table were derived from the Office of the
Secretary of State, State of Louisiana (1972).

TABLE 8B
VOTES CAST IN 1972 LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT RACE FOR 131 NEW ORLEANS AREAL UNITS,
BY RACE/CLASS DESIGNATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS RATING: ANALYSIS
OF VARIANCE OF MEAN PERCENT VOTES CAST PER CANDIDATE

dfa

Total

130

Race/Class

dfb

2

Black vs. White
Lower White vs.
Upper White

Calogero

14.09

Sarpy

Calogero

Sarpy

507.42**'3 35.84**

327.74**

294.21**

273.14**

10.07**

14.67**

-13.27**

13.23**

125

-2.07*

4.71*

6.58**

-6.04**

5.83**

104.29**

2.61

17.42

Interaction

2

69.81**

125

Redmann

-14.60**

1

Black vs. White
High, low OrgEff
Lower vs. Upper
White, High, Lew
OrgEff

Ortique

125

Organizational
Effectiveness

Error

Second Primary

First Primary

Source of
Variation

27.14

.58

15.95

18.27

33.91

93.39**

40.48*

49.69*

125

0.41

2.02*

1.88

2.08*

125

6.97**

4.00**

2.23*

2.50*

10.00

16.04

1.49

10.54

11.21

11.07

aColumn entries for components associated with these degrees of freedan are mean squares.
T_

Column entries for components associated with these degrees of freedan are t-statistics.
Asterisks refer to the level of significance associated with the listed statistic, as follows:
no asterisk, p >.05; *, p < .05; **, p <.01.
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except that of Calogero.

Orthagonal contrasts indicate

that these discrepancies across race/class levels are sig
nificant for both black-white and lower white-upper white
differences.

A strong interaction effect is also noted in

both the Calogero and Sarpy distributions, symptomatic
mainly of the heavy support for Sarpy in the high effective
ness, upper white areas and the corresponding low support for
Calogero in these same areas.
The distribution of votes cast shows a statistically
significant difference across levels of the organizational
effectiveness variable only in the case of Ortique.

Here,

a difference between high and low effectiveness areas stands
at eleven percentage points in favor of Ortique.

Since,

however, he was not endorsed by one of the eight organizations
in the high effectiveness category, and the bulk of the vote
in his direction occurred in black neighborhoods, it is
difficult to construe this as evidence supportive of the or
ganizational variable.
The major issue in the second election revolved around
the question of to whom Ortique1s bloc of votes would shift.
Black organizations previously backing Ortique now endorsed
Calogero.

The Landrieu connection was reaffirmed.

5

Sarpy,

meanwhile, continued his policy of working independently of
organizational support.

Political wags fully expected

Calogero to take the bulk of the departed candidates' support.
Returns from the second primary suggest quite clearly
to whom Ortique's share of the black vote went.

Calogero
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received 58.4% of all votes cast in Orleans Parish, enough
to offset his losses in neighboring parishes, and 73.5% of
the black vote.

This represented an increase of 41% in his

support among blacks over the first primary.

He also in

creased his share of the lower white vote to 53.3%, and
carried 37.7% the upper white vote.

The analysis shows that

the differences in the vote by race/class categories is sta
tistically significant for both candidates.

There also is

an interaction effect, again centered in the ten percentage
point gap in candidate choice in upper white neighborhoods
between high and low organizational effectiveness areas.
Votes in black and lower white areas vary no more than five
percentage points across organizational effectiveness levels.
Differences in overall mean votes per candidate across the
organizational variable are not significant.
In sum, the data for this election do not tend to
support the mediating hypothesis.

The organizational effec

tiveness variable shows a significant difference only in the
case of the vote for Ortique— an instance which must be dis
counted since the high effectiveness organizations endorsed
his opponent.

One might argue, however, that the effect of

an endorsement is relative, that is, Calogero did well by the
organizations in the first election in drawing almost onethird of the black vote against a black opponent.

On the

other hand, in the absence of a black opponent in the second
- primary, he still received 70.7% of the vote in low effec
tiveness black neighborhoods— only four percentage points
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less than in high organization black areas.

In short,

the endorsed candidate won, but it is difficult to point to
solid evidence of organizational mediation.
1973 Orleans Parish District Attorney Race.

The

District Attorney's race in 1973 featured a rematch of the
1969 election in which Harry Connick challenged incumbent
Jim Garrison.

These two were joined in the 1973 election by

attorney George Reese and former Garrison aide Ross T.
Scaccia.

Connick's campaign emphasized a tough "law-and-

order" stance which included a promise to prosecute blackon-black crime, a claimed weakness of the Garrison regime.
As otherwise used, law-and-order is generally a codeword
for cracking down upon black-on-white crime.

Connick sought

to soften the hard image that law-and-order thus carries in
the black community by personally and openly courting the
support of the black organizations.
tions favored Connick over Garrison.

Upper white organiza
Connick was well-known

among them through his work as a successful attorney in
criminal law and through his participation in AGG prior to
seeking office.

As indicated in table 9, Connick was success

ful in gaining the support of the higher ranking black organ
izations, with the exception of OPPVL, and of all the upper
white organizations.

Among the lower white organizations,

he was able to secure the endorsement only of MCD.
Garrison was seeking his fifth term as district
attorney and, whether he himself actually contributed to the
problem or not, was a natural target for the frustration over
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TABLE 9
ORGANIZATIONAL ENDORSEMENTS, 197 3 ORLEANS
PARISH DISTRICT ATTORNEY RACE

Organizations .
Race/Class
Designation

1st Primary
Connick

Garrison

2nd Primary
Reese

Connick

Garrison

Black:
SOUL
COUP
OPPVL
NWCVL
BOLD
CCIVL
DAWN
TIPS

X
X

X
X
X

X
X

X
X

X

X
X
X

X
X
X

Lower White:
AFL-CIO
RDO
MCD

X
X
X

X

CCDA
NOVA
AID

X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

Upper White:
IWO

X

X

AGG
NOC

X
X

X
X
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rising crime rates in New Orleans.

Generally regarded as

a charismatic individual, Garrison maintained extensive
support in lower white areas over the years and, despite
occasional recriminations, was personally popular among
blacks as well.

However, his involvement in the Kennedy

assassination case, considered by some as a wasteful and
foolish divergence,

7

seemed to have cost him some measure

of support in upper white areas.

Garrison drew endorsements

from two old-guard black organizations

(OPPVL and CCIVL) and

all the lower white organizations except M C D .

The leaders

of DAWN, somewhat leery of all the law-and-order talk being
generated, decided to stay with Garrison.
Reese, the third candidate, was able to attract only
the endorsement of BOLD, although several organizations ex
pressed their basic satisfaction with his credentials.

His

efforts in aligning organizational support appeared hampered
chiefly by the belief that Connick had the best chance of
unseating Garrison.

A handsome and charismatic sort, he

concentrated upon personal appearances and media advertising.
The basic pattern of the endorsements varies in this
election significantly from that of the previous one.

In

this race, upper white and black organizations are found
leaning toward the same candidate, who is actively opposed
by the lower white organizations.

In this scheme, the high

er organizational effectiveness category is initially some
what diluted.

In keeping with hypothesized relations,

support for Connick is expected to be least elevated in the
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organizationally effective areas of lower white neighbor
hoods.

The reverse pattern, that is, low support in black

and upper white areas and high support in lower white neigh
borhoods,
vote.

should hold for the distribution of the Garrison

The Reese support should be randomly distributed

across levels of the race/class and organizational effective
ness variables.
These expectations, therefore, anticipate quadratic
trends within the distribution of the Connick and Garrison
votes.

Such trends may be specifically assessed by utilizing

the two orthagonal contrasts associated with the race/class
variable to test for linear and quadratic trends rather than
the black-white and lower white-upper white comparisons em
ployed in analyzing the previous election.

In this instance,

the former set of contrasts is clearly preferable.
Tables 10A and 10B_contain the distribution and
analysis of votes cast in the district attorney's race.
Garrison carried 40.4% of the vote in the first primary, com
pared with Connick's 34.4%.
third place finish of 23.9%.

Reese was eliminated with his
The largest single bloc of

votes within any race/class category is the 49.2% of the
black vote given to Garrison— despite the endorsement of
Connick by the bulk of the strongest black organizations.
Connick followed in black neighborhoods with thirty-six per
cent of the votes.

Lower whites favored Garrison, giving

him 40.3% of the vote, and split their remaining votes almost
equally between Connick and Reese

(29.8% and 28.2%,

TABLE 10A
VOTES CAST IN 1973 ORLEANS PARISH DISTRICT ATTORNEY RACE FOR 131 AREAL UNITS,
BY RACE/CLASS DESIGNATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS RATING: MEAN
PERCENT VOTES CAST PER CANDIDATE, UNADJUSTED MEANS3

First Primary
Candidate:

Race/Class

Connick
OrgEffb

High
Low
Column Mean

Second Primary
Race/Class

Black

Lower
White

Upper
White

Row
Mean

Black

Lower
White

Upper
White

Row
Mean

37.1
32.2
36.0

29.3
30.4
29.8

41.7
37.7
39.8

35.3
34.4
34.4

44.4
39.8
43.0

45.1
48.2
46.6

68.2
61.9
66.0

50.7
51.2
50.9

48.8
49.9
49.2

41.1
39.2
40.3

20,6
25.6
23,1

41.3
39.0
39.0

55.5
60.1
56.8

54.8
51.7
53.3

31.8
38.1
33.9

49.2
48.8
49 .0

13.3
16.3
14.2

27.9
28.2
28.0

34.3
34.8
34.8

22.2
26.9
23.9

Garrison
OrgEff

High
Low
Column Mean
Reese

OrgEff

Hiqh
Low
Column Mean

aRaw data used in generating this table were derived from the Orleans Parish
Democratic Executive Committee (1973a).
The abbreviation "OrgEff" refers to the organizational effectiveness variable.

TABLE 10B
VOTES CAST IN 1973 ORLEANS PARISH DISTRICT ATTORNEY RACE FOR 131 AREAL UNITS, BY
RACE/CLASS DESIGNATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS RATING: ANALYSIS OF
VARIANCE OF MEAN PERCENT VOTES CAST PER CANDIDATE

Second Primary

First Primary

Source of
Variation

dfa

Total

130

Race/Class

dfb

2

Linear Trend
Quadratic Trend

125
125

Connick

Garrison

Reese

Connick

Garrison

21.91**C

204.22**

122.91**

171.13**

170.13**

2.85**
5.97**

-13.54**
-3.65**

15.17**
3.24**

10.55**
4.12**

-10.46**
-4.12**

Organizational
Effectiveness

1

8.48

.11

9.65

21.79

23.06

Interaction

2

10.31

10.16

4.38

25.70*

26.21*

Linear Trend,
High, Lew OrgEff
Quadratic Trend,
High, Lew OrgEff
Error

125

125

0.41

-0.39

125

2.56*

-2.55*

4.48

6.22

2.97

7.85

7.94

aColumn entries for components associated withthese degrees of freedan are mean squares.
Column entries for components associated withthese degrees of freedom are t-statistics.
CAsterisks refer to the level of significance associated with listed statistic, as follows:
no asterisk, p > .05, *, p < .05; **, p < .01.
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respectively).

Connick and Reese were the clear choices of

the upper white neighborhoods, drawing 39.8% and 35.8% of
those votes.

Garrison finished a poor third there with only

23.1%.
The F-ratios associated with the race/class designation
indicate that the mean differences among the categories are
indeed statistically significant.

Further, a clear quadratic

trend is present in the distribution of Connick votes.

The

expected quadratic trend in the Garrison vote is overshadowed
by the strong linear trend induced by the unexpected high
support for Garrison in black areas.

Reese's support is like

wise obviously linear, but in the opposite direction from
Garrison's distribution.

Differences among levels of organi

zational effectiveness are not statistically significant.
The distribution of the vote in the first primary
suggested that Garrison faced an uphill battle in the run-off.
Reese's votes seemed most likely to swing in Connick's direc
tion.

Votes cast for Reese shared an important characteristic

with those for Connick, namely, both were votes against the
incumbent.

To Connick's advantage also, Reese was the clear

favorite over Garrison in upper white areas.

Finally, several

of the black organizations backing Connick seemed slightly
embarrassed by the strong black support for Garrison in the
first primary.

Atonement could be made in the second election.

A breakdown of the votes cast in the second primary generally
confirmed these projections, with the exception of Garrison's
black support diminishing.

Garrison carried 56.8% of the
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black vote, an increase of about seven percent over the
first primary.

However, Connick managed to win the election

by a narrow margin, 50.9% to 49.0%.

He did so by carrying

two-thirds of the votes from upper white areas— an increase
of nearly thirty

percent— and drawing 46.6% and 43.0% from

lower white and black areas respectively.
The differences among the race/class categories are
shown to be statistically significant in the analyses of
variance.

A strong positive relationship between the race/

class variable and the Connick support and the concommitant
inverse relationship between race/class and the Garrison
support are indicated.

These linear trends overshadow the

predicted quadratic trends.

The interaction effect is noted

again, resulting from the magnitude of the differences in
support between high and low organizational effectiveness
areas of the upper white category, compared with the simi
larities found in black and lower white areas across organi
zational effectiveness ratings.
In this election, there are some factors which conform
with expectations.

The quadratic distribution of the Connick

vote in the first primary and the higher vote totals for
Connick in high organization upper white areas are examples.
However, the organizational variable again shows poorly and
most of the expectations associated with it are, in fact, not
substantiated by the evidence.

In addition, one may note

the 61.9% support gained by Connick in low organizational
effectiveness upper white areas or the 55.5% for Garrison in
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high organizational effectiveness black areas.

Such

discrepancies must be balanced against the confirmed expec
tations .
1973 Orleans Parish Civil Sheriff R a c e .

Political

observers indicated prior to this 1973 election that long
time incumbent, Milton Stire, again appeared unbeatable.
Stire was reputed among the organizational leaders and can
didates to run and clean and tight office.

Further, he had

proved over the years to be an active and shrewd politician.
Formally, he eshewed personal affiliation with any one po
litical organization.

He did, however, maintain open and

public ties with a number of organizations, expecially the
city's lower white groups.

As illustrated in table 11,

Stire acquired the backing of these organizations for the
election and also secured the endorsement of AGG.
the issue of the campaign was simple:

For Stire,.

"Re-elect me, I've

done a good job."
Stire was opposed by two black candidates— Rev.
Johnny Jackson, Sr. of DAWN, and Alvin Sargent.

Jackson

voiced no specific complaints about Stire's performance in
office other than the incumbent's rather conservative racial
stance.

Given the extent to which matters of this office

affected the black' community, Jackson primarily claimed to
seek greater black participation and input.

The entry of

Sargent into the race touched off some controversy in the
black community.

It was charged by some that Sargent's

candidacy was inspired by the Stire camp to put a crack in

186

TABLE 11
ORGANIZATIONAL ENDORSEMENTS, 1973 ORLEANS
PARISH CIVIL SHERIFF RACE

Organizations
First Primary^
Race/Class
Designation

Jackson

Sargent

Stire

Black:
SOUL
COUP
OPPVL
NWCVL

X
X
X
X

BOLD
CCIVL
DAWN
TIPS

X
X
X
X

Lower White:
AFL-CIO
RDO
MCD

X
X
X

CCDA
NOVA
AID

X
X
X

Upper White:
IWO

X

AGG
NOC

X

X

Stire won re-election without a run-off (second primary).
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the solid black vote needed by Jackson to pull an upset.
Jackson gained the unified endorsement of all the major
black organizations,

and drew the support of IWO and NOC as

well, who agreed "it was time for a change."
The pattern of endorsements in this election closely
resembles that of the district attorney race (which, inci
dentally, was conducted concurrently).

Quite simply, black

and upper white organizations are found to favor the same
candidate, Jackson, in opposition to the choice of the lower
white organizations, Stire.

According to the hypothesized

relationships, therefore, quadratic trends are expected in
the distributions of Stire and Jackson support across levels
of the race/class designation.

Thus, the greatest support

for Jackson is expected in high organizational effectiveness
portions of black and upper white areas, while comparatively
fewer votes should be found for him in high organizational
effectiveness areas of lower white neighborhoods.

Stire's

support should be concentrated in the lower white categories,
especially in the high organizational effectiveness classi
fication.

These patterns are again tested directly in the

set of orthagonal comparisons.
The results of the first primary for this office are
presented in table 12A.
instance affirmed.

The political forecasts were in this

Stire won easily without necessitating a

run-off by cornering 56.4% of the vote.

Jackson followed

with 34.1% and Sargent claimed the remaining 9.1%.
est

The larg

single bloc of votes within categories of the race/class

T A B L E 12A

VOTES CAST IN 1973 ORLEANS PARISH CIVIL SHERIFF RACE FOR 131 AREAL UNITS, BY
RACE/CLASS DESIGNATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS RATING: MEAN
PERCENT VOTES CAST PER CANDIDATE, UNADJUSTED MEANS3

Candidate:
Race/Class
Jackson
High
Organizational
Effectiveness
Low
Column Mean

Black

Lower White

Upper White

Row Mean

63.0
52.3
60.1

18.9
19.9
19.5

10.1
12.1
11.5

40.2
27.1
34.5

8.7
9.5
9.0

8.6
9.7
9.1

8.4
10.6
9.4

8.6
9.8
9.1

28.2
38.1
31.0

71.4
71.3
71.4

81.5
77.3
79.4

49.7
63.1
56.4

Sargent
Organizational
High
Effectiveness
Low
Column Mean
Stire
High
Organizational
Low
Effectiveness
Column Mean

aRaw data used in generating this table were derived from the Orleans Parish
Democratic Executive Committee (1973b).

designation is found among the high organizational effective
ness upper white neighborhoods where Stire gained 81.5% of
the vote.

Overall, Stire collected 79.4% of the votes cast

in upper white neighborhoods.

Jackson and Sargent split the

remaining twenty-one percent almost evenly, 11.5% to 9.4%
respectively.

Stire likewise carried lower white neighbor

hoods by a wide margin, 71.4%, with only one tenth of one
percent difference showing between high and low organization
al effectiveness areas.

Jackson managed to get 60.1% of the

black vote, carrying high organization areas of these neigh
borhoods by about eleven more percentage points than in low
organizational effectiveness areas.

However, Stire did re

ceive almost one-third of the black vote despite solid
organizational opposition in black areas.

The nine percent

won by Sargent would apparently not have altered the out
come of the election, even if it had been unanimously co
opted by Jackson.
The analyses of variance, presented in table 12B,
indicates that the differences in support for Stire and
Jackson are statistically significant across race/class
categories.

The distribution of votes for Sargent by this

variable is well within chance expectations.

The expected

quadratic trends are not pronounced due to the low support
accorded Jackson, or conversely, the strong support for
Stire, in upper white neighborhoods.
are pure and prominent.

However, linear trends

The Jackson vote is clearly related

inversely to the race/class dimension and the Stire support

TABLE 12B
VOTES CAST IN 1973 ORLEANS PARISH CIVIL SHERIFF RACE FOR 131 AREAL UNITS, BY
RACE/CLASS DESIGNATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS RATING: ANALYSIS
OF VARIANCE OF MEAN PERCENT VOTES CAST PER CANDIDATE

Source of Variation

dfa

Total

130

Race/Class

2

Linear Trend
Quadratic Trend
1

Interaction

2

Linear Trend, High,
Low OrgEff
Quadriatic Trend, High,
Low OrgEff

Jackson

701.09**°
125
125

Organizational
Effectiveness

Error

dfb

Sargent

4.62

-14.97**
-6.30**
123.96**

Stire

675.79**
14.40**
6.16**

6.23

107.23**

41.85

4.69

49.41

16.07

12.74

17.11

125
125
125

a Column entries for components associated with these degrees of freedom are mean squares,
k Column entries for components associated with these degrees of freedom are t-statistics.
c
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. •
Asterisks refer to the level of significance associated with the listed statistic, as
follows: no asterisk, p >.05; *, p < .05; **, p < .01.
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subsequently shows a strong positive relation with the race/
class variable.
The organizational factor likewise shows significant
variation here in the distribution of votes for both major
candidates.

The significant variation in the vote between

high and low organizational effectiveness areas is largely
attributable to the differences in support among black neigh
borhoods.

Differences in candidate choice among white

neighborhoods of the low and high effectiveness rating are
quite small by comparison.

Generally, these data are quite

supportive of the hypothesized relationships, with the not
able exception of the potent support given Stire in upper
white areas.
1973 Orleans Parish Clerk of Criminal Court Race.
The Clerk of Court election bears much resemblance to the
race for Civil Sheriff.

A long term white incumbent, Daniel

Haggerty, faced opposition from a promising black candidate,
g

Edwin Lombard, and a third minor candidate, Herman Bustemente.
Haggerty was considered to be more vulnerable than Stire.
Dissatisfaction had surfaced concerning Haggerty's perform
ance in office, particularly during the most recent term.
situation posed a dilemma in the minds of some people.
posing of Haggerty was one thing.
man was another.

The

Dis

Replacing him with a black

However, by almost any standard, Lombard

was an attractive candidate.

He was well and locally—

Loyola University School of Law— educated.

He had worked

for Mayor Landrieu in recent elections and was considered to
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be a stable, known quantity.

He was an effective and

articulate speaker, especially in comparison to Haggerty.
Bustemente sought to gain entry and consideration into the
race, but was largely ignored as major organizations and
figures chose

sides between Haggerty and Lombard.

Organizational endorsements for the election are pre
sented in table 13.

Lombard received unanimous support from

the city's black and upper white organizations.

His candi

dacy was even endorsed by the conservative morning daily,
The New Orleans Times-Picayune.

He was likewise endorsed by

The New Orleans State-Item, the editorially more liberal
evening newspaper.

For the black organizations, Lombard's
✓

\

candidacy became a •cause celebre.

The specifics of the

election indicated that Lombard had a good chance of becom
ing the first black to win a city-wide elective post since
Reconstruction.

On the other hand, if he failed, it was

difficult to envision a situation in which a black candidate
might succeed in the near future.

Haggerty drew the unified

support of the lower white organizations.

Thus, the elec

tion, like the previous two, shows black and upper white
organizations siding in their endorsements against those of
the lower white organizations.

The expectation, then, is

that the distributions of support for Haggerty and Lombard
will follow linear and quadratic trends.
Tables 14A and 14B contain the distribution and
analysis of the votes cast in the two primaries for this
office.

In the first primary, Haggerty barely missed
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TABLE 13
ORGANIZATIONAL ENDORSEMENTS, 1973 ORLEANS
PARISH CLERK OF CRIMINAL COURT RACE

Organizations
Race/Class
Designation

Bustemente Haggerty

Lombard

Haggerty

Lombard

X
X
X
X

BOLD
CCIVL
DAWN
TIPS

X
X
X
X

XXXX

SOUL
COUP
OPPVL
NWCVL

xxxx

Black:

Lower W hi t e :
AFL-CIO
RDO
MCD

X
X
X

X
X
X

CCDA
NOVA
AID

X
X
X

X
X
X

IWO

X

x

AGG
NOC

X
X

XX

Upper W h i t e :

TABLE 14A
VOTES CAST IN 1973 ORLEANS PARISH CLERK OF CRIMINAL COURT RACE FOR 131 AREAL
UNITS, BY RACE/CLASS DESIGNATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS
RATING:
MEAN PERCENT VOTES CAST PER CANDIDATE,
UNADJUSTED MEANSa

Second Primary

First Primary
Candidate:

Race/Class

Race/Class
Haggerty
OrgEff

High
Low
Column Mean

Black

Lower
White

Upper
White

Row
Mean

Black

Lower
White

Upper
White

Row
Mean

23.0
37.0
27.0

64.2
63.3
62.8

63.9
62.7
63.3

44.1
52.6
48.5

16.7
30.5
20.8

64.5
65.3
65.0

58.4
60.5
59.5

40.3
54.0
45.6

73.3
59.1
69.3

30.1
30.4
30.2

27.9
29.0
28.5

50.8
38.5
46.0

83.5
69.2
79.5

35.4
34.6
35.0

41.0
39.4
40.5

5S.8
46.0
54.4

Lombard
OrgEff

High
Low
Column Mean

aRaw data used in generating this table derived from Orleans Parish Democratic
Executive Committee (1973c).
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TABLE 14B
VOTES CAST IN 1973 ORLEANS PARISH CLERK OF CRIMINAL COURT RACE FOR 131 AREAL
U NITS, BY RACE/CLASS DESIGNATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS
RATING: ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF MEAN PERCENT VOTES
CAST PER CANDIDATE

First Primary
Source of Variation

dfa

Total

130

Race/Class

dfb

2

Linear Trend
Quadratic Trend

125
125

Haggerty

Lombard

359.43**C

450.49**

579.62**

578.59**

10.74**
-7.21**

-11.87**
7.02

10.06**
-8.58**

-10.16**
8.55**

214.31**

221.99**

Organizational
Effectiveness

1

208.40**

220.48**

Interaction

2

76.57**

76.04**

Linear, High, Low
OrgEff
Quadratic, High,
Low OrgEff
Error

125
125
125

Second Primary

2.44*

Haggerty

Lombard

56.73

60.75

20.94

20.93

-2.41*

-1.53

1.41

15.88

16.82

aColumn entries for components associated with these degrees of freedom are mean squares.
Id
Column entries for components associated with these degrees of freedom are t-statistics.
CAsterisks refer to the level of significance associated with the listed statistic, as follows:
no asterisk, p > .05; *, p < .05; **, p < .01.
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collecting a majority of the votes, receiving 48.5% of
those cast.

Lombard finished a scant two and one half per

centage points behind with 46.0%.

Thus, Bustemente forced

a run-off though getting only 5.1% of the vote.

The largest

bloc of votes in any race/class category is the 73.3%
support for Lombard found in high organizational effective
ness black neighborhoods.

Overall, Lombard received 69.3%

of the black vote, while drawing 30.2% and 28.5% from lower
white and upper white areas respectively.

Surprisingly,

upper white areas gave Haggerty his largest proportion of
support.

He received 63.3% of that vote and 62.8% of the

vote in lower white areas.
Analysis of these figures shows that the average
voting levels recorded for the two candidates vary signifi
cantly across both levels of the race/class dimension and
levels of the organizational effectiveness variable.

Tests

for linear trends indicate the Lombard vote to be strongly
and inversely related to the race/class designation and
positively related to the organizational effectiveness rat
ing of areal units.

These relationships are present in the

Haggerty vote as well, but run in the opposite direction.
That is, Haggerty support tends to increase across levels
of the race/class variable and decrease across organizational
effectiveness levels.

The quadratic trend is less pronounced

due to the unexpected level of support received by Haggerty
in upper white neighborhoods.

An interaction effect is

present in the data, attributable mainly to the large
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difference in support between high and low organizational
effectiveness areas in black neighborhoods.

The differences

average almost fourteen percentage points in black areas, as
compared with fluctuations of only one or two percentage
points in white areas. 1
With both sides realistically sensing victory, the
campaigns between the primaries intensified considerably.
Both organizational efforts and media advertising increased
noticeably.

Special efforts were made to further inform

voters residing in upper white areas of Lombard's education
al and political credentials.

Perhaps of even greater

significance, his name was subtlely linked with that of
Connick (the district attorney candidate)

and Charles Foti

(the challenger in the criminal sheriff race) as the reform
"ticket."

This strategy would presumably help Lombard in

white areas, and work to the advantage of Connick and Foti
in black neighborhoods.
The second primary was not as close a contest as had
been expected.

Lombard won with 54.4% of the vote.

He drew

79.5% of the black vote, an increase of almost ten percentage
points over the first primary.

He also received 40.5% of

the upper white vote, a shift of twelve percentage points
over the first primary, and drew over one-third of the vote
in lower white neighborhoods.

Thus, Haggerty recorded 65.0%

of the lower white vote, but fared more poorly in both black
and upper white areas than in the first primary.
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Differences in the average votes cast per candidate
vary significantly across both race/class and organizational
effectiveness categories.

Lombard's support is inversely

related to race/class and positively related to organization
al effectiveness.
image.

Haggerty's support appears as the mirror

The quadriatic trends across race/class levels are

clearly evident, with Lombard's support in black and in
upper white areas being larger than that recorded in lower
white neighborhoods.

For Haggerty, the reverse is true.

interaction effect is noted.

No

In short, the results of this

election conform in every way to the hypothesized expecta
tions .
1974 Louisiana State Supreme Court Race.

The 1974

race for the Louisiana State Supreme Court involved the
same associate justice seat contested in the 1972 election
treated earlier.

This time, however, the victor could ex

pect to serve a full ten-year term before facing re-election.
Justice Calogero was challenged by Jefferson Parish Criminal
Sheriff, Alwynn Cronvich, and the former Orleans Parish
District Attorney, Jim Garrison.
Cronvich attacked Calogero's record on the court,
claiming that Calogero served as the liberal swing vote that
allowed rapists and murderers to run free.

He vowed to

bring a tough law-and-order stance and a lawman's point of
view to the court.

Calogero defended the legal and moral

integrity of his court decisions.

He further emphasized

his private role of parent, implying that the concerned
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father of eight children would not turn loose murderers
and rapists into the streets.

Garrison's candidacy seemed

doomed to failure from the start.

Having just been defeated

in the district attorney's race in the midst of law-andorder talk, he had no unique stand left between Calogero and
Cronvich.

Further, his major strengths during the district

attorney years— lower whites and blacks— were major sources
of Calogero's constituency in the 1972 race.

The tough-

talking sheriff, meanwhile, seemed to hold a decided edge
among the suburban whites of Jefferson Parish and the rural
whites of St. Bernard and Plaquemines Parishes that might
otherwise be predisposed to Garrison.
Calogero's strategy in 1974 was similar to that used
two years earlier— to win by a large enough margin in New
Orleans to off-set expected losses to Cronvich in the other
three parishes of the district.

Table 15 contains a summary

of the endorsements of New Orleans political organizations
for this election.

Calogero secured the endorsements of

all seventeen organizations.

The organizations worked the

campaign with some sense of urgency.
risk losing the campaign to Cronvich.
about Cronvich's ideology.

Few were willing to
Some were concerned

For others, it was simply a

matter of retaining the seat for a New Orleanian

rather

than giving it up to someone in Jefferson Parish.
The pattern of endorsements in this election leads
to the standard set of expectations used in the analysis of
the 1972 race.

The distribution of the Calogero vote is
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TABLE 15
ORGANIZATIONAL ENDORSEMENTS, 1974 LOUISIANA
STATE SUPREME COURT RACE

Organizations
1st Primary
Race/Class
Designation

Calogero Cronvich Garrison

2nd Primary
Calogero Cronvich

Black:
SOUL
COUP
OPPVL
NWCVL

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

BOLD
CCIVL
DAWN
TIPS

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

•X
X
X

IWO

X

X

AGG
NOC

X
X

X
X

Lower White:
AFL-CIO
RDO
MCD
' CCDA
NOVA
AID
Upper White:
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expected to be inversely related to the race/class variable.
Black areas are anticipated to support Calogero in a greater
proportion than are lower white or upper white areas.

Lower

white support for Calogero should exceed that found for him
in upper white areas.

Finally, the vote should be signifi

cantly larger in Calogero's behalf among high than low
organizational effectiveness areas.

Distributions of support

for Cronvich and Garrison should follow a random pattern
across levels of the race/class and organizational effective
ness variables.

These trends are specifically tested in the

set of orthagonal comparisons.
Tables 16A and 16B contain the results and analysis
of the two primaries.

In the first primary, Calogero just

missed a majority in Orleans Parish, carrying 49.7% of the
vote.

Garrison was second in the parish with 28.8% and

Cronvich finished third here with 21.5% of the New Orleans
vote.

However, by virtue of his stronger showing in the

other three parishes of the district, Cronvich outdistanced
Garrison for the run-off slot against Calogero.
Returning to the New Orleans vote, black neighbor
hoods gave Calogero the largest single bloc of votes
of any of the race/class areas.

(59.5%)

He also carried the largest

percentage of the votes cast in white areas, taking 43.1%
of the lower white and 41.9% of the upper white votes.
Garrison did almost equally well in lower white and black
areas, polling 31.8% and 30.1% of the votes, but fared
poorly in upper white neighborhoods.

Cronvich received a

r

TABLE 16A
VOTES CAST IN 1974 LOUISIANA STATE SUPREME COURT RACE FOR 131 AREAL UNITS,
BY RACE/CLASS DESIGNATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS
RATING: MEAN PERCENT VOTES CAST PER CANDIDATE,
UNADJUSTED MEANS3

First Primary

Second Primary

Race/Class
Candidate:
Calogero
OrgEff

High
Low
Column Mean

Cronvich
OrgEff

High
Low
Column Mean

Race/Class

Black

Lower
White

Upper
White

Row
Mean

Black

Lower
White

Upper
White

Row
Mean

61.4
54.7
59.5

43.3
42.3
43.1

40.6
43.4
41.9

51.9
46.2
49.7

81.2
76.7
79.8.

56.4
52.8
54.8

43.7
51.0
47.2

66.2
59.6
63.6

10.0
11.3
10.5

23.3
26.5
24.8

41.2
33.4
37.5

20.0
23.8
21.5

18.8
23.3
20.0

43.4
47.1
45.1

56.1
48.7
52.5

33.6
40.5
36.3

28.6
33.9
30.1

32.5
31.0
31.8

18.2
23.0
20.5

28.1
29.9
28.8

Garrison
OrgEff

High
Low
Column Mean

a

Raw data used in generating this table derived from the Office of the Secretary
of State, State of Louisiana (1974a).
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TABLE 16B
VOTES CAST IN 1974 LOUISIANA STATE SUPREME COURT RACE FOR 131 AREAL UNITS, BY
RACE/CLASS DESIGNATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS RATING: ANALYSIS
OF VARIANCE OF MEAN PERCENT VOTES CAST PER CANDIDATE

First Primary

Source of
Variation

dfa

Total

130

Race/Class

dfb

2

Black vs. White
Lower White vs.
Upper White

Calogero

Cronvich

Garrison

Calogero

Cronvich

76. 35**C

185.46**

44.13**

317.91**

316.00**

16.18**

-4.05**

-15.04**

14.93**

7.93**

-7.20**

-3.16**

3.09**

1.99

30.32**

22.19

22 .18

27.65**

15.76*

33.58*

33.63*

1.73

1.70

125

-9.93**

125

0.64

Organizational
Effectiveness

1

48.58**

Interaction

2

19.73*

Black vs. White,
High, Lew, OrgEff
Lower vs. Upper
White, High, Lav
OrgEff
Error

125

Second Primary

125

2. 33*

1.44

1.43

125

1.22

3.50**

2.03*

6.48

4.28

-2.35*
9.22

2.36*
9.27

Column entries for components associated with these degrees of freedan are mean squares.
Column entries for components associated with these degrees of freedan are t-statistics.
203

Asterisks refer to the level of significance associated with the listed statistic, as follows:
no asterisk, p >.05; *, p <.05; **, p <.01.
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meager 10.5% of the black vote and 24.8% of the votes in
lower white neighborhoods.

Upper whites gave him 37.5% of

their votes.
Differences in votes cast across the race/class
designation of areal units are statistically significant in
all cases, and the discrepancies between lower and upper
white levels of support vary significantly in the cases of
Cronvich and Garrison.

An interaction effect is noted as

well for the distribution of support for each candidate.
This effect is located in the difference between high and
low organizational effectiveness levels of support in black
versus white areas for the Calogero vote and in lower versus
upper white areas for both the Garrison and Calogero votes.
The organizational variable shows significant differences
as expected only in distribution of the Calogero vote.
Projections indicated that Calogero would fare even
better in Orleans Parish in the second primary.

Calogero

seemed sure to pick up the bulk of Garrison's substantial
black and lower white support.

Further, if trends in the

first primary carried into the run-off, Calogero and Cronvich
stood to split Garrison's small upper white following almost
evenly.

A look at the results for the second primary gen

erally confirm the accuracy of these predictions.

Calogero

carried 63.6% of the votes cast in Orleans Parish, with an
increase of twenty percentage points over the first primary
from blacks
lower whites

(to 79.8%), an eleven

percent increase from

(to 54.8%), and an additional six percent in
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upper white areas

(to 47.2%).

These differences, as well

as those contained in the Cronvich vote, are statistically
significant across race/class categories.

Orthagonal con

trasts show the differences to be significant for both black
versus white and lower white versus upper white variations.
The interaction effect is also significant in the comparison
of lower and upper white patterns across levels of the or
ganizational variable.

Variation in the vote by levels of

organizational effectiveness ratings are likewise significant.
These data are only partially supportive of the hy
pothesized trends.

The Calogero vote is indeed inversely

related to race/class and, especially in the second primary,
the organizational variable does register a significant
effect.

However, as indicated by the persistent presence

of the interaction effect, these trends are not entirely
consistent across all levels of the independent variables.
In short- variations in the dependent variable, votes cast,
occasionally carry a unique effect at certain levels of the
independent variables.

Here, the loci have generally been

the high and low effectiveness categories of the black or
upper white area designations.

At this juncture, therefore,

the organizational variable seems to assume the hypothesized
mediation role only under certain circumstances.

Even then,

it deviates at times from expectations.
1974 Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals Race.

The

Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals race is of particular interest
for two reasons.

One, the organizational endorsement procedure
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became a campaign issue in this election.

City Councilman

and Uptown resident, Peter Beer, declared that he would not
"pay" for organizational support.

Other of the candidates

resented at least one implication of the pronouncement,
namely, the charge that only they were buying votes.
Several organizational leaders were rankled by the remarks
as well.

If candidates were being impugned for buying votes,

the organizations were also being accused of selling them.
Secondly, this election shows a third pattern of organiza
tional endorsements— that of black and lower white organiza
tions siding against the choice of the white organizations.
The question of organizational endorsements had been
a campaign issue on previous occasions.

For example, Sarpy

had disdained the practice during the 1972 Louisiana Supreme
Court election.

However, the issue was highlighted in the

Fourth Circuit Court election, probably because of the en
dorsement of Municipal Judge Joseph Bossetta by several
black organizations, including SOUL.

SOUL's pragmatism, or

more baldly, its reputation for requiring money in exchange
for an endorsement, had received considerable media attention.

9

Black endorsement of Bossetta, a Wallace elector in

the 1968 presidential race, constituted for some substantia
ting evidence of such practices--although Bossetta had in
fact established a more moderate reputation among several
black leaders since 1968 and could reasonably have been
supported by them on these grounds.
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Table 17 contains a summary of the organizational
endorsements for this election.

Of the strongest black

organizations, SOUL and OPPVL endorsed Bossetta, while COUP
and NWCVL supported George Reese.

Bossetta also obtained

the endorsements of all but one of the remaining black
organizations and all of the lower white groups.

One black

leader commented:
We would have been quite comfortable politically with
Beer.
He had a pretty good record while on the (city)
council.
But when we met the candidates, here he was
standing there spouting off about money and endorse
ments and generally being offensive to us.
Bossetta
. . . was making an effort to relate to us and, by
contrast, seemed the more friendly candidate. . . .
Of course, his background did, nonetheless, make him
hard to peddle in our precincts.
Beer drew the solid endorsements of the upper white organi
zations.

However, securing endorsements was a difficult

matter for the two remaining candidates, Civil Court Judge
Dom Grieshaber and Reese, the former district attorney can
didate.

Grieshaber won the support only of BOLD.

As

indicated earlier, at least one important consideration
entertained by the organizations in making endorsements is
the candidate's probability of winning.

As such, much of

the natural constituency which Grieshaber and Reese could
expect to attract was pre-empted by the two other candidates.
The basic pattern of endorsements contained here—
black and lower white versus upper white— generates the
following set of expectations.

Support for Bossetta is

anticipated to be greatest in the high organizational effec
tiveness areas of black and lower white neighborhoods.
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TABLE 17

ORGANIZATIONAL ENDORSEMENTS, 1974 FOURTH
CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS RACE

Organizations;
First Primary
Race/Class
Designation

Beer

Bossetta

Grieshaber

Second Primary
Reese

Beer Bossetta

Black:
SOUL
COUP
OPPVL
NWCVL

X

X
X

X
X

X

X

BOLD
CCIVL
DAWN
TIPS

X

X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

AFL-CIO
RDO
MCD

X
X
X

X
X
X

CCDA
NOVA
AID

X
X
X

X
X
X

Lower White:

Upper White:
IWO

X

X

AGG
NOC

X
X

X
X
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Further, there should be an inverse relationship between
the race/class variable and support for Bossetta.

Beer, on

the other hand, is expected to carry upper white neighbor
hoods, with special strength in the high organizational
effectiveness areas.

The series of orthagonal contrasts are

fitted to test the particular black-lower white versus white
dichotomy found here.
Results and analyses of the two primaries are pre
sented in tables 18A and 18B.

The returns of the first

primary indicate a fairly close election, with the top three
candidates finishing within eight percentage points of each
other.

Beer and Bossetta qualified for the run-off with

31.5% and 29.7% of the votes respectively.

Grieshaber was

a close third with 23.6% and Reese finished last with the
remaining 15.2%.

The largest blocs of votes found in any

of the cross-classifications by race/class and organizational
effectiveness are the 52.0% and 44.6% of the votes cast in
upper white high and low organizational effectiveness areas
respectively.

The remaining portion of the upper white vote

slightly favored Grieshaber (20.7%), with Bossetta
and Reese

(13.4%) close behind.

The largest percentage of

the black vote was gained by Bossetta

(37.7%), followed by

decreasing levels of support for Grieshaber
(21.3%), and Reese

(17.8%).

(17.4%)

(23.3%), Beer

Lower white preferences were

even more closely contested among the top three candidates.
In lower white areas, Beer received 33.3% of the votes, while
Bossetta and Grieshaber finished with 27.8% and 25.5%

TABLE 18A
VOTES CAST IN 1974 FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS RACE FOR 131 AREAL UNITS,
BY RACE/CLASS DESIGNATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS RATING:
MEAN PERCENT VOTES CAST PER CANDIDATE, UNADJUSTED MEANS3

First Primary

Second Primary

Race/Class
Candidate:

Lower
White

Upper
White

Row
Mean

Black

Lower
White

Upper
White

Row
Mean

21.0
21.7
21.3

32.4
34.3
33.3

52.0
44.6
48.4

30.3
33. 3
31.5

43.8
41.5
43.2

47.9
49.6
48.8

65.5
58.2
62.0

48.0
53.6
50.8

39.0
34.5
37.7

29.5
25.7
27.8

13.7
21.1
17.4

31.3
27.1
29.7

56.1
58.9
56.9

52.0
50.2
51.2

34.2
41.7
37.8

49.9
49 .0
49.2

21.6
28.0
23.3

23.5
28.0
25.5

22.5
18.9
20.7

22.3
25.6
23.6

18.6
15.7
17.8

14.5
11.9
13.3

11.7
15.2
13.4

16.0
13.9
15.2

Black

Beer
OrgEff

High
Low
Column Mean

Race/Class

Bossetta
OrgEff

High
Low
Column Mean

Grieshaber
OrgEff

High
Low
Column Mean

Reese
OrgEff

High
Low
Column Mean
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aRaw data used in generating this table derived from the Office of the Secretary
of State, State of Louisiana (1974b).

TABLE 18B
VOTES CAST IN 1974 FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS RACE FOR 131 AREAL UNITS,
BY RACE/CLASS DESIGNATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS RATING:
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF MEAN PERCENT VOTES CAST PER CANDIDATE

Source of
Variation

dfd

Total

130

Race/Class

Second Primary

Bossetta Grieshaber Reese

Beer

v*
df

1

Interaction

2

Black, Lower vs.
Upper White, High,
Low OrgEff
Black vs. Lower
White, Hiqh, Low
OrgEff
125

Bossetta

66.35**

39.69**

11.63**
7.02**

-7.48**
-4.92**

-2.62**
0.59

21.58

16.63

9.38

5.51

8.03

20.38*

32.20*

21.87*

10.49

17.86

19.52

125

2.42*

-2.92*

125

0.34

0.18

0.59

6.75

8.02

6.35

4.05

8.25

8.11

125
125

Organizational
Effectiveness

Beer

184.18**c

2

Black, Lower White
vs. Upper White
Black vs. Lower White

Error

First Primary

.60

8.15

97.11**

102.87**

8.12**
3.26**

-8.28**
-3.44**

2.58**

aColumn entries for components associated with these degrees of freedom are mean squares.
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^Column entries for components associated with these degrees of freedom are t-statistics.
c
Asterisks refer to the level of significance associated with the listed statistic, as follows:
no asterisk, p >.05; *,p <.05; **,p <.01.
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respectively.

As in the other areas, Reese was the last

choice with only 13.3%.
Differences in the distributions of votes cast
across categories of the race/class variable are statisti
cally significant in the cases of Beer, Bossetta, and
Grieshaber.

Beer was clearly favored by the upper whites

and the overall distribution of his support is positively
correlated with race/class.

Bossetta and Grieshaber were

supported primarily by votes from black and lower white
neighborhoods.

Orthagonal contrasts reveal a consistent

inverse relationship between the Bossetta vote and the race/
class variable.

F-ratios for the organizational effective

ness variable are not statistically significant.

However,

this effect is diluted somewhat by the particular pattern
of endorsements in this election.

Thus, it is important

to note that the patterns of support found in the Bossetta
and Beer votes match expectations associated with the or
ganizational variable.
The second primary gave every indication of being
an even closer election.

Beer seemed likely to pick up the

greater share of the lower white and upper white support
previously accorded Grieshaber and Reese, and Bossetta stood
to gain most of their black support if trends established
in the first primary persisted.

However, lower white or

ganizations, which had shown poorly in the first primary
with Beer actually carrying their combined area of opera
tion, intensified efforts in Bossetta's behalf.

Also, Beer

213

quietly moved to smooth over the ruffled feathers of several
black organizations in an effort to secure crucial support
in these a r eas.

T h u s , although the endorsements and the

voting patterns in the first primary were known, the exact
levels of support in the second level were difficult to pre
cisely predict.
An unusual incident further muddied the picture.

A

few days prior to the election, a letter, supposedly endorsed
by the captains of several Mardi Gras krewes, was made public
denouncing Beer as an "enemy of Mardi Gras."

The letter

noted that Beer, while a city councilman, had questioned the
amount of money budgeting for sanitation and other services
provided by the city during the Carnival season.

It further

implied that Beer was not a full participant or enthusiastic
supporter of Mardi G r a s .
public reaction.

The letter elicited a negative

First, it was viewed as containing the

hint of an unpleasant attack upon Beer as a member of the
Jewish community.

Jews have been traditionally excluded

from most Mardi Gras krewes, and thus many of them are not
"full participants" or "enthusiastic supporters."

Secondly,

Beer's full record on the council hardly warranted the
attack.

The letter was therefore commonly viewed as a last

ditch effort to smear the Beer candidacy.
Bossetta campaign personnel denied any connection
with or knowledge of the drafting of the letter.

The effect

of the letter incident upon the election is difficult to
gauge.

If it had any effect at all, it was thought to have
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been more detrimental to Bossetta than to Beer, and since
Bossetta lost in an extremely close election, the question
has generated much speculation.
Beer carried 50.8% of the votes cast in the second
election, drawing his major support from upper white neigh
borhoods where he received 62.0% support.

Lower white and

black areas offered decreasingly lower levels of support
for him with 48.8% and 4 3.2% of the votes cast respectively.
Bossetta's support follows the opposite pattern.

Differ

ences in the votes cast vary significantly across levels of
the race/class variable.

These differences are of signifi

cant magnitude for both black, lower white versus white
comparisons and black versus lower white comparisons.

This

indicates a positive relationship between the support for
Beer and the race/class variable, and a consistent inverse
relationship between the distribution of Bossetta votes and
the race/class variable.

Differences across organizational

effectiveness levels are not statistically significant, nor
is an interaction effect noted.

However, the distribution

of the votes do conform closely with the expectations
associated with the organizational variable.
Race/Class, Organizational Effectiveness,
^
and the Index of Cohesion
Interpretation of the race/class and organizational
effectiveness variables can be aided by the computation and
analysis of an index of cohesion variable.

As stated in

chapter three, the index of cohesion is an indication of the
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extent to which the vote in any given area is unanimous
or, conversely,

fragmented.

the proportion of votes cast

It is computed by subtracting
in an areal unit for the less

favored candidate from the percentage of votes cast in that
unit for the favored candidate.

The greater the percentage

of votes cast for the favored candidate, the more unanimous
the vote, and the higher the

index of cohesion score.

versely, the closer the contest

Con

in an areal unit, the more

divided the vote, and the lower the index of cohesion score.
The computational procedure of the index of cohesion
restricts its effective use to elections in which there are
only two candidates.

Thus, the analysis here is restricted

to those five elections which featured second primaries:
the 1972 and 1974 Louisiana State Supreme Court races, the
1973 Clerk of Criminal Court race, the 1973 District Attorney
race, and the 1974 Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals race.

If

the mediating hypothesis is correct, that is, if organiza
tional effectiveness as an attribute of areal units is a
key intervening variable in the expression of levels of
political action in varying race/class areas, then the
following two expectations are warranted.

One, the race/

class variable will be inversely related to the index of
cohesion scores of areal units.

Specifically, black neigh

borhoods are anticiapted to have the highest levels of
cohesiveness, with decreasing levels expected in the lower
white and upper white areas respectively.

Second, high

organizational effectiveness areas should exhibit higher
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index of cohesion scores than areas of low organizational
effectiveness.
Table 19A contains a presentation and analysis of
index of cohesion scores.

The 1973 Clerk of Court race

shows the presence of the highest index of cohesion score.
In that election, votes for the favored candidate of an
areal unit exceeded the proportion of votes given his oppon
ent by an average of 44.0%.

In order, decreasingly lower

scores are found in the 1974 and 1972 Supreme Court races
(32.7% and 30.5%), the District Attorney race (20.3%), and
the Fourth Circuit Court race

(18.3%).

Overall, the index

of cohesion scores are highest among black neighborhoods
with an average score of 41.2%.

Upper white areas have the

next highest average cohesion score with 23.4,%, and lower
white areas show the least cohesion with an average of
19.2 percentage points separating their favored from their
less favored candidates.

High organizational effectivenss

areas show a mean cohesiveness score of 28.4%, while a mean
score of 21.8% is found for low organizational effective
ness neighborhoods.
Analysis of the index scores presented in table 19B
show that the degree of cohesiveness varies significantly
across levels of the race/class variable in all five of the
elections.

Further, differences in cohesiveness scores

vary significantly in high and low organizational effective
ness areas in three of the five elections— the 1972 and 1974
Supreme Court races, and the Clerk of Court race.

Interaction

TABLE 19A
INDICES OF COHESION FOR 131 AREAL UNITS IN SELECTED NEW ORLEANS ELECTIONS, BY
RACE/CLASS DESIGNATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS RATING: MEAN
INDEX SCORES, UNADJUSTED MEANS

Race/Class
Election:
-------1972 Louisiana Supreme Court

Lower White

Upper White

Row
Mean

50.4
36.9
46.7

17.8
13.6
15.9

33.3
16.0
25.1

36.4
21.1
30.5

18.2
20.7
18.9

18.7
12.5

T5T9'

36.8
24.8
31.1

21.7
18.1
20.3

68.1
43.7
61.4

36.5
36.2
36.4

23.1
23.0
23.1

49.7
35.1
44.0

62.2
54.7
58.9

15.1
16.0
15.6

13.0
10.7
11.9

37.7
24.9
32.7

19 7
21.8
20.2

12.5
11.3
12.1

32.9
17.9
25.7

19.7
16.2
18.3

Black

Organizational
High
Effectiveness
Low
Column Mean
1973 District Attorney
Organizational
High
Effectiveness
Low
Column Mean
1973 Clerk of Court
Organizational
High
Effectiveness
Low
Column Mean
1974 Louisiana State Supreme Court
Organizational
High
Effectiveness
Low
Column Mean
1974 Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
Organizational
High
Effectiveness
Low
Column Mean

TABLE 19B
INDICES OF COHESION FOR 131 AREAL UNITS IN SELECTED NEW ORLEANS ELECTIONS, BY
RACE/CLASS DESIGNATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS RATING:
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF MEAN INDEX SCORES

Sources of Variation:

dfa

Total

130

df

Black vs. White
Laver White vs.
Upper White

District
Attorney

269.38**C

71.07*

125

-6.89**

1.54

125

2.11*

5.01**

2

Race/Class

Supreme
C o u r t (72)

Criminal Supreme
Court
C ourt(74)

722.67**

51.98*

-6.13**

-12.57**

0.84

-2.51*

0.87

151.78*

Organizational
Effectiveness

1

196.70**

6.80

644.97**

141.34*

Interaction

2

47.51

47.51

202.19*

45.25

Black vs. White,
High, Lew OrgEff
Lower vs. Upper
White, High, Low
OrgEff
Error

125

Fourth
Court

4.41**
' 4.54
63.65*

125

-2.83**

2.05*

125

0.03

2.25*

31.10

aGolumn entries

for ccmponents associated with

Column entries

for components associated with

16.14

48.89

these degrees
these degrees

of
of

30.91
freedom
freedom

16.15
aremean squares.
aret-statistics.

cAsterisks refer to the level of significance associated with the listed statistic, as follows:
no asterisk, p >.05; *,p <.05;
**, p <.01.
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effects are noted in the Clerk of Court and Fourth Circuit
Court elections.

The interaction effect for the 1973 race

is located in the high organizational effectiveness black
areas and, in the 1974 election, in the high organizational
effectiveness upper white areas.

Orthagonal contrasts

confirm greater cohesiveness among black than white areas
in the 1972 and 1974 Supreme Court races and the Clerk of
Court election, and greater voter cohesiveness among upper
white than lower white areas in all but the Clerk of Court
race and the 1974 Supreme Court race.
These data are generally quite supportive of the
specified hypothesis.

Black areas do indeed show signifi

cantly higher cohesion scores than white neighborhoods.

In

three of the elections, the organizational variable like
wise is shown to exhibit- significant variation in the
predicted direction.

The major flaw in the match of

hypotheses and the data here lies in the cohesion scores
of upper whites, which are slightly higher than predicted.
Discussion
A number of issues have now been raised and given
extended treatment.

The most basic question' under study

involves the mediating potential of organizations, spe
cifically in this case, the role of political organizations
in affecting patterns of political participation.

In this

dissertation, an attempt has been made to treat the organ
izational variable as an attribute of areal units.

Such
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strategy is consistent with the theoretical tradition of
political ecology and has the further advantage of tapping
a wide range of data already enumerated and available as
characteristics of areal units.
However, as has been noted on occasion in the
previous pages, the measurement of organizational effec
tiveness as an ecological characteristic is not without
certain problems.

In this study, the organizational effec

tiveness rating of an area has been obtained by (a) asking
each organizational leader to specify the area of operation
claimed by his organization,

(b) asking organizational

leaders and candidates for office to rate the organizations
in terms of their judged effectiveness, and (c) applying
the effectiveness rating attached to organizations to their
respective areas of operation.

Thus, the nature of the

characteristic is somewhat different than other ecological
attributes employed in the study.

If census materials or

precinct returns indicate something about the racial com
position of a census tract or the number of votes cast for
a given candidate, one can feel fairly certain that such
traits do indeed reside in the geographical unit under study.
Such certainty is much weaker in the case of the organiza
tional variable measured here.
To begin with, while most organizations operate in
terms of geographical areas, there are some whose geogra
phical orientations are either quite loose or even inciden
tal.

In such cases, defining the organization geographically
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or, conversely, defining the characteristic of an area on
the basis of that organization's activity becomes problem
atic.

Further, even if the operation of the organization

is clearly specified in geographical terms, the actual or
physical presence of the organization is, nonetheless, in
determinate.

Namely, it is still not known that the

residents of the areal unit are aware of the organization
and its activity— or even more to the point, that they con
sult it for guidance in political matters.

In large part,

the problem resides in the measurement of organizational
effectiveness through a reputational approach.

However,

given the logistics of the study, there was little other
choice.
Thus, it should be kept in mind that the measurement
of the organizational variable contains an unknown amount
of error.

It is possible, though unlikely, that the organ

izations exert little or no influence and, consequently,
that their effectiveness is vastly overrated by the reputa
tional approach.

Such would require a collective effort on

the part of the organizational leaders and candidates for
office similar to that found in the tale of the king's "in
visible clothes."

It seems more likely that, if anything,

the actual effect and operation of the organizations will
be somewhat underestimated— mainly because the areal units
comprised of census tracts almost certainly overextends or
slightly misrepresents the target areas in which organiza
tions operate.

Thus, even if one had individual level
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measurements covering the connection between organizations
and areal residents, additional error is always present in
assigning the organizational rating to the entire areal unit.
An important facet in the test of the organizational
variable is the race/class dimension and its correlates.
The data show that the basic relationship between the race/
class and organizational attributes of areal units is in
verse, that is, the highest organizational rankings are con
centrated in black areas.

This finding modified the set of

hypotheses advanced earlier in the dissertation.

However,

the race/class variable is strongly and consistently related
to the measures of political participation--voter registra
tion, voter turn out, and votes for candidates.

In virtually

every election and comparison, the distribution of the polit
ical participation measure is found to be distributed nonrandomly across levels of the race/class designation.

The

essential question then involves the identification of the
mechanism whereby these categories of political action emerge.
Of course, the organizational variable is tested here as the
potential mechanism.
The evidence concerning the mediation role of the
organizational variable is decidedly mixed.

No real organi

zational effect could be noted in the registration data,
although these data are clearly correlated with the race/
class dimension.

Evidence of organizational activity is

likewise scarce in reviewing the turn out data, although
1973 constitutes a year in which turn out levels best
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indicate the organizational effect.

However, no statistically

significant differences are found for that year since the
higher turn out among black and lower white areas simply
brought their percentages to parity with the usually higher
upper white turn out figures.

Finally, in turning to the

election returns, solid evidence for the organizational var
iable is found only in the 1973 Clerk of Court and the 197.3
Civil Sheriff races.

Lower levels of support can be gleaned

from certain aspects of the other elections, especially the
1972 and 1974 Louisiana Supreme Court races.
With this maze of sometimes conflicting evidence,
how can one answer the question,
organizational variable?"

"what is the effect of the

The best answer seems to be that

the organizational variable does indeed have an impact upon
political activity, both in terms of candidate support and,
to a lesser extent, voter turn out.

However, the effect of

the organizational variable seems to be primarily situation
al.

Given a setting in which issues can be clearly defined

in racial or class terminology, organizations bearing and
playing upon these identifications appear to be able to act
persuasively.
These statements require some clarification.

One,

the actual effect of an organizational endorsement or of
organizational activity calls for a relative judgment.

In

situations where organizations have endorsed candidates al
ready popular and acceptable to the residents of their area,
a high vote in support of that candidate may only appear to
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constitute an organizational effect.

On the other hand, a

comparatively lower showing in that area by a less attrac
tive candidate endorsed by the organization may actually
constitute a strong organizational impact.
Secondly, modern organizations do not seem to hold
the extensive control over their patrons apparently avail
able to the traditional machine.

They can no longer expect

to be an exclusive information source, mobility vehicle, of
political godparent.

One consequence of this is that few

organizations can expect to generate the same sort of loyalty
often rendered the traditional

machine.

One further con

sequence is that, while the influence of the organization
is more fragmented,

it is often more diffuse as well.

The

implication of this factor is that the reference group
attribute of the organization may be quite extensive.

Fi

nally, it appears that the organizational structure relevant
to the generation of categories of political action extends
beyond the narrowly defined set of political organizations
used here.

This would seem to be especially true of activity

patterns in upper white neighborhoods, where overall levels
of participation in political organizations are quite small
yet particular patterns of political participation were quite
well defined.
These basic trends within the data can be further
illustrated as statistically defined dimensions by the factor
analysis technique.
these dimensions.

Table 20 contains a presentation of
The first dimension, entitled "The Black
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TABLE 20
FACTOR ANALYTIC DIMENSIONS OF ECOLOGICAL VARIABLES

Factor 1— The
Black Vote

Factor 2— The Up
per White Vote

% Lombard 1 .95

% Connick 2

.90

% Ortique 1 .95 Median School .86
Years Ccmpl
% Lombard 2 .94
% Garrison 1 -.84
% Jackson 1 .93
% Haggerty -.93
1
% Stire

Factor 3— Voter
Registration

Factor 4— Voter
Turn Out

% Registered
1973

.86

% Turn out
2 73

.79

% Registered
1972

.84

% Turn out
1 73

.78

% Registered
1974

.84

% Turn out
2 74

.74

% Turn out
1 72

.72

% Nonmanual

.81

SES Index

.79

% High School
Graduates

.76

% Turn out
1 74

.69

% Connick 1

.68

% Turn out
2 72

.67

% Beer 2

.68

Race/Class

.47

-.93

% Haggerty -.92
O

% Calogero
1 74

.88

% Calogero
2 74

.88

% Nonwhite

.88

% Sarpy 1

-.74

% Calogero
1 72

.72

Race/Class -.66
Organiza
tional
Effective
ness

1
2
72
73
74

=
=
=
=
=

.40

First Primary
Second Primary
1972
1973
1974
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Vote," contains support for candidates Lombard, Jackson,
Ortique, and Calogero, lack of support for Haggerty, Stire,
and Cronvich, and the ecological characteristics of a high
percentage of nonwhite residents, a "black" race/class
designation, and high organizational effectiveness rating.
The second factor, labeled "The Upper White Vote," indicates
a dimension detailing support for Connick and Beer, lack of
support for Garrison, and high scores on schooling, educa
tional, income, occupational, and race/class attributes.
No factor is noted for the lower white group.

Finally,

factors three and four represent "Voter Registration" and
"Voter Turn out" as dimensions separate from candidate
choice.
These findings are consistent with the theoretical
expectations expressed in chapters two and four and drawn
from Etzioni's

(1975) typology of organizations.

It was

argued in these chapters that upper white organizations
typically exhibit normative compliance structures.

Such

structures are characterized by the exercise of "normative"
power, that is, the use of symbolic sanctions to enact or
ganizational control, and by the presence of

"moral" in

volvement patterns, that is, members tend to be positively
oriented toward organizational power and participate as
committed believers.
By comparison, black and lower white organizations
were argued to be structured primarily along utilitarian
lines.

This type of structure is based upon the allocation

of material sanctions— remunerative power--and upon a
calculative orientation of its members to organizational
power.

Thus, the emphasis here is upon the practical con

sequences and spoils at stake in elections.

Simply stated,

supporting winning candidates affords access to the formal
positions of power, either directly through the placing of
organizational personnel in these positions or indirectly
through the development personal/professional ties with non
member candidates and the accumulation of political credits
The data suggest with a fair degree of clarity that
black and upper white organizations are regarded as rela
tively effective forces in the elections considered.

The

strongest black organizations are clearly ulititarian.
They enjoy reputations of being effective organizations in
influencing the vote and of being able to command a high
price or promise for patronage in exchange for services
rendered.

The dominant upper white organizations are known

as being idealistic groups whose endorsements help "legiti
mize" candidates, that is, attest to the mainstream accept
ability of candidates' credentials.

However, these organi

zations are also regarded as relatively unimportant in
actually delivering the vote.

They likewise are not known

to entertain openly material concerns in contemplating en
dorsements.

These several differences between black and

upper white organizations reflect clearly the key distinc
tions between utilitarian and normative organizations.

228

Turning to the low ratings and apparently weak
performances of the lower white organizations,

it may be

said that their utilitarian posture has been undermined by
increasing problems in effectively allocating material
sanctions.

In prior times, lower white organizations tended

to the politics of New Orleans while upper whites tended to
the business affairs.
not a formal factor.

Blacks, largely disenfranchised, were
However, with increasing black regis

tration, white migration patterns, and increasing concern
for political reform, the operational bases of lower white
organizations appears to have become increasingly eroded.
On occasion, these organizations are still able to muster
effective power and participation.

For the most part, how

ever, their effectiveness seems pre-empted directly by
competing black organizations and indirectly by reform
oriented upper white organizations.
Footnotes
^"Figures are for the month prior to the first primary
in the years 1972, 1973, and 1974.
2
Cell frequencies are as follows:

Organizational
Effectiveness

High
Low

Black

Lcwer White

Upper White

Total

39
15

27
23

13
14

79
_52

54

50

27

131

JComputer programs employed in the analyses are drawn
from Nie et al. (1975).
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4
.
.
An interaction effect indicates that the effects
assocated with one variable are not consistent across levels
of another variable.
In such instances, prime consideration
needs to be devoted to the interaction effects rather than
the main effects.
^Mayor Landrieu placed a personal advertisement in
the New Orleans States-Item, entitled, "So That Mr. Sarpy
Will Understand."
The ad contained pointed references to
Sarpy's social status, asking at one point if the ex-King
of Rex expected to ascend to the Supreme Court by virtue of
the "divine right of kings."
It defended Calogero as the
realization of the American dream— by contrast to Sarpy, a
"poor boy makes good" story (Glassman and Davis, 1972).
g

Scaccia, who received less than 3% of the vote, is
excluded from the analysis.
7
Recent revelations concerning the CIA seem to re
deem Garrison's preoccupation somewhat.
A recent cover story
in New Orleans magazine carries the blurb, "What with the
recent revelations about the CIA, the former D.A.'s theories
seem a lot saner.
Listen to them again" (Manguno, 1976) .
g

Bustemente, who received under 5% of the vote, is
excluded from the analysis.

CHAPTER SIX
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Summary
This dissertation has been addressed at the most
general level to one basic question:

how is it that cer

tain clusters of individuals come to act "collectively,"
that is, to share some behavioral pattern in common.

After

all, it is quite evident that a large number of character
istics shared with others typically result in no such col
lective action.

For example, group consciousness among

those who wear glasses is ordinarily quite low, and there
have been few uprisings among those who write with the left
hand.

However, various forms of collective sentiment and

action are, under certain circumstances, found among those
with the same skin color or those who live in the same
neighborhood.

It is assumed that almost any discernible

characteristic might be used to distinguish meaningful cate
gories of individuals.

It is also thought that these char

acteristics tend to remain inert in the absence of socially
attached meanings.
At the more specific level, the study deals with
conditions relating to the emergence of certain forms of
political action, namely, stages of political participation
230
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ranging from registering to vote to casting the ballot.
Here, too, it is expected that some characteristics by which
individuals might be classified will be practically useless
in generating adequate predictions and explanations of po
litical activity.

Candidate choice is not anticipated to

very significantly between those with glasses and those with
perfect eyesight.

However, certain characteristics are ex

pected to show a relationship with patterns of political
participation.

It is further anticipated that these char

acteristics receive salience through the presence of some
definitional agent.
The major factors thought to be related to the po
litical participation variable are social class and race.
However, individuals sharing given levels of income or a
given skin pigment are not expected to automatically show
similar participation patterns.

Rather, it is argued that

objective characteristics of class and race come to be de
fined as socially meaningful and, hence, serve as a politi
cal rallying point chiefly through the presence of an
organizational variable.

That is, organizations found in a

community setting are said to play a major role in specify
ing which differences among individuals are worth noting.
Simply stated, then, the electorate may be correct
ly viewed as a series of aggregates, groups, and organizations
rather than as a composite of individuals.

A wide range of

sociological literature has been shown to intimate the role
of "groups" in disseminating, legitimating, and interpreting
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information for their members and sympathizers.

The problem

is only slightly modified if the concern is focused upon or
ganizations.

The model offered here assumes that, however

an organization emerges or is structured, an important aspect
of organizational maintenance is that of extending influence
to appropriate categories of sympathetic nonmembers and of
retaining the interest of current members.

Aggregates of

those sharing objective class and racial characteristics are
merely said to provide an especially convenient and poten
tially responsive target population for these tasks.

Inso

far as organizations are effective in defining and publicizing
such themes, distinctive forms of political participation are
expected to emerge along class and racial lines.
The ecological perspective was employed in developing
the operationalization of these basic concepts.

This approach

is based upon the premise that certain distinctive facets of
areal units constitute contextual circumstances which in
fluence the types of behavior likely to occur.

Applied to

the problem at hand, it assumes that the distributions of
objective class and racial characteristics in specified areas
will, in the presence of an appropriate organizational factor,
lead to distinctive patterns of political participation by
class and race.
Operationalization of the class, race, and political
participation variables was achieved in a relatively straight
forward manner utilizing census materials and precinct data.
Census tract and precinct boundaries proved to be coterminous
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enough to permit matching into usable areal units.

The

class and racial characteristics of areal units were further
refined into a race/class index consisting of three dimen
sions— black,

lower white, and upper white neighborhoods.

Precinct based data, including registration figures, turn
out levels, and votes cast for candidates in selected elec
tions from 1972 to 1974 in New Orleans, were compiled as
indicators of the political participation variable.
Operationalization of the organizational variable
as an attribute of areal units was more problematic.

There

is no corresponding data repository for this variable indi
cating the organizational characteristics of the community.
Thus, a large part of the dissertation is devoted to estab
lishing this information through field interviews.
sideration

Con

of the organizational factor was restricted to

political organizations.

Interview data was collected from

nineteen political organizations active in recent New Orleans
elections.

Further, organizational leaders and candidates

for office in these elections were asked to rate the po
litical organizations in terms of their impact and effec
tiveness in the elections.

Composite ratings derived from

this procedure were then used to apply the reputed effec
tiveness labels of the organizations themselves to their
corresponding areas of operation, thus converting organizaJ

tional effectiveness into an ecological as well as organi
zational characteristic.
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Descriptions of the basic structural and compositional
characteristics of the nineteen organizations are detailed
in chapter four.

Basically, the organizations lend them

selves to categorization on the basis of both organizational
effectiveness ratings and their respective class and racial
compositions.

Contrary to expectations, the number and

overall reputed effectiveness of political organizations in
New Orleans is inversely related to the race/class dimension.
That is, there is apparently much more formal political or
ganizational activity and a higher reputation for organiza
tional effectiveness among black than white areas and among
lower white than upper white neighborhoods.

The exact ex

planation for this is not totally clear from the data.

It

was suggested that organizational participation levels among
upper whites may indeed be greater than among lower whites
and black areas if the term were broadened to include activ
ity in nonpolitical organizations.

Further, the relative

absence of upper whites in formal political organizations
may well belie a great deal of parapolitical organizational
activity, that is, the operation of technically nonpolitical
networks which, nonetheless, serve political ends.
Political organizations in New Orleans were identified
within a typology of organizations based upon the compliance
thesis.

This thesis proposes that compliance with organiza

tional directives is grounded in power options available to
the organization

(coercive, remunerative, and normative

power options) and orientations of participants to the power
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of the organization
involvement types).
therefore, emerge:

(alienative, calculative, and moral
Three basic types of organizations,
coercive organizations

(coercive power,

alienative involvement), utilitarian organizations

(re

munerative power, calculative involvement), and normative
organizations

(normative power, moral involvement).

Although political organizations may fall into any
one of the three classifications depending upon the styles
and goals employed by them, no empirical examples of co
ercive political organizations were identified in New Orleans.
However, black and lower white organizations were generally
said to have utilitarian compliance structures, while upper
white organizations were more likely to exhibit normative
compliance structures.

This is not meant to imply that

upper white organizations do not benefit materially from
electoral activity.

They may simply be more clever in dis

guising their "true" intentions.

It is also possible that

the material rewards for the upper white category are
realized in more subtle form.
more "public-regarding."

Finally, they may indeed be

The utilitarian-normative distinc

tion, however, reflects the difference between the recurrent
references in black and lower white organizations to mone
tary and patronage considerations and the typical "good
government" themes of the upper white organizations.
Analyses of election related data allow further in
sight into these issues.

It was anticipated that areas

supporting high organizational effectiveness ratings would
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show higher levels of voter registration and voter turn out
for selected elections than would the lesser rated areas.
A l s o , the distribution of votes cast in high organizational
effectiveness neighborhoods was expected to match more
exactly the pattern of endorsements advanced by highly rated
organizations, while the distribution of votes in areas with
low effectiveness ratings were expected to exhibit greater
departure from the pattern recommended by lower rated organ
izations.

On the basis of the previous discussion of the

relationship between organizational composition and reputed
organizational effectiveness, it was anticipated that regis
tration, turn out, and candidate support levels would be
inversely related to the race/class dimension, specifically,
that these levels would be highest in black neighborhoods
and lowest in upper white areas.

To the extent that this is

not found to be the case, the organizational thesis is called
into question.
Examination of registration levels by the race/class
designation and organizational effectiveness ratings of areal
units generally indicated a positive relationship between
race/class and registration levels and the absence of any
relationship between organizational effectiveness and regis
tration levels.

Basically, overall registration levels

declined from 1972 to 1974 rather uniformly across both race/
class and reputed organizational effectiveness characteristics
of areal units.

The decline is thought to be mainly attribu

table to the peaking of a registration trend associated with
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the 1972 presidential campaign.

This factor aside, however,

registration was highest in upper white areas and lowest in.
black neighborhoods, while differences between high and low
organizational effectiveness areas were minimal.

Thus, the

variation in registration levels is n o t .accountable within
the confines of the organizational variable, at least in
terms of the manner in which it is defined here.
Levels of voter turn out, analyzed by the race/class
designation and organizational effectiveness ratings of
areal units, showed a slightly different pattern.

Overall,

voter turn out was highest in two of the years considered
in upper white areas.

However, in 1973, turn out in black

and lower white areas matched that found in upper white
neighborhoods and, in one primary, actually exceeded the
upper white figure.

Later analysis of votes cast indicated

1973 to be a year of exceptionally high electoral interest
in the black community.
Analyses of the distributions of votes cast in the
selected elections across levels of race/class and organi
zational effectiveness variables contain some rather inter
esting trends.

First, the pattern of endorsements by the

organizations in these elections indicate the presence of
three basic "coalitions."

It was noted that in five of the

eleven elections, black and upper white organizations sided
against the candidate choice of lower white organizations.
However, in two of the elections, black and lower white
organizations found themselves basically supporting the same
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candidate in opposition to the choice of the upper white
organizations.

Finally, in the remaining four elections,

the same candidate was endorsed by practically all of the
organizations.

These patterns reinforce the earlier find

ings of a number of studies dealing with electoral trends
in the New South, particularly those of Howard, Long, and
Zdrazil

(1971).
A second feature noted in the analysis of these elec

tions concerns the distributions of the votes themselves.
Voting cohesiveness, that is, the tendency to "bloc vote,"
was found to be greatest in black neighborhoods and also to
be fairly pronounced in upper white areas as well.
cohesiveness is negligible in lower white areas.

Such
However,

voting cohesiveness is greater in higher rated organization
al effectiveness areas than in lower rated neighborhoods
only occasionally.

To begin with, a fair amount of unanim

ity in candidate preference was noted in all neighborhoods,
irrespective of organizational effectiveness.

Nonetheless,

areas with a reputation for organizational effectiveness do
show a significantly greater level of cohesiveness in can
didate choice— especially,

it seems, when the candidate

involved is politically identified in either racial or class
terminology beyond mere physical identification.
A factor analysis of the basic variables involved
confirms these contentions.

It clearly indicates that the

voter registration, voter turn out, and candidate choice in
dicators of political participation merit consideration as
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independent dimensions, at least as far as analysis within
the context of the race/class and organizational effective
ness variables are concerned.

Further, black and upper

white neighborhoods emerge as distinct factors comprising
both their respective ecological characteristics and can
didate choices.

The pattern is more pronounced in the

black areas than in the upper white.

No independent factor

was shown for the lower white areas.
Limitations of the Study
The major limitations incurred in the execution of
this study involve the treatment of the organizational
effectiveness variable as a characteristic of areal units.
This circumstance is not entirely incidental.

The strategy

of applying the organizational variable in this way is con
sistent with the theoretical tradition of political ecology.
It has the further advantage of tapping a wide range of
data already enumerated and available as characteristics
of areal units.

However, these positive attributes like

wise spell some disadvantage.
The first limitation stems from the nature of the
theoretical assumptions accompanying the ecological approach
itself.

The focus of an ecological analysis is placed

squarely upon the characteristics and patterns of behavior
found in areal units without regard for the subjective defi
nitions, perceptions, and interactional content of the in
dividuals involved.

Such dynamics are simply assumed to

be operating and are accepted as "givens."

Thus, despite

the interest expressed here in the organizational factor,
the researcher, nonetheless, has no firsthand evidence of
(1) individual exposure to organizational activity leading
to (2) individual behavior commensurate with organizational
exhortations leading to (3) the organization's reputation
for effectiveness.
this order:

The study allows only statements of

it is highly unlikely that one would uncover

a series of incidences in which pattern A is found rather
consistently under conditions B and C by chance alone.

Thus,

insofar as pattern A is observed under predictable circum
stances, one's theoretical statements in which A, B, and C
are integrated receive further credence.

However, these

items A, B, and C must, in discussion, be kept at the level
of contextual variables rather than individual level ones
(a, b, and c ) .
A second limitation revolves around the practical
problems of defining organizational effectiveness as an
attribute of areal units.

Simply put, the organizational

variable is not intrinsically an ecological characteristic
in the sense that are population characteristics.

Thus,

an organization's target population may not be strictly de
finable in areal terms.

The political organization studied

here, UNO-YD and its orientation toward the "youth vote,"
is an apt illustration.

Further, the influence of the or

ganization is not necessarily restricted to specified areal
units.

For example, a political organization may indeed

operate exclusively and effectively in a given ward.
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However, the organization's sphere of influence may, nonethe
less, exceed the boundaries of that ward as manifested by
positive and negative identifiers in other areas who orient
their behavior accordingly.
The overall effect of these limitations may be summed
as follows.

In the instance of the first limitation, actual

organization impact, while assessed indirectly, is nonethe
less directly unknown.

Thus, conclusions can be legitimately

expressed only in the terms of ecological or contextual cir
cumstances.

The second limitation, on the other hand, is

likely to result in an underestimation of the organizational
effect.

Thus, the registered organizational effect, as an

ecological characteristic, is probably stronger than indi
cated in this study.
Recommendations for Future Study
Ensuing research dealing with the substantive sorts
of problems treated here is likely to be fruitful if oriented
in two basic directions.

One, further analyses of political

organizations qua organizations are essential.

Many de

scriptive studies of organizations have been formulated by
sociologists and political scientists.

However, what is

noticeably lacking are studies designed to test propositions
about political organizations drawn from the wider organi
zational literature in sociology.

Further, attempts can be

made here to establish the sphere of influence of political
organizations using organizations as a base of social net
works .
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Secondly, sociometric types of analysis focusing
upon the individual are needed as well.

This strategy seeks

to establish the community's vital social networks by
establishing and tracing the relationships of separate in
dividuals to their usual clusters of primary and secondary
acquaintances.

Both of these types of analysis constitute

efforts to establish the effect of the organizational var
iable on the basis of firsthand and direct evidence.
Conclusions
The major conclusions of the study may be stated as
follows:
(1)

The relative numbers and strengths of politi

cal organizations in New Orleans were hypothesized to be
positively related with the race/class dimension.

Specif

ically, upper white areas were expected to show the greatest
evidence of organization and effectiveness, while decreasingly lower levels of these characteristics- were anticipated
in lower white and black areas.

Neither of these hypotheses

were substantiated by the data.

Rather, upper white organi

zations were few in number and were not generally regarded
as being every effective.

Lower white organizations, while

more numerous than upper white organizations, were consid
ered as a group to be in a state of decline.

Black organi

zations were found in the greatest numbers and, in some
instances, were regarded as having organized quite effective
ly.
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(2)

Cast within a typology of organizations, upper

white organizations were said to exhibit normative compliance
structures, while black and lower white organizations were
characterized as utilitarian compliance organizations.

Thus,

upper white organizations tend to operate in terms of norma
tive adherence to political ideals and quasi-ideological
standards, especially those involving "reform" and "good
government."

Participants in these organizations are more

likely to be idealistically motivated in their participation.
Black and lower white organizations, on the other hand, tend
to operate on the basis of the material benefits at stake.
These benefits are typically allocated in a systematic fash
ion in order to maintain organizational operations.

Partic

ipation in these organizations by members is more likely
to be calculative, that is, to be motivated in terms of
the acquisition or loss of these rewards.
(3)

Commensurate with expectations, voter registra

tion, voter turn out, and candidate choice were found to be
consistently and positively correlated with the race/class
variable.
(a)

It was found that upper whites were more

likely to register and turn out to vote than were lower
whites and blacks.

With some exceptions, levels of voter

registration and voter turn out did not vary significantly
across levels of the organizational variable.

The note

worthy exception occurred in three elections in which race
and class became very explicit issues.

In these elections,.
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voter turn out in black and lower white areas approximated
that found in upper white neighborhoods.
(b)

In every election, the distribution of

votes for the candidates considered was found to vary dis
tinctively by race/class.

However, only in elections in

which candidates became politically identifiable in race or
class terms did the distributions of the vote across levels
of the race/class variable correspond to the pattern of
organizational endorsements.
(c)

These factors suggest that political or

ganizations in New Orleans are able to mobilize sentiment
mainly under a sepcialized set of conditions.

Apparently,

where the focus of the campaign can be cast in terms other
than those of race or class, the organizations are less
effective.
(4)

All logical combinations of bloc votes among

the black, lower white, and upper white areas occurred in
the elections under study.

In primary elections with more

than one candidate, each bloc often voted independently of
each other.

In run-offs

(and some first primaries),

populist (black, lower white vs. upper white), white supre
macy (black vs. lower white, upper white), and moderationpaternalism (black, upper white vs. lower white) coalitions
were observed.

These were not necessarily formal coalitions--

in fact, they most often were not.

However, these patterns

do indicate the practical air to the politics of New Orleans.
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(5)

Upper white and black bloc votes emerge as

independent dimensions in a factor analysis of all the char
acteristics under study.

An independent lower white

dimension was not detected.

Upper white organizations tend

to be normatively structured, a stance apparently commen
surate with the mood of the upper white areas.

Black and

lower white organizations tend to fall into the utilitarian
compliance mode.

However, the ability of lower white organ

izations to operate effectively in this mode seems to have
become seriously eroded.

Both white migration patterns and

the enfranchisement of the black voter have coupled to
weaken the organizational base of the lower white organiza
tions in their traditional areas of operation.

Further,

the rise of black organizations has sharply increased com
petition for the spoils.

Thus, the utilitarian posture of

the lower white organizations is now only occasionally
effective.
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APPENDIX 1
JUXTAPOSITION OF WARD AND CENSUS TRACT
BOUNDARIES, NEW ORLEANS, 1970

JUXTAPOSITION OF WARD AND CENSUS TRACT
BOUNDARIES, NEW ORLEANS,

19703

2401

i

.

The seventeen political wards are
demarcated by heavy solid lines where coterminous with'
tract boundaries.
Map exerpted from the United States
Bureau of the Census (1972). Ward broundary information derived
from maps provided by the Department of Streets for the City of
New Orleans.
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APPENDIX 2
MATCHED TRACTS/PRECINCTS FOR ORLEANS PARISH

a

Match Tracts/Precincts for Orleans Parish
WARD 1
1)
2)
3)

Tract (Tr) 77 - Ward (Wd) 1: Precinct (Pet) 1; W
Tr 78 - Wd 1: Pets 2, 5.
Tr 79, Tr 80 - Wd 1: Pets 6, 7.

l

2:

WARD 2
4)
5)
6)
7)

Tr
Tr
Tr
Tr

67
68
69
70

-

Wd
Wd
Wd
Wd

2:
2:
2:
2:

Pets 2, 3.
Pets 4, 5.
Pets 6, 6A.
Pet 7.

Tr
Tr
Tr
Tr
Tr
Tr
Tr

58, Tr 59,
60 - Wd 3:
63 - Wd 3:
64 - Wd 3:
65 - Wd 3:
71 - Wd 3:
49 - Wd 3:

Tr
Tr
Tr
Tr
Tr
Tr
Tr
Tr

47, Tr 48 - Wd 4: Pet 2.
50, Tr 54 - Wd 4: Pets 5, 6, 7, 8.
55 - Wd 4: Pets 9, 10,
10A, 11, 12.
56.01 - Wd 4: Pets 19, 20, 20A, 21, 21A.
56.02 - Wd 4: Pets 17, 17A, 18, 18A.
56.03 - Wd 4: Pets 15, 16, 16A.
56.04 - Wd 4: Pets 13, 13A, 14, 14A.
133.01 - Wd 4: Pets 22, 23; Wd 5: Pets 17, 18,

Tr
Tr
Tr
Tr
Tr

42
43
44
45
46

-

Wd
Wd
Wd
Wd
Wd

5:
5:
5:
5:
5:

Pet 1, 2, 3.
Pet 4.
Pets 5, 6, 7, 8.
Pets 9, 10, 11.
Pets 12, 13, 14, 15, 16.

Tr
Tr
Tr
Tr

38
39
40
41

-

Wd
Wd
Wd
Wd

6:
6:
6:
6:

Pets 1, 2.
Pet 4.
Pet 5, 6, 7.
Pet 8, 9.

WARD 3
8)
9)
10)
11)
12)
13)
14)

Wd 3: Pet. 1.
Pets 4, 6.
Pets 7, 9, 10.
Pets 13, 14, 16.
Pets 17, 18, 19, 20.
Pets 8, 12, 15
Pets 3, 3A,' 5; Wd 4: Pets 3, 4.

WARD 4
15)
16)
17)
18)
19)
20)
21)
22)
WARD 523)
24)
25)
26)
27)
WARD 6
28)
29)
30)
31)
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WARD 7
32)
33)
34)
35)
36)
37)
38)
39)
40)
41)
42)
43)
44)
45)
46)

Tr 26 - Wd 7: Pets 1, 2.
Tr 27, Tr 29 - Wd 7: Pets 4, 4A, 5, 7.
Tr 28 - Wd 7: Pets 10, 20.
Tr 30, Tr 31 - Wd 7: Pets 8, 9, 9A, 20A.
Tr 33.01
-Wd 7: Pets 32, 33A, 39, 40.
Tr 33.02
-Wd 7: Pets 28A, 30, 31, 33.
Tr 33.03, Tr 133.02, Tr 25.01 - Wd 7: Pets 37, 38,
38A, 41, 42; Wd 8: Pets 26, 27, 28, 29.
Tr 33.04 - Wd 7: Pets 34, 35, 36, 36A.
Tr 33.05, Tr 33.06 - Wd 7: Pets 27, 27A, 27B, 28.
Tr 33.07
-Wd 7: Pets 26A,. 29.
Tr 33.08
-Wd 7: Pets 23, 24, 25.
Tr 34 - Wd 7: Pet 6.
Tr 35, 36 - Wd 7: Pets 11, 12, 13, 14.
Tr 37.01
-Wd 7: Pets 18, 19.
Tr 37.02
-Wd 7: Pets 15, 16, 17, 17A, 21.

WARD 8
Tr
Tr
Tr
Tr
Tr
Tr
Tr
Tr
Tr

18 - Wd 8: Pets 1, 2.
19 - Wd 8: Pets 4, 5, 6 •
20 - Wd 8: Pets 7, 8.
21 - Wd 8: Pets 9, 11.
22 - Wd 8; Pets 10, 12.
2 3 - Wd 8: Pets 13, 14; Wd 7 , Pets 22 , 26 •
24.01, Tr 24.02 - Wd 8: Pets 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20.
25.02 - Wd 8: Pets 26A, 27A, 30.
25, 25A.
25.03, Tr 25.04 - Wd 8: Pets 21, 22, 23,
CM

47)
48)
49)
50)
51)
52)
53)
54)
55)
WARD 9
56)
57)
58)
59)
60)
61)
62)
63)
64)
65)
66)
67)
68)
69)
70)
71)
72)
73)
74)

Tr 7.01 - Wd 9: Pets 8, 8A.
Tr 7.02, Tr 8 - Wd 9: Pets 1, 1A, 2, 4, 7.
Tr 9.01 - Wd 9: Pets 3, 3A, 3B.
Tr 9.02, Tr 9.03 - Wd 9: Pets 6, 6A, 6B, 6C, 6D.
Tr 9.04 - Wd w: Pets 5, 5A.
Tr 11 - Wd
9: Pets 9,10, 11.
Tr 12 - Wd
9: Pets 12,13, 14.
Tr 13.01
-Wd 9: Pets 15, 19, 21.
Tr 13.02
-Wd 9: Pets 16, 17, 18.
Tr 14.01
-Wd 9; Pets 25, 25A, 26.
Tr 14.02
-Wd 9: Pets 22, 23.
Tr 15, Wd 9: Pets 20, 24.
Tr 16 - Wd
9: Pet 27.
Tr 17.01 Wd 9: Pets 31B, 31C, 31D, 31E.
Tr 17.02 Wd 9: Pets 29A, 30, 30A, 31, 31A.
Tr 17.03, Tr 17.04, Tr 17.05 - Wd 9: Pets 28, 28A, 28B,
28C 29
Tr 17.07 - Wd 9: Pets 33, 33A, 42, 42A, 42B.
Tr 17.08
-Wd 9: Pets 34, 35, 36, 36A, 36B.
Tr 17.09
-Wd 9; Pets 37, 37A, 38,38A, 39, 39A.
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WARD 9, Continued
75)
76)
77)
78)

Tr 17. 10
Tr 17. 11
44A.
Tr 17. 12
Tr 17. 13

- Wd 9: Pets 39B, 40, 40A,
- Wd 9: Pets 42C, 43, 43A,
- Wd 9: Pets 41, 41A.
- Wd 9: Pets 32, 45.

WARD 10
79)
80)
81)
82)

Tr
Tr
Tr
Tr

81 - Wd 10:
82, Tr 83 84 - Wd 10:
85, Tr 86 -

Pets 3, 4, 5.
Wd 10: Pets 6, 7 , 8,
Pets 10, 11.
Wd 10: Pets 12, 13,

Tr
Tr
TR
Tr
Tr
Tr
Tr
Tr

87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94

Tr
Tr
Tr
Tr
Tr
Tr
Tr

96 - Wd 12: Pets 1, 2.
97 - Wd 12: Pets 3, 4.
99 - Wd 12: Pets 5, 6, 7, 8.
100 - Wd 12: Pets 9, 11, 13.
101 - Wd 12: Pets 10, 12.
102 - Wd 12: Pets 14, 15, 16 •
103 - Wd 12: Pets 17, 18, 19 , 20

Tr
Tr
Tr
Tr
Tr
Tr

105 - Wd 13: Pets 1, 3.
106 , Tr 108 - Wd 13: Pets 2, 4,
107 - Wd 13: Pets 5, 7.
109 - Wd 13: Pets 9, 10, 11, 12.
111 - Wd 13: Pets 13, 14, 14A.
112 - Wd 13: Pets 15, 16.

Tr
Tr
Tr
Tr
Tr

114
115
116
117
119

WARD 11
83)
84)
85)
86)
87)
88)
89)
90)

-

Wd
Wd
Wd
Wd
Wd
Wd
Wd
Wd

11:
11:
11:
11:
11:
11:
11:
11:

Pet 1.
Pets 2, 4, 7.
Pets 3, 5.
Pets 6, 8, 9.
Pets 10, 11.
Pets 12, 13.
Pets 14, 15, 16.
Pets 17, 18, 19.

WARD 12
91)
92)
93)
94)
95)
96)
97)
WARD 13
98)
99)
100)
101)
102)
103)
WARD 14
104)
105)
106)
107)
108)

-

Wd
Wd
Wd
Wd
Wd

14:
14:
14:
14:
14:

Pets 1, 2.
Pets 3, 4, 8.
Pets 5, 6.
Pets 7, 9, 14, 15.
Pets 16, 17.
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WARD 14, Continued
109)
110)
111)
112)
113)
114)
115)

Tr 120 - Wd 14:
Tr 121.01 - Wd
Tr 121.02 - Wd
Tr 122 - Wd 14:
Tr 123 - Wd 14:
Tr 124 - Wd 14:
Tr 72 - Wd 14:
12, 14.

Pets 10, 11.
14: Pets 18, 18A, 19.
14: Pets 12, 13 (+13A in 1973, 1974).
Pets 20, 21.
Pets 22, 23, 24.
Pets 24A, 25, 26.
Pet 26A,; Wd 16: Pet 9: Wd 17: Pets

WARD 15
115)
117)
118)
119)
120)
121)
122)

Tr 1 - Wd 15: Pets 1, 2, 3, 4.
Tr 2, Tr 3, Tr 4, Tr 6.01 - Wd 15: Pets 5, 6, 7, 8,
9, 10, 11, 11A.
Tr 6.02, Tr 6.04 - Wd 15: Pets 12, 12A, 13, 14.
Tr 6.03, Tr 5.08, Tr 5.10 - Wd 15: Pets 13A, 18, 18A,
18B, 1 8 C , (+14C, 14D, and 18D in 1973 and 1974).
Tr 6.05, Tr 6.06 - Wd 15: Pets 14A , 14B, 15, 15A.
Tr 6.07 - Wd 15: Pets 16, 17, 17A, 17B.
Tr 6.09 - Wd 15: Pets 19, 19A.

WARD 16
123)
124)
125)
126)

Tr
Tr
Tr
Tr

125
126
127
128

-

Wd
Wd
Wd
Wd

16:
15:
16:
16:

Pets
Pets
Pets
Pets

1,
2,
4,
7,

1A.
3.
5, 6.
8.

WARD 17
127)
128)
129)
130)
131)

Tr 75.01, Tr 75.02 - Wd 17: Pets 9, 11, 13, 13A.
Tr 76.01 - Wd 17: Pets 18, 18A, 19,19A, 20, 21.
Tr 72.02 - Wd 17: Pets 15, 16, 17.
Tr 129, Tr 130, Tr 131 - Wd 17: Pets 1, 2, 3, 4,
5,6.
Tr 132 - Wd 17: Pets 7, 8, 10.

Maps used in generating these areal units derived from
the United States Bureau of the Census (1972) and the Depart
ment of Streets for the City of New Orleans.
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POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS FOUND TO BE ACTIVE IN RECENT
LOCAL ELECTIONS IN NEW ORLEANS
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

-

Alliance for Good Government (AGG)
American's Changing Society Democratic Association
Association of Independent Democrats (AID)
Black Organization for Leadership Development (BOLD)
Blacks United for Leadership League (BULL)
Black Women's Caucus
Black Youth for Progress (BYP)
Brothers Improvement Association
Central City Coalition for Urban Politics
Civic Independent Association

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

-

21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

-

Faith Beneficial Association
Ghetto Democrats
Greater Algiers Voters Education League (GAVEL)
Greater New Orleans AFL-CIO
Handicap Voters League
Independent Women's Association (IWO)
Louisiana Advancement Association
Louisiana Concerned Citizens Council (LCCC)
Mid-City Democrats (MCD)
New Breed Civic Association

31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

-

New Orleans Coalition (NOC)
New Orleans Public Housing Tenants Association
New Orleans Voters Association (NOVA)
New Orleans Voters League (NOVL)
New Orleans Young Democrats
Ninth Ward Citizens Voters League (NWCVL)
Orleans Parish Progressive Voters League (OPPVL)
Political Workers of America, Inc.
Regular Democratic Organization (RDO)
Seventh Ward Democratic Voters League

Community Organization of League (COOL)
Community Organization for Urban Politics (COUP)
Consolidated Independent Democrats of New Orleans
Cresent City Democratic Association (CCDA)
Cresent City Independent Voters League (CCIVL)
Daneel Street Democrats
Democratic Alliance of Louisiana
Democratic Beavers of America, Inc.
Development Association of Wards and Neighborhoods
(DAWN)
20 - Eighth Ward Political Group

41 - Southern Democratic Association
42 - Southern Organization for Unified Leadership

(SOUL)
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43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

-

Suburban Political and Social Club
State-Wide Voters League
Tough-Minded Independent Leadership Tribunal (TILT)
Treme Independent Political Society (TIPS)
United Black Brotherhood
United Brothers League
University of New Orleans Young Democrats (UNO-YD)
Uptown Democratic Association (UDA)

51 - Voters Improvement Through Progress
52 - West New Orleans Democratic Civic Association
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BASIC QUESTIONNAIRE FOR NEW ORLEANS ORGANIZATIONAL STUDY
Questionnaire for Organizational Leaders:
Q1

Let me begin with some general questions about your
organization.
come into being?
How did the ________
name of organization
INTERVIEWER:

PROBE DATE, POL SETTING/SOC ISSUES

Q2

What is the stated purpose of your organization?

Q3

What regularly scheduled meetings or events does your
organization have?

Q4

Does the organization have any other programs or on
going activities?

Q5

I realize that the
fluctuates during
approximately how
zation had during
or two?

Q7

Approximately how many members have been active in your
organization's meetings or activities in the last two
or three months?

Q8

Do the members of your organization tend to live in any
particular area of the city?

size of an organization often
and between elections.
On the average,
many active members has your organi
any given election in the past year

IF YES, GO TO Qll
IF NO, GO TO Q10
Q9

Could you pin down these areas for me, say in terms of
neighborhoods or precincts?
IF NO, GO TO Qll

Q10

So your membership tends to reside fairly evenly through
out the city?
IF YES, GO TO Qll
IF NO, RETURN TO Q10

Qll

Is your membership predominantly "white" or "black"?
IF WHITE, GO TO Q12
IF BLACK, GO TO Q13
268
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Q12

Approximately what percentage is white?
GO TO Q14

Q13

Approximately what percentage is black?

Q14

Would you say that the average member of your organi
zation has "completed grade school," "completed some
high school," "completed high school," or "attended
college"?

Q15

Q16

Would you say that the average member of your organi
zation is "upper class," "upper middle class," "middle
class," "working class," or "lower class," as these
terms are commonly used in New Orleans?
Do you see your organization as representing the in
terests of any particular segment of the New Orleans
population?
IF YES, ASK Q17
IF NO, GO TO Q18

Q17

Can you identify this segment for me in terms of
neighborhoods or even precincts?

Q18

Could you briefly describe for me the staff positions
of your organization?

Q19

Of your staff positions, approximately what percentage
are salaried?
IF SOME ARE SALARIED, ASK Q20 ■
IF NONE ARE SALARIED, GO TO Q21

Q20

Do any of the persons in these positions also hold jobs
with local or state government? Of these paid positions,
approximately what percentage are considered full-time?

Q21

What is the affiliation of your organization with the
national Democratic party?

Q22

Were any members of your organization delegates to the
national Democratic convention in either 1968 or 1972?

Q23

What is your current position in

Q24

How did you come to hold this position?
PROBE:

the organization?

HOW LONG POSITION HELD: APPOINTIVE VS. ELECTIVE
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Q25

What other occupational, professional, and/or advisory
positions do you hold?

Q26

What would you say is the prime factor prompting your
involvement in the organization?

Q27

Do any other factors prompting your involvement come
to mind?

Q28

What is your current age?

Q29

What is the highest level of formal education you have
completed?

Q30

To which kinds of these clubs or organizations are
you a member?
ASK FOR NAME OF EACH ORGANIZATION IN WHICH PARTICIPATION
IS INDICATED; IF N O N E , GO TO Q33

Q31

Do you hold an office or leadership position in any of
these organizations?

Q32

Concerning your participation in ________________ , how
often have you participated in its meetings or functions
in the last three months?
REPEAT FOR EACH ORGANIZATION IN WHICH PARTICIPATION IS
INDICATED; RETRIEVE CARD A
Let's turn to some recent elections in New Orleans.
In these elections, many organizations such as yours
endorsed and actively supported selected candidates.

Q33

Has your organization endorsed candidates in recent local
elections?
IF YES, ASK Q34
IF NO, GO TO Q52

Q34

What procedure has customarily been used to decide
which candidate the organization endorsed?
GIVE RESPONDENT CARD B. Here is a summary list of
candidates for office in selected recent, local elections.

Q35

In the 1972 Louisiana Supreme Court Justice first pri
mary, did your organization endorse Calogero, Ortique,
Redmann, or Sarpy?

Q36

In the run-off, did your organization endorse Calogero
or Sarpy?
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Q37

What were the key considerations in the decision to
endorse __________________ ?
REPEAT IF ENDORSEMENT CHANGED FROM PRIMARY TO RUN-OFF

Q38

In the 1973 Orleans Parish District Attorney first
primary, did your organization endorse Connick, Garrison,
Reese, or Scaccia?

Q39

In the run-off, did your organization endorse Connick
or Garrison?

Q40

What were the key considerations in the decision to en
dorse ________________ ?
REPEAT IF NECESSARY

Q41

In the 1973 Orleans Parish Civil Sheriff race, did
your organization endorse Jackson, Sargent, or Stire?

Q42

What were the key considerations in the decision to
endorse ___________________ ?

Q43

In the 1973 Orleans Parish Clerk of Criminal Court first
primary, did your organization endorse Bustamente,
Haggerty, or Lombard?

Q44

In the run-off, did your organization endorse Haggerty
or Lombard?

Q45

What were the key considerations in the decision to
endorse _______________ ?
REPEAT IF NECESSARY

Q46

In the 1974 Louisiana Supreme Court Justice first primary,
did your organization endorse Calogero, Cronvich, or
Garrison?

Q47

In the run-off, did your organization endorse Calogero
or Cronvich?

Q48

What were the key considerations in the decision to
endorse ____________________ ?
REPEAT IF NECESSARY

Q49

In the 1974 Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals first pri
mary, did your organization endorse Beer, Bossetta,
Grieshaber, or Reese?
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Q50

In the run-off, did your organization endorse Beer or
Bossetta?

Q51

What were the key considerations in the decision to
endorse
?
REPEAT IF NECESSARY: RETRIEVE CARD C FROM RESPONDENT

Q52

In your estimation, how does the average voter decide:
a) whether to vote, and b) for whom to vote?
a)
b)

Q53

What role does an organization such as yours play in
influencing whom the voters support?
IF ORGANIZATION DOES NOT ENDORSE, GO TO Q59

Q54

Why does your organization endorse candidates, i.e.,
what's in it for you?
GIVE RESPONDENT CARD C. Here is a list of campaign
activities often performed by organizations such as
yours in behalf of candidates they have endorsed.
These activities have been grouped into three categories.

Q55

What two or three activities best represent the primary
efforts of your organization in behalf of candidates
if endorsed?
IF A THRU G IS CITED, ASK Q56
IF H OR I IS CITED, AS Q57
IF NONE, GO TO Q58

Q56

Can you specify for me who was the target population of
these campaign activities— in terms of segments of the
electorate, neighborhoods, or even precincts?

Q57

What effect upon election outcomes do you feel that these
campaign activities by your organization had in these
areas of the city?
RETRIEVE CARD C FROM RESPONDENT
GIVE RESPONDENT CARD D. Campaign activities and dayto-day operations require some source of revenue.
Here
is a list of potential sources of revenue available to
organizations such as yours.

Q58

Were there other organizations with whom you were in
contact or worked?
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Q59

Which of these possible sources of income has your
organization used to raise money in the last year or
so?

Q60

Which of these sources would you say is your organi
zation's primary source of revenue?
RETRIEVE CARD D.
I am interested in learning more
about which organizations you feel exert the most
influence in affecting the vote in New Orleans.
Here
is a list of organizations which have made endorsements
in recent elections.
GIVE RESPONDENT CARD E

Q61

Which three or four groups are, in your opinion, the
most influential in affecting the vote in New Orleans?

Q61A

In which specific area, i.e., neighborhoods and pre
cincts, are these organizations influential?

Q62

In

what ways would you

say that they are influential?

Q63

Is
there any political organization whom you regard as
influential whose name is not on the list?
IF YES, SPECIFY

Q64

Are there any social, civic, religious, business or
other technically non-political organizations which
you feel have in some way played a politically signif
icant role in recent New Orleans elections?
IF YES, SPECIFY AND EXPLAIN

Q65

What would you say are the two or three most pressing
issues facing the community which your organization is
trying to do something about?
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CARD A
Here is a list of the types of clubs and organizations found
in the New Orleans community:
A - church connected groups (Knights of Columbus,
Brothers Zion, Knights of Peter Claver, etc.)
B - labor unions
C - veteran's associations
D - service organizations

(American Legion, VFW, etc.)
(Rotary, Lions, Kiwanis, etc.)

E - business or civic groups
JC's, etc.)

(YMBC, Chamber of Commerce,

F - civil rights organizations
SCLC, etc.)

(NAACP, Urban League,

G - PTA's
H - clubs for people of same.nationality or race
I - sports clubs or recreational groups
J - country clubs
K - youth groups

(Scouts, Big Brothers Program, etc.)

L - professional or occupational groups
Bar Association, etc.)

(AMA, Louisiana

M - political clubs or organizations
N - social clubs or groups, including Carnival krewes
0 - charity, health, or welfare organizations (Heart
Fund, Sickle Cell Anemia Foundation, March of
Dimes, Christian Relief Fund, etc.)
P - neighborhood improvement associations (Gentilly
Neighborhood Association, Lower Ninth Ward Civic
Association, Audubon Civic Association, etc.)
Q - other (please specify)
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CARD B
Candidates for local office in selected recent elections.
1972

1973

1973

Louisiana Supreme Court Justice

(1st District) race:

first primary

second primary

Pascal Calogero
Revius Ortique
William Redmann
Leon Sarpy

Pascal Calogero
Leon Sarpy

Orleans Parish District Attory race:
first primary

second primary

Harry Connick
Jim Garrison
George Reese
Ross T. Scaccia

Harry Connick
Jim Garrison

Orleans Parish Civil Sheriff race:
first primary

second

primary

Johnny Jackson, Sr.
Alvin J. Sargent
Milton A. Stire
1973

1974

1974

Orleans Parish Clerk of Criminal Court race:
first primary

second

primary

Herman Bustamente
Daniel Haggerty
Edwin Lombard

Daniel Haggerty
Edwin Lombard

Louisiana Supreme Court Justice

(1st District) race:

first primary

second

primary

Pascal Calogero
Alwynn Cronvich
Jim Garrison

Pascal
Alwynn

Calogero
Cronvich

Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals Judgeship race:
first primary

second

primary

Peter Beer
Joseph Bossetta
Dominic Grieshaber
Geroge Reese

Peter Beer
Joseph Bossetta
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CARD -C
Here is a list of campaign activities often performed by
organizations such as yours in behalf of endorsed candidates.
A - hold or sponsor campaign rallies, picnics, or other
get-togethers in behalf of endorsed candidates
B - place ads in newsletters or local newspapers en
dorsing selected candidates
C - place or distribute campaign posters
D - distribute sample ballots endorsing selected candi
dates
E - conduct house-to-house or telephone canvassing
F - place ads on radio or TV endorsing selected
candidates
G - provide transportation to polls for voters
H - contact leaders of other political, social, civic,
or religious groups in behalf of endorsed candidates
I - work through other political, social, civic, or
religious groups in behalf of endorsed candidates
J - contribute money to the campaign funds of selected
candidates
K - other (please specify)
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CARD D
Here is a list of potential sources of revenue often relied
upon by organizations such as yours:
A - membership dues
B - fund-raising events (dinners, fairs, picnics, dances,
and other events sponsored by organization)
C

- contributions

from candidates for office

D

- revenue generating

E

- contributions

from individuals

F

- contributions

from groups and businesses

property owned by organization

G - other (please specify)
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CARD F
Here is a list of organizations that have endorsed candidates
in recent New Orleans elections:
A - AFL-CIO
B - Alliance for Good Government

(AGG)

C - Association of Independent Democrats

(AID)

D - Black Organization for Leadership Development

(BOLD)

E - Community Organization for Unified Leadership

(COUP)

F - Crescent City Democratic Association

(CCDA)

G - Crescent City Independent Voters League

(CCIVL)

H - Criminal Courts Bar Association
I - Development Association of Wards and Neighborhoods
(DAWN)
J - Independent Women's Organization (IWO)
K - Mid-City Democrats

(MCD)

L - New Orleans Bar Association
M - New Orleans Coalition

(NOC)

N - New Orleans Voters Association (NOVA)
O - New Orleans Young Democrats
P - Ninth Ward Citizens Voters League

(NWCVL)

Q - Orleans Parish Progressive Voters League
R - Regular Democratic Organization

(OPPVL)

(RDO)

S - Southern Organization for Unified Leadership

(SOUL)

T - Tough-Minded Independent Leadership Tribunal

(TILT)

U - Treme Independent Political Society

(TIPS)

V - University of New Orleans Young Democrats
X - Uptown Democratic Association
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Questionnaire for Candidates from Selected Elections;
The following questions are in reference to your bid for
office in the
race.
Q1

What considerations prompted you to run for this office?

Q2

In your estimation, how does the average individual
decide
a)

whether to vote, and

b) for whom to vote?

a)
b)
Q3

What has been the role of political organizations in in
fluencing which candidates the voters have supported in
recent local elections?

Q4

From which political organizations did you or your staff
actively seek support?

Q5

Which portions of the New Orleans electorate would you
say provided you with the strongest support?
INTERVIEWER:
PROBE AREAS OF SUPPORT.

Q5A In what way, if any, do you feel that political organi
zations were a factor in the outcome of the
race?
INTERVIEWER:
PROBE AREAS OF OPERATION.
Q6

Card A contains a list of political organizations which
have endorsed candidates in recent elections.
Of the
organizations on the list, which three or four would you
say are the most influential politically?

Q6A In what areas of the city are these
zations influential?

(top 3 or 4)

organi

Q7

In what way are these organizations influential?

Q8

Is there any political organization whom you regard as
influential whose name is not on the list?
If so, please
indicate its name and specify its importance.

Q9

What "non-politiaal" organizations, i.e., social, civic,
religious, business, etc., organizations, do you feel
played a political significant role in the __________ race?
Please explain your answer.
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CARD A
Here is a list of organizations that have endorsed candidates
in recent New Orleans elections:
A - AFL-CIO
B - Alliance for Good Government

(AGG)

C - Association of Independent Democrats

(AID)

D - Black Organization for Leadership Development

(BOLD)

E - Community Organization for Unified Leadership

(COUP)

F - Crescent City Democratic Association

(CCDA)

G - Crescent City Independent Voters League

(CCIVL)

H - Criminal Courts Bar Association
I - Development Association of Wards and Neighborhoods
(DAWN)
J - Independent Women's Organization
K - Mid-City Democrats

(IWO)

(MCD)

L - New Orleans Bar Association
M - New Orleans Coalition (NOC)
N - New Orleans Voters Association

(NOVA)

0 - New Orleans Young Democrats
P - Ninth Ward Citizens Voters League

(NWCVL)

Q - Orleans Parish Progressive Voters League
R - Regular Democratic Organization

(OPPVL)

(RDO)

S - Southern Organization for Unified Leadership (SOUL)
T - Tough-Minded Independent Leadership Tribunal
U - Treme Independent Political Society (TIPS)
V - University of New Orleans Young Democrats
X - Uptown Democratic Association

(TILT)

APPENDIX 5

INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED FOR NEW ORLEANS ORGANIZATIONAL STUDY
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INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED FOR NEW ORLEANS ORGANIZATIONAL STUDY
Candidates for O f f i c e :
Peter H. Beer, candidate, Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., candidate, Louisiana Supreme
Court Justice, 1972 and 1974
Harry Connick, candidate, Orleans Parish District Attorney
Dominic C. Grieshaber, candidate, Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals
Daniel B. Haggerty, incumbent, Orleans Parish Clerk of
Criminal Court
Johnny Jackson, Sr., candidate, Orleans Parish Civil
Sheriff
Edwin Lombard, candidate, Orleans Parish Clerk of Criminal
Court
Revius O. Ortique, Jr., candidate, Louisiana Supreme Court
Justice, 1972
George W. Reese, candidate, Orleans Parish District
Attorney and Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
Leon Sarpy, candidate, Louisiana Supreme Court Justice,
1972
Milton A. Stire, incumbent, Orleans Parish Civil Sheriff
Organizational L e a d e r s ;
Sandra Anderson, secretary to Lindsey Williams, president
of Greater N e w Orleans AFL-CIO
Richard Boseman, vice-president of Ninth Ward Citizens
Voters League (NWCVL)
John Cassreino, president of Crescent City Democratic
Association (CCDA)
Lawrence A. Comiskey, Jr., president of Mid-City Democrats
(MCD)
Joseph Cangemelli, president of Regular Democratic Organi
zation (RDO)
Waifred Daliet, president of Crescent City Independent
Voters League (CCIVL)
Rev. A.L. Davis, president of Orleans Parish Progressive
Voters League (OPPVL)
Bobby Dupont, president of New Orleans Coalition (NOC)
Emilo Dupre, president of Community Organization for Urban
Politics (COUP)
Gale Gagliano, president of Independent Women's Organi
zation (IWO)
Donald A. Hoffman, president of Alliance for Good Govern
ment (AGG)
Rev. Johnny Jackson, S r., president of Development Assoc
iation of Wards and Neighborhoods (DAWN)
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Darleen Jacobs, president of Association of Independent
Democrats (AID)
Sen. Nat Kiefer, president of New Orleans Voters Associa
tion (NOVA)
Susan Magee, president of New Orleans League of Women
Voters
David Quidd, president of University of New Orleans Young
Democrats (UNO-YD)
Norman Smith, vice-president of Treme Improvement Polit
ical Society (TIPS)
Paul Valteau, president of Black Organization for Leader
ship Development (BOLD)
Reference Persons:
James Chubbuck, director, Institute of Politics, Loyola
University of New Orleans
James K. Glassman, editor, Figaro, New Orleans
Rosemary James, political analyst, WWL TV, New Orleans
Marcel Trudeau, director, New Orleans Chapter of the
Urban League
Joe Walker, research specialist, Walker Associates, New
Orleans.
Freddie Warren, attorney and past assistant district
attorney, New Orleans
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